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**THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF REGIONALISM: REGIONAL
INTEGRATION ARRANGEMENTS AND AFRICA'S DEVELOPMENT—
COMESA IN A COMPARATIVE CONTEXT.**

**By
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**A Thesis
Submitted to the Faculty of Graduate Studies and Research
Through the Department of Political Science
In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for
The Degree of Master of Arts at the
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ABSTRACT

Since the end of the Cold War era in the 1990s and the subsequent intensification of the globalization phenomenon, regionalism has become an important development strategy for both the developing and the developed countries. This thesis adopts a comparative approach to examine the role of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) in the promotion of socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa. The thesis begins by providing a theoretical background to the concept of regionalism. It then traces the emergence of regionalism within the political economy of the international system, beginning from the era of mercantilism to the era of globalization. It then provides a critical overview of the European Union (the EU), the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) and analyses the achievements of these regional integration arrangements in so far as meeting the socio-economic and political development needs of their respective regions is concerned and builds the framework within which COMESA is compared vis-à-vis these regional integration arrangements. Based on the outcome of this comparative analysis and the broader literature on regionalism, the thesis identifies some of COMESA's main challenges and makes some recommendations on how COMESA could overcome these challenges so as to improve its prospects for playing a more effective development role for the Southern and Eastern Africa region. Finally, the thesis concludes that although COMESA's gains from regionalism so far remain minimal— compared to those of the other regional integration arrangements in this study—it remains a better vehicle for the development of Eastern and Southern Africa—more so, in this era of post-Cold War regionalism and globalization.

DEDICATION: To My Mom, Alice Monchari and Dad, Paul Monyoncho.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS:

- 1. ACP:** African Caribbean Pacific
- 2. AMU:** Arab Maghreb Union.
- 3. APEC:** Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
- 4. ASEAN:** Association of South East Asian Nations
- 5. EAC:** East African Community
- 6. ECCAS:** Economic Community of Central African States
- 7. CEAO:** West African Economic Community
- 8. COMESA:** Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
- 9. ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States
- 10. EU:** European Union
- 11. ECOWAS:** Economic Community of West African States
- 12. GATT:** General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
- 13. IGAD:** Intergovernmental Authority on Development
- 14. LAFTA:** Latin American Free Trade Agreement
- 15. LPA:** Lagos Plan of Action
- 16. MERCOSUR:** Common Market of the Southern Cone
- 17. MWENGO:** Mwelekeo Wa NGO
- 18. NAFTA:** North American Free Trade Agreement
- 19. NEPAD:** New Partnership for Africa's Development
- 20. PTA:** Preferential Trade Area
- 21. SADCC:** Southern Africa Development Coordination Conference
- 22. SADC:** Southern Africa Development Community
- 23. SEATINI:** Southern and Eastern African Trade Information and Negotiations Institute
- 24. TRIPS:** Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
- 24. UDEAC:** West African Customs Union
- 25. UNECA (ECA):** Economic Commission for Africa
- 26. WTO:** World Trade Organization.

Background

Regionalism is increasingly becoming a major force in world politics¹. Since the end of the Cold War, the major economic regions of the world—i.e. the mega-economies of North America and Europe and the emerging economies of East Asia—have given regionalism a prominent seat in their body-politic in order to accomplish two related objectives: first, so that they may be in a better position to mitigate the uncertainties of globalization and second, so that they may be in a better position to consolidate new socio-economic and political gains from an increasingly globalizing world².

If these three mega-economic regions of the world have adopted regionalism as one of the main strategies through which to wither the vagaries of globalization, the less-powerful economic regions of the world—i.e. Latin America, the Caribbean, South East Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa—have similarly taken a keen interest in regionalism as a development strategy in this era of globalization. The renewed interest in regionalism in the developing world is clearly manifested by the formation of new regional integration arrangements or the rekindled commitment to already existing regional integration arrangements in these parts of the world. Like the powerful economies of the North, the less powerful economies of the South have opted for regionalism as a strategy through which they hope to, among other things: cope with the uncertainties of globalization, stem their continued marginalization from the world economy and finally, develop a development strategy that will see them gainfully integrate into the emerging global economy³.

Existing, newly-formed or reinvigorated regional integration arrangements such as the Association of South East Asian Nations (henceforth, ASEAN), the European Union (henceforth, the EU), the Common Market of the Southern Cone (henceforth, MERCOSUR), the North American Free Trade Agreement (henceforth, NAFTA), and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (henceforth, COMESA) are some of the organizational vehicles through which states in different regions of the world are pursuing the strategy of regionalism in the post Cold War era. Increasingly, regional integration arrangements are becoming a prominent feature in the post Cold War international political system. While the international political system has in the past

undergone transformation due to such forces as imperialism, colonialism and the politics of the Cold War among others, globalization is currently the main transformative force in the international political arena⁴. Every time each of these global transformative forces came to dominate the international political system, they prompted different and unique strategic responses and reactions from the key political actors and or players in the international system. For example, imperialism and colonialism were marked by an expansionist strategy that led to the era of empire building via overseas territorial acquisitions by the leading European imperial and colonial powers⁵. The resistance and the eventual attainment of independence also marked this global transformative period by those who were under imperial or colonial domination⁶. As the main transformative force in international politics since the late 1940s to the early 1990s, super-power rivalry between the US and the USSR marked the Cold War era⁷. Some of the political strategies adopted by the superpowers during the Cold War era period included: building spheres of influence in different regions of the world via satellite states, building alliances with ideologically similar-minded political actors or seeking to win over political allies along ideological lines. Similarly, during this period, some of the less powerful political actors—especially the newly independent states in Africa, Latin America and Asia—chose to cope with the uncertainties of the Cold War era by declaring themselves “non-aligned” to neither the Western Bloc nor the Eastern bloc⁸.

With the end of the Cold War era in the early 1990s, globalization rose in prominence and currently, it is the main transformative agent in the international political system. Globalization is rapidly altering the hitherto existing Cold War international socio-economic and political order. Due to the ubiquitous nature of globalization and due to its unpredictable impact in global affairs, nation-states (the principal actors in the international political system since the peace of Westphalia in 1648) are increasingly finding it imperative to come up with new ways of both maintaining political stability and ensuring the socio-economic development of their citizenry. Regionalism has become one of the main strategies through which different political actors, particularly nation-states, are responding to and or coping with the transformative forces of globalization. Given its rising prominence in world politics, regionalism is now regarded as an important strategy in the socio-economic and political development efforts of both the North and the South.

What is more, an increasing number of scholars are now acknowledging that given the uncertainties of the current era of globalization, regionalism is an important factor in the development strategies of both the developing and the developed countries⁹.

In fact, linking the concept of regionalism to development has become so important in this era that scholars like John Sloan would prefer to aptly refer to regionalism as “developmental regionalism”¹⁰. Having taken cognizance of the multifaceted nature of globalization and the broad range of issues that it encompasses, these scholars have similarly broadened the mandate of regionalism. Hence, according to Sloan, unlike the past instances of regionalism that mostly limited themselves to economic concerns, under globalization, the current revival of regionalism is not only about economic growth (a position supported in this thesis) but rather a broader concept that encompasses the social and political dimensions of development as well¹¹. Sloan further contends that limiting regionalism to economic issues—as has been mainly the case in past studies on regionalism—is imprecise, static and irrelevant to the broader developmental spectrum within which regionalism currently operates¹².

However, it must be noted that while regionalism has been widely embraced as one of the most viable post Cold War development strategies, its success as a tool for development has been uneven. For example, while the developmental gains of regionalism have been impressive in Europe, fairly successful in North America and increasingly promising in both South East Asia and Latin America, the same cannot be said about the gains of developmental regionalism in Africa where so far, such gains remain minimal¹³. This thesis seeks both to identify some of the main barriers to successful developmental regionalism in Africa and to make some recommendations on how these barriers could be overcome so as to make regionalism a more effective development strategy in Africa. Hence, despite the minimal gains that have so far accrued from regionalism in Africa, in this thesis, while paying special attention to the case of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), I argue that regional integration arrangements still offer one of the most viable development strategies through which the African continent can improve its socio-economic and political conditions. It is my contention that successful developmental regionalism in Africa will propel the continent into a position where it will be able to generate the resources needed to

effectively deal with its development challenges such as the elimination of absolute poverty, the combating and or treatment of such preventable and treatable diseases like diarrhoea and malaria and the improvement of basic survival skills through the provision of basic education to all¹⁴.

In defending regionalism as a viable development strategy for Africa, I am aware of the fact that a number of contentious issues arise in so far as the efficacy of regionalism as a paradigm for Africa's development is concerned¹⁵. These issues are even more poignant, especially given the fact that the numerous regional integration arrangements that have existed in the continent since the 1960s have so far only made a miniscule contribution towards meeting Africa's development needs¹⁶. However, it is my strong believe that African policy-makers and other scholars of African development are now in a much better position than they were in the past both to analyse the limitations of past regional integration arrangements in Africa and to formulate new and more appropriate regional integration strategies that will be relevant to Africa's development efforts¹⁷. In this thesis, I seek to make a contribution to this end. Additionally, it is fair to say that given the failure of past development theories (I discuss some of these theories in detail below) and the adoption of regionalism as a way of promoting the socio-economic and political well-being of people in different regions of the world (including the developed world), the African continent has fewer options to development that can match the immense potential of regionalism as a development strategy for Africa¹⁸. What is more, for Africa—just like it is the case for the other regions of the world—regionalism carries with it the dual advantage of both tempering the negative forces of globalization on the continent while at the same time, acting as a medium through which Africa may pursue its development aspirations.

Regionalism offers better prospects of bringing about political stability as well as setting in place the necessary socio-economic structures capable of bringing about intra-regional and trans-regional development in Africa¹⁹. However, it must be noted that regionalism can only bring about socio-economic and political development to the African continent if and only if the new (or the re-invigorated) regional integration arrangements seek to overcome the internal and the external obstacles to successful

regionalism in Africa at the following four levels: the commitment level, the strategic level, the sustainability level and the geopolitical level.

First, at the commitment level, the main political actors (in this case, the African political leaders) must be willing to make some concrete political commitment to the success of their respective regional integration arrangements, even if this means ceding part of their juridical sovereignty in order to achieve this goal²⁰. In the past, lack of political will has been one of the major hindrances to successful regionalism in Africa²¹. However, I believe that this obstacle can be overcome if African leaders learn to appreciate the fact that successful regionalism in other parts of the world has only occurred partly because of the firm political commitment to regional integration arrangements by the leaders in these parts of the world²².

Second, at the strategic level, regional integration arrangements in Africa must seek to develop the necessary infrastructure that will enable them gain the skills needed (both at the organizational and national levels) to face up to the present socio-economic and political development challenges in the continent²³. It must be noted that the inability to establish, fund or staff regional integration arrangements in Africa with high-calibre personnel (capable of effectively and efficiently running the day to day affairs of regional initiatives in Africa) has been one of the main obstacles to successful regionalism in the continent²⁴. At the national level, it is instructive to point out that the individual countries within the different regional integration arrangements have not put in place sufficient socio-economic and political infrastructure for successful regionalism to take place²⁵. These obstacles must be overcome first before successful, development-oriented regionalism can occur in Africa.

Third, African countries must realize that since they first got their independence in the 1960s and set-up regional integration arrangements as a means to harnessing their wealth and promoting development, their efforts have been, to say the least, less rewarding. One of the explanations for this is that for the most part, these regional integration arrangements were nothing more than non-sustainable initiatives, backed by high sounding political statements that had little or no chance of succeeding. A cursory look at the current regional integration arrangements in Africa reveals that most of them are still heavy on grand rhetoric and less committed to a light, clear-focused agenda that

will ensure both their sustainability and growth²⁶. In this thesis it is my contention that if regionalism is to succeed in Africa, then it must start small, focus on a few socio-economic and political sectors (such as the promotion of a culture of good governance, investment in health and education, investment in transport and telecommunication services and the relaxation or reduction of barriers to intra-regional economic growth) that are crucial to the initial stages of regionalism before expanding out. If this approach is not adopted, regional integration arrangements are likely to continue being photo-ops for African leaders with no real chance of promoting socio-economic and political development in Africa. What is more, African countries will continue becoming less and less competitive in the global economy and therefore incapable of seizing the new socio-economic opportunities that have emerged under globalization²⁷.

Fourth and finally, the other powerful regional integration arrangements must seek to be altruistic and therefore willing to both help and allow fragile regional integration arrangements like COMESA take root. Regional integration arrangements in Africa, and indeed those in other parts of the third world, must collectively lobby against such practises like the EU's agricultural policies that make it difficult for them to effectively compete in those areas where they possess the so-called comparative advantage²⁸. What is more, African leaders must come to terms with the fact that with the end of the Cold War, their ability to play both the West and the East for political gain has been severely diminished. Therefore, they must seek to make regionalism work, since it is the only effective strategy through which the weak African states can still remain geopolitically relevant in the post Cold War era and therefore ensure their political survival²⁹.

From the foregoing, it can be clearly seen that before COMESA, and indeed the other regional integration arrangements in Africa, can start playing a meaningful development role in Eastern and Southern Africa, it must take a two-pronged approach. First, it must seek to overcome the internal and external obstacles to developmental regionalism identified at the above given levels. Then second, it must seek to promote the internal and external development opportunities made possible under globalization. But how can COMESA overcome these internal and external obstacles to successful developmental regionalism and in what ways can it promote the internal and external opportunities that developmental regionalism has to offer in a highly globalizing world?

In this thesis, I seek to offer some insights into how COMESA could attain these two seemingly diametrically opposed goals.

Objectives and Methodology of this study

Objectives

This study focuses on the EU, NAFTA, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and COMESA and seeks both to establish the socio-economic and political trends and characteristics of successful regional integration arrangements and, based on these trends and characteristics, draw generalizations on the efficacy of regionalism—in this case COMESA—as a strategy that is best suited to meeting Africa’s socio-economic and political development needs, especially in this era of globalization. In order to realize these objectives, the study critically examines and analyses the following issues:

- The Challenges of development in Africa and some of the theoretical and political explanations and solutions that have been offered to address the issue of Africa’s socio-economic and political under-development, particularly since the 1950s to the present.
- The reasons for the failure of some of the ‘theoretical and political development doses’ administered to Africa in the first phase (1950s to 1980s) and the second phase (1980s to the 1990s) of attempts at Africa’s development.
- The role of regional integration arrangements as a paradigm for Africa’s development in this era of globalization.
- The internal and external context of COMESA’s dual approach to development in Eastern and Southern Africa: First, the challenges that COMESA must overcome so as to evolve into an effective regional integration arrangement and second, the opportunities that it must seize so as to increase its prospects of offering an effective strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa’s socio-economic and political development aspirations.

Methodology

This is a qualitative study that is based on an in-depth analysis of COMESA as well as a comparative analysis of COMESA and other regional integration arrangements in Europe (the EU), in South East Asia (ASEAN), in North America (NAFTA) and in Latin America (MERCOSUR). Owing to resource and other logistical constraints, I could not travel to the field to conduct interviews, surveys and or make personal observations on the functioning of regional integration arrangements in Africa and the other regions—Europe, Asia, Latin America and North America—that I have analyzed in the study. However, through a careful analysis of the secondary data that included scholarly texts and other related materials like journals, published government statistics and institutional databases of the regional initiatives in this study as well as the institutional databases of other reputable organizations, I was able to establish fairly predictable socio-economic and political trends and patterns of countries that are likely to be successful at developmental regionalism. Based on these trends and patterns, I was able to analyse the efficacy of regionalism in COMESA and therefore draw general conclusions on why, compared to other development strategies of the past and in spite of its currently limited gains, regionalism offers better prospects for Africa's development.

For comparative purposes, and so as to develop a clear picture of the status of COMESA vis-à-vis other regional integration arrangements, four regional organizations—each from a different geographic region of the world—are incorporated into this study. These regional organizations are: the European Union (the EU) for the European region, the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) for Latin America, the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) for Asia and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) for North America. These regional organizations represent both the developed (the EU and NAFTA) and the developing (ASEAN and MERCOSUR) world and are therefore likely to offer a more balanced view on the general trends and patterns of successful developmental regionalism. Since regional integration arrangements in Africa are still locked up in the battle of confronting political, economic and institutional difficulties, I believe that a comparative analysis of regional integration arrangements in Europe, Asia, North America and Latin America will offer COMESA vital lessons on how to both confront and overcome or reduce the degree

of some of the institutional, political and economic obstacles that have thus far hindered COMESA's development efforts in Eastern and Southern Africa.

In this study, I used both the interpretive and the critical approaches to conduct a comparative analysis of COMESA and the other regional integration arrangements identified above³⁰. I adopted these approaches for two main reasons. First, since COMESA, and by extension all the other regional integration arrangements in this study, is in the constant process of becoming, the interpretive approach—with its clear emphasis on the fact that human beings are always in a process of becoming and that this process of becoming entails being influenced by how they see themselves, by how others see them and by what they want to become—offers an apt portrayal of some of the assumptions made in this study in so far as developmental regionalism in Africa is concerned³¹. One of these assumptions is that although the development gains from COMESA are currently minimal, over time and with the right set of policies choices and goals, COMESA will evolve into an effective tool for socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Second, since it places an obligatory role on social scientists that requires them to act as advocates of change and social justice to all in society, the critical approach is important in this study, especially given the fact that the current socio-economic and political development status quo in Africa cannot be sustained³². The current status quo in Africa is one of intolerable socio-economic deprivation anchored on non-viable political systems and practices³³. Indeed, owing to this status quo, there is an urgent need for political scientists to candidly confront both the internal and the external causes of socio-economic and political under-development in Africa through illuminating research that highlights the crisis of development in Africa under the current status quo and how this crisis could be resolved³⁴. This candour requires that political scientists be forthright in condemning certain values like corruption (manifested through economic mismanagement), political repression and violence or unfair trade practices—all of which have made development in Africa almost impossible—while extolling others, such as democracy, the rule of law and fair trade practices that are urgently needed to make development in Africa possible³⁵.

Based on the interpretive and the critical approaches, I make two key arguments in this thesis. First, at the interpretive approach level, I argue that although COMESA has not so far made substantial inroads into meeting the socio-economic and development needs of the Eastern and Southern Africa region, it would be improper to dismiss its potential in meeting these needs. This is because COMESA is still in the process of becoming and this process may as well be a long one. However, as long as COMESA is willing to take stock of its performance (something to which it seems to be currently resolutely committed to)³⁶ and as long as it is willing to capitalize on its gains, learn from its failures and reasonably emulate the successes of other regional integration arrangements, then there can be no denying the fact that it stands a better chance of evolving into a formidable development avenue for Eastern and Southern Africa.

Second, at the critical approach level, I argue that poor political leadership in Africa, wrong resource allocation priorities at the national socio-economic level and unfair economic and political practices at the international level—particularly by the rich Northern countries—are some of the main reasons that explain the dismal performance of regional integration arrangements in Africa. Based on this argument, I contend that COMESA, and indeed other regional integration arrangements in Africa, can only become effective development models if and only if they abandon wrong values (e.g. a staunch commitment to juridical sovereignty, political repression and economic mismanagement) that have impeded regionalism in Africa since the 1960s and embrace correct values (like the willingness to cede some of their juridical sovereignty, the promotion of democratic governance and commitment to sound economic management) that are needed for successful developmental regionalism to take place³⁷. Similarly, I argue that COMESA will improve its socio-economic and political development record if and only if the other powerful international players abandon the pursuit of anti-regionalism values, like subsidies to their farmers and other unfair economic and political practices, and instead embrace values that will assure their own advancement while at the same time giving other less powerful players like COMESA some room to thrive³⁸.

--Chapter One--

(i) Introduction

An extensive amount of literature has been written concerning development in the third world³⁹. The bulk of this literature generally dwells on two related issues: the crisis of third world development and the factors causing this crisis⁴⁰. The literature is replete with both the explanations on the causes of third world under-development and the possible diagnosis to this under-development⁴¹. While “development” and “third world country” remain contested concepts with no precise or concise definitions, there exists a general consensus on some of the features and characteristics that distinguish the third world (also known as the developing world) from the first world (also known as the developed world). Here, I adopt Handelman’s categorization of these features and characteristics and seek to discuss the concept of developmental regionalism in Sub-Saharan Africa within the following three distinguishing categories of under-development: Economic Underdevelopment, Social Underdevelopment and Political Underdevelopment⁴². Together, these features and characteristics make up what can be referred to as ‘the commonalities of third world under-development’ and help in identifying some of the reasons why the gains from developmental regionalism remain low in Africa compared to other regions of the world⁴³.

A number of development theories and strategies have been formulated to address the issue of third-world under-development. However, these theories have so far failed to adequately address the question of under-development in the third world. Given the failures of these past theories, perhaps it is about time that a new strategy and approach to confronting third world under-development were adopted. This thesis focuses on under-development in the African continent and seeks to examine the role of regionalism in both overcoming the challenges of and improving the prospects for development in Africa. In this thesis, I examine the case of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) and argue that, compared to the different theories of development or the different structural reform approaches that have so far failed to effectively address Africa’s crisis of development, regional integration among the countries in this regional

initiative offers a better strategic approach to development in Eastern and Southern Africa⁴⁴.

Regionalism (in this case, as envisaged in COMESA) is a better strategy for development in Eastern and Southern Africa in particular and to Africa in general because of its capacity to directly and locally intervene in the development process at both the political and the socio-economic level⁴⁵. First, at the political level, unlike modernization theories which are generally seen as a form of external ideological imposition on the African continent, regional integration arrangements are generally seen as decidedly home-grown political initiatives among independent African states out to improve the socio-economic and political conditions of their people⁴⁶. What is more, unlike modernization theories, regional integration arrangements do not normally carry the overtly condescending message of “us, the modern and developed west from whom you must learn versus you, the traditional and under-developed African continent who had better learn from us or else.....” that is a central plank of the modernization theory. On the contrary, COMESA—just like the other regional initiatives in other regions of the world—is a product of political negotiation and compromise among a group of willing and equal political actors—in this case those independent states in Eastern and Southern Africa—who have joined this regional initiative.

As a product of negotiation and compromise, COMESA stands a better chance of nurturing a culture of political dialogue and confidence building in the Eastern and Southern region of Africa. A culture of political dialogue and confidence building is particularly crucial for Africa where political conflict continues to hamper the prospects of sustained development⁴⁷. Therefore, regional integration arrangements are one of the possible avenues through which political stability could both be established and maintained on the African continent. It is not difficult to determine that the constant instances of political conflict that have dogged the African continent over the last four and a half decades have had a devastating impact on the prospects of development in the continent⁴⁸. For example, as a result of these conflicts, vital human and material resources have been wasted in wanton acts of destruction that have turned some countries in Africa into socio-economic and political wastelands, despite the fact that some of these countries are endowed with immense natural wealth⁴⁹. The current political conflict in the great

lakes region among the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Rwanda and the accompanying socio-economic and political misery that this conflict has visited on the peoples of these countries is a prime example of the negative impact of political conflict on Africa's development⁵⁰.

Although the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda and Rwanda are all members of COMESA, they have intermittently engaged in acts of political conflict since the horrors of the genocide in Rwanda hit the great lakes region in 1994. However, the fact that these COMESA members are locked up in political conflict should not be construed as a failure of regional integration in Africa. On the contrary, this should be construed as part of the institutional limitations that COMESA must overcome before it can broaden its role in the development of Eastern and Southern Africa. What is more, the continuing conflict among some COMESA member-states in the great lakes region is a clear indication that regional integration arrangements in Africa have not yet developed the necessary socio-economic and political mechanisms to effectively deal with political conflict among their member states. The foregoing contention is supported by the existence of compelling evidence in the literature that in other regions—such as the EU in Europe and MERCOSUR in Latin America—where such mechanisms have been developed, regional integration arrangements have succeeded in securing the necessary political stability needed for sustainable development⁵¹. It is encouraging to note that there are clear indications that COMESA is striving to establish these mechanisms⁵². Therefore, it is not far-fetched to say that once these mechanisms have been established, COMESA will acquire the capability needed to secure the much needed political stability that is crucial for sustained development in this region of the world.

Second, at the socio-economic level, regional integration arrangements are an important tool for development since, unlike the dependency theories that advocate for the development of Sub-Saharan Africa outside the mainstream global economy, their development agenda is formulated within the context of improving their over socio-economic development within the global economy⁵³. Furthermore, unlike the arrogant, “one-size-fits-all” prescriptive development approach advocated for by structural-institutional reformists, regionalism—as already noted above—advocates for negotiation and compromise as opposed to prescription and order-taking as the basis upon which

sustainable development is built. Therefore, since COMESA's approach to the development of Eastern and Southern Africa is based on negotiation and compromise, it is likely to promote a better understanding of the socio-economic and political development challenges in this region through such cooperative efforts like the pooling of knowledge, experience and resources⁵⁴. I will discuss the merits of regionalism as a development strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa in detail in the subsequent chapters of this thesis. In the meantime, let us examine some of the leading development theories before embarking on a substantive analysis of the role of regionalism in Africa's development within the framework of these theories.

While most of the development challenges currently confronting most African countries can be traced back to the eras of imperialism and colonialism, the literature on both the causes of Africa's under-development and the suggestions of the possible solutions to this under-development is relatively new (dating mainly from the 1950s) in the political economy of international development. Here, I divide this literature into the following three main chronological phases: the theoretical-developmentalism phase, marked by various theories of development; the structural-institutional reform phase, marked by the structural adjustment programs; and the strategic-regionalism phase, marked by the rise of regional integration arrangements. I examine these phases in turn.

(ii) The Theoretical-developmentalism Phase

The theoretical-developmentalism phase was prominent from the 1950s to the late 1970s⁵⁵. This phase was marked by a number of competing theoretical explanations and suggestions on the causes of and the possible solutions to third-world under-development⁵⁶. I do not intend to delve into a detailed analysis of these theories here. However, since the application of most of these theories largely failed to bring about development in Africa, a brief synopsis stating what kind of development strategy they stood for, how they failed to bring about the desired development and why there exists a need to critique them within a new strategy of development (in this case regionalism), is in order. Different scholars have grouped the development theories into various conceptual categories⁵⁷. Here, I discuss them within two broad categories: Modernization theories and the Dependency theories.

- **Modernization theories**

The concept of a traditional society is central to this school of thought⁵⁸. According to modernization theorists, the essence of a traditional society is that it is stagnant and unchanging⁵⁹. It is this stagnant and unchanging nature of the traditional society setting that is inimical to development. The following are some of the hallmarks of a traditional society: people lead fairly routine lives, they do not strive after profit in their daily work but for subsistence, they are not innovative and finally, people make no attempts to better their lot⁶⁰. Since the modernization theorists explain socio-economic and political development in terms of the processes and institutional changes that society undergoes—in this case, from the traditional society to the modern society—they argue that no development can occur in the stagnant and unchanging world that is the traditional society⁶¹. The modernization theorists would characterise most of the Sub-Saharan African countries as being traditional. Therefore, according to modernization theorists, the biggest challenge that must be overcome before development can take place in Sub-Saharan Africa is the breaking up of the firmly entrenched traditional mind-set among the states and peoples of this region.

In contrast to the traditional societies, the modern societies are associated with the following: organizational sophistication (manifested through specialization, differentiation of roles and functions in organizations and government), technological improvement (manifested through an increase in the means of producing goods and services) and attitudinal differences (manifested through “modern” attitudes that are characterized by increased knowledge, rationality, secular values and individualism)⁶². According to modernization theorists, the foregoing features are the key ingredients to development and only those societies that seek to acquire these features and therefore strive after modernity, have any reasonable chance for socio-economic and political development⁶³. The modernization theorists would characterize Western states/countries as being modern⁶⁴. The modernization school of thought is based on the idea that Sub-Saharan African countries (and indeed all the developing countries of the third world) will have to follow the same path that Western states did if they wish to modernize, nay, attain desirable levels of socio-economic and political development⁶⁵. But how do we

establish the rationale (and therefore the legitimacy) for this Western-oriented path to development? I attempt to answer this question next.

Historians in the modernization school of thought point out to the fact that about five hundred years ago, most people in the world were poor, mostly living in traditional societies⁶⁶. Although the literature is mixed on whether the standard of living was the same in different regions of the world at this time, there can no denying the fact that most people everywhere in the world lived at very low standards compared to the norms in today's wealthier countries⁶⁷. Then, sparks of scientific discovery occurred in widely scattered parts of the world (i.e. in the Middle East, China, Africa, Europe and South America)⁶⁸. However, due to various historical reasons, scientific inquiry led to consistent technological innovation mainly in Western Europe and not the other parts of the World⁶⁹. Coupled with the entrepreneurial spirit of capitalism, this technological innovation provided the push that led to Western Europe's evolution from the traditional society to the modern society. Walt Rostow captured the process of this evolution through a five-phase airplane take-off metaphor⁷⁰.

According to Rostow's development metaphor, Britain was the first airplane to take off from tradition to modernity in the late nineteenth century⁷¹. It was then followed over the next century by France, Germany and other European countries and by the United States, Canada and Australia⁷². The twentieth century saw the take-off of Russia, Japan and several smaller Asian countries⁷³. Since then, the planes in different parts of the third world have made little progress or no attempt at flying at all⁷⁴. Simply put, the fleet of the majority of third world countries is still at the airport, their airplanes grounded. As a result, these countries are still stagnant and still traditional as they have been for centuries⁷⁵. Therefore, the main development task for these countries is to make sure that their fleet is propelled into motion and that they are set on the runway, ready to start the takeoff journey that will launch them into the high skies of development. What is more, the modernization theorists argue that unlike the pioneer countries that had to plunge into the development runway without any role models to emulate, the countries of Sub-Saharan Africa have numerous examples of success stories (mainly from the West) that they can emulate in their journey to socio-economic and political development⁷⁶. In fact, owing to this line of thinking, in the 1950s and the 1960s, most of the development

programmes in Sub-Saharan Africa were inspired by the modernization theories and heavily supported by the West⁷⁷.

However, the modernization theory of development suffers a number of limitations. Here, I identify three. First, based on Rostow's airplane metaphor, what happens if the planes on the ground choose not to snag onto the hooks offered them by the planes that are already in flight? This could happen for example if they fail to (and many of them have failed to) develop the preconditions for takeoff, i.e. the right kind of education, the right kind of legal system, the right kind of political systems (right kind in this case being western-based) or the necessary levels of sectoral mobility needed for development takeoff⁷⁸. Second, what happens if the planes that are already flying are slowed down, and therefore made to lose the power that they need in order to lift the grounded planes into flight⁷⁹? If this were to happen (and it happened for example during the global recession of the 1980s), one of the fundamental tenets of the modernization theory will not hold. According to this tenet, the already developed countries must continue to develop and grow if they are to assist the poor. Modernization theorists argue that without growth in the developed countries, there will be no new capital for investment in Africa and the rest of the third world and markets in the developed world will not expand to stimulate export growth in Africa and the rest of the third world⁸⁰.

Finally, drawing a dichotomy between what is traditional and therefore underdeveloped and what is modern and therefore developed is not a simple and straightforward task as the modernization theorists would want to have us believe. In fact, the reality is that the cultures of the world are greatly varied. Hence, they are both traditional and dependent⁸¹. Accordingly, even at the heart of the so-called modern societies of Western Europe, one can still find a lot that can still be regarded as traditional. For example, the religious forms of the rich countries—i.e. the many variant forms of Christianity and Judaism—have ancient origins and yet are still vital cultural heritages for many⁸². These traditional cultural beliefs show no signs of disappearing. On the contrary, some forms of these practices, such as charismatic and fundamentalist Christianity, are growing stronger as people in the West turn to them to make sense out of the constant changes and dislocations in their society⁸³.

16th century⁹³. As a result, capitalists from Europe began to seek profits from all over the globe⁹⁴. Slowly, the pre-sixteenth century socio-economic and political order began to be transformed by these European capitalists. The search for profits through the production of agricultural goods for sale became the dominant force in the world economic system. Gradually, Europeans seeking profits came to control the rest of the world. This control was exerted either formally and administratively through colonial empires or informally and commercially through European economic might and Europe's capacity to strike unequal bargains with the other less powerful political entities in different parts of the world⁹⁵.

With the accumulation of wealth and the expansion of their socio-economic and political power across the globe, the Europeans established a capitalist market system that has dominated the world since the sixteenth century to the present⁹⁶. The dependency theorists argue that the problem with this capitalist process of development is that while the process has, on one hand, led to the emergence of a core of rich, mainly Western capitalist countries, it has, on the other, led to the emergence of a periphery of poor, mainly third-world countries that have been drawn into the world economy in a manner that makes them dependent on the industrial countries of the West⁹⁷. For example, as a result of this dependency, the workers of the poor third countries are often drawn into doing the socio-economic and political bidding of the west. Hence, they produce raw material for export to the rich countries; they work for foreign companies and they are normally caught up in the geopolitical power struggles of the economically advanced countries; and finally, they are culturally and economically dominated since they are required to speak the language of the ex-colonial powers and use their currencies⁹⁸. Therefore, according to dependency theorists, it is not that the poor countries are in some sort of primitive, unchanged state as the modernization theorists would want to have us believe⁹⁹. On the contrary and for better or worse, these countries have been changed by centuries of contact with the rich countries¹⁰⁰.

Dependency theorists also see a host of other problems with the capitalist economic system. Here, I list four. First, dependency theorists are critical of the role of western multinational firms in the socio-economic and political affairs of most third world countries. According to them, some of these multinationals have dominated weak

third world countries in ways that, for example, distort the structure of the domestic economy of their host countries through policies that create vast income gaps or seek to pursue self-serving economic priorities that have rendered genuine development in the third world impossible. Second, the dependency theorists criticize the tariff policies in the rich countries by arguing that these policies dictate the sorts of industrial patterns that the poor countries can choose while at the same time stifling the competitive capacity of these countries¹⁰¹. Third, dependency theorists argue that the major banks of the rich countries are conduits for the siphoning-off of resources from the third world¹⁰². In the same vein, they fault international economic agencies such as the World Bank and the IMF for imposing policies that are favourable to the rich countries and detrimental to the poor ones¹⁰³. Fourth and finally, dependency theorists argue that the problems of underdevelopment in the third world are caused by unequal exchange, which is manifested in the declining terms of trade for the third world¹⁰⁴. Due to the declining terms of trade, the relative prices of third world country exports have been falling over time while the prices of their imports from the industrialized world have been rising¹⁰⁵.

The dependency theorists argue that as a result of the declining terms of trade, the third world countries have been caught up in a circular trap. This circular trap functions as follows:

Export prices are low because wages in the third world are low, and prices of industrial goods are rising because wages in the rich countries are high and rising. In turn, wages in the third world are low because the terms of trade are moving against the third world, and wages in the industrial world are high because the rich countries have been able to exploit the poor. Exploitation creates poverty, which permits more exploitation, and the circle goes around¹⁰⁶.

Therefore, while modernization theorists sees the capitalist system as offering the socio-economic and political salvation for the poor countries, the dependency theorists see capitalism as the main culprit behind the socio-economic and political damnation of the poor countries¹⁰⁷. So what option(s) do dependency theorists offer for the third world's socio-economic and political development? We shall now turn our attention to some of these options.

The dependency theorists offer a number of possible strategies for third world development. First, there are those in this school who argue that the best course of action

for the third world in so far as development is concerned is to fight fire with fire¹⁰⁸. According to this strand of dependency theorists, the third world can consciously seek to transform capitalism from an enemy to a saviour¹⁰⁹. In order to support their contention, these scholars point to the capitalist success stories of Hong Kong, Taiwan, South Korea and Malaysia, all of which have adopted capitalism to unleash creative entrepreneurship in the manufacturing sector and acquired levels of success that are challenging those of the rich Western countries¹¹⁰. However, this strategy has not been widely embraced by the dependency theorists. For example, some argue that while the capitalist strategy has brought about success in scattered parts of the third world, it has also reproduced the tensions and inequities found in the economically advanced countries.

The second strategy for socio-economic and political development in the third world is offered by the liberal wing of the dependency theorists¹¹¹. According to liberal school of thought, capitalism should be the main philosophy guiding development in the third world¹¹². However, these theorists argue that capitalism should be subject to strong state guidance so as to ensure that it serves the real needs of the people and not the external demand of foreign markets¹¹³. Proponents of this view support such protectionist economic policies like: import substitution industrialization, the erection of tariff barriers against foreign imports, the implementation of effective government economic plans and the establishment of public financial institutions that favour some sectors (considered crucial to national development) over others¹¹⁴. As a result of the views of this school, a number of third world countries like Sri-Lanka and Kenya sought to develop their economies along import substitution industrialization policies but for these and other countries that adopted a similar strategy, the development record has not been impressive¹¹⁵.

However, most dependency theorists regard the first two strategies as half-hearted, if not outright naïve¹¹⁶. The bulk of these theorists fall within the radical school of dependency theory and call for full socialist revolutions in the third world that includes the expropriation of private enterprises (both foreign and domestic owned), so that the people as a whole, acting together through their governments, can combat the destructive forces of capitalism¹¹⁷. While this school of thought continues to inspire the socio-economic and political development policies of such countries like Cuba, it has greatly

lost its appeal, especially since the demise of the Soviet Union¹¹⁸. What is more, some of the third world countries that sought to pursue their development along strictly socialist lines (e.g. Tanzania under Ujamaa) failed to bring about the desired levels of socio-economic and political development to their citizens¹¹⁹. So what are some limitations of the dependency theory and why did the dependency approach fail to bring about the desired levels of development in Sub-Saharan Africa and indeed in the majority of other third world countries? While numerous reasons have been advanced to explain the limitations of the dependency theory, for the purposes of this thesis, the following three will suffice.

First, one of the biggest limitations of the dependency theory is that its advocates tend to exclude the internal dynamics of the state from their analysis¹²⁰. In fact, the dependency theorists often portray the third-world states/countries both as innocent and helpless victims of vicious Western capitalist countries¹²¹. However, such a portrayal is far from the reality. While the Western capitalist countries have had a tremendous (and sometimes a negative one) impact on the socio-economic and political aspirations of the third world countries, it will be dishonest not to acknowledge the fact that some of the problems of third-world under-development are solely attributable to the internal dynamics in these countries. For example, in Sub-Saharan Africa, internal ethnic tensions have been largely responsible for such anti-development outcomes as the 1967 civil war in Nigeria and the horrors of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda¹²². Additionally, continued practices of poor political governance and economic mismanagement have seen such resource-rich countries like the Democratic Republic of Congo and Angola reduced to levels of abject poverty¹²³.

Second, the dependency theorists assume that the state of dependency is an unalterable fact of third world existence¹²⁴. These theorists homogenize the experience of all third world countries into one preconceived pattern arising out of colonialism¹²⁵. However, it is important to note that though most third world countries were under colonial domination at one point of time or another, it is difficult to say that all of them had similar colonial experiences. For example, while the countries of Asia and Latin America received substantial levels of investment during the colonial era, those in Africa barely received any¹²⁶. Even in Africa, the colonial experience was varied. Hence, while

independence was preceded by violent clashes between the British and the Mau Mau in Kenya, the French and the Algerians in Algeria, and the Boers and the anti-apartheid forces in South Africa, independence was generally conflict-free in places like Ghana, Uganda and Tanzania¹²⁷.

Third and finally, dependency theorists do not explain why states in the third world differ so greatly in their socio-economic and political development policy choices and outcomes¹²⁸. Some third world countries (especially the so-called Asian Tigers) have been able to make impressive development strides while others (especially those in Sub-Saharan Africa) have made negligible progress¹²⁹. While the dependency theorists maintain, at least at the ideological level, that the only way for third world countries to attain development is by breaking free from the global capitalist system, they are hard put to explain the fact that the Asian Tigers have not attained their impressive development record by breaking with the global capitalist system but rather, by productively integrating their economies into this system. So, between the modernization and the dependency theories, which theory best captures the challenges of development in Sub-Saharan Africa and which theory offers viable solutions to the crisis of development in Sub-Saharan Africa?

There is no simple and straightforward response to the foregoing question. For example, the explanations behind development are so numerous and varied that it is not possible to pin down one explanation as the source or basis of development in any given state or region of the world. In fact, some scholars even go to the extent of questioning whether the mainstream development (modernization and dependency) theories discussed above have any role at all in the development of the third world. Take the case of the Asian Tigers for example. While the modernization theorists would be quick to take credit for the impressive economic growth in these countries, the mainstream development theory sceptics would argue that these countries have made tremendous strides in the economic development front not so much as result of modernization theories but largely due to other development strategies (in this case, the developmental state strategy) that are hardly recommended by the modernization theorists¹³⁰. Hence, although most African countries attempted to bring about development to their citizens based on these theories, it is important to point out that while most of them did not succeed in

doing so, the development successes in other regions of the third world are not necessarily as result of these development theories.

Another important point to note is that both the dependency and the modernization theories were normally shaped and defined within the realities of the bi-polar (Western capitalism under the leadership of the US and Eastern communism under the leadership of the USSR) world that dominated the international political order since the late 1940s to the early 1990s. The modernization theory clearly fell within the Western capitalist ideology while the dependency theory, even though its main theorists sought to distinguish it from the US-USSR rivalry, was mainly based on an Eastern-leaning communist ideology. Therefore, even when it became clear that these theories were ill suited in meeting the development needs of the third world, they continued to be pursued, mainly as a result of other geopolitical reasons.

However, it is important to acknowledge the fact that these theories have made—and indeed continue to make—an important contribution to our understanding of the development challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. This is because, while the modernization and the dependency theories suffer from various conceptual limitations in their respective bid to define the concept “development” and how development can be realized, they nonetheless offer some explanations which, if but partially, sharpen our general understanding development concept and what it is and how it can be attained¹³¹. Be that as it may, it is equally important to note that while these theories were meant provide a basis upon which “development” in Africa could be pursued and therefore realized, most of them failed to bring about the desired development to this continent¹³².

Hence, by the beginning of the 1980s, it was becoming increasingly clear that a new mode of thinking was necessary if African countries were to make any meaningful socio-economic and political development strides. So, where did this new mode of thinking, especially in so far as resolving the problems of Africa’s under-development, come from? Unlike the first phase of development theory that had been mainly dominated by development theorists and scholars backed by respective super-power legitimacy, the second phase of dealing with Africa’s under-development (beginning in the 1980s) was not based on a concrete and rigorous theoretical foundation. Instead, structural-institutional reforms as carried out under the policy recommendations of Western-leaning

international institutions like the IMF and the World Bank, in the context of waning Soviet influence, marked the main approach to development in this phase¹³³. The IMF and the World Bank have been at the forefront of pushing for Africa's development under the Structural Adjustment Programs (S.A.Ps)¹³⁴.

Since the 1980s, theoretical-developmentalism has increasingly given way to the structural-institutional reform phase of development strategies for Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest the third world¹³⁵. As already noted above, this phase has not been so much driven by a concrete theoretical argument as it has been by an ideological—free market neo-liberalism—one. Under structural-institutional reform, the free-market neo-liberal ideology has provided the main approach to socio-economic and political development. So far, the so-called Washington Consensus has provided the intellectual legitimacy for free market neo-liberalism and given a stamp of approval to the IMF, the World Bank and the G8 (excluding Russia) to pursue a neo-liberal, free-market development agenda in the third world¹³⁶.

However, just like the theories under the first phase had failed to bring about development to Africa, the second phase theories (though still being championed to varying degrees by the IMF and the World Bank as the magic dose for Africa's development malaise) have so far failed to bring about development in Africa¹³⁷. In fact, the application of the structural-institutional reform strategies to Africa's development has only exacerbated the crisis of development, especially since this approach has led to the collapse of such vital development input sectors like education and health¹³⁸. What then are the other options for African countries in their quest to attain meaningful levels of sustainable development, especially given their dismal failure to attain development in the first phase of theoretical-developmentalism and the non-impressive development record of the second phase of structural-institutional reform? Additionally, given the fact that most African countries continue to face the threat of a greater degree of socio-economic and political marginalization, more so in this era of globalization, what development strategy can Africa adopt in order to stem this continued marginalization and to bolster its chances of meaningfully integrating into the new global economy? In response to these questions, I argue that regional integration arrangements offer the most

viable option both for overcoming the development challenges in Africa and for laying the foundation for sustained socio-economic and political development in the continent.

However, as I have already pointed above, before regional integration arrangements can become effective mechanisms of development in Africa, the main challenges hindering their effectiveness must both be identified and addressed. In this thesis, I analyze the case of COMESA in a comparative context and examine both the challenges and prospects facing this regional integration arrangement in its bid to bring about sustained socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa. I analyse COMESA's challenges and prospects for development in Eastern and Southern Africa within a broad conceptual framework set out in the context of the following four questions:

- (i) What are the main theoretical contentions on regionalism and why have regional integration arrangements become a prominent factor in the international political system, especially since the beginning of the 1980s?
- (ii) What are some of the socio-economic and political characteristics of successful regional integration arrangements and what role do these characteristics play in the promotion of developmental regionalism in different regions of the world?
- (iii) Given the comparative study of COMESA vis-à-vis the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN, what lessons can COMESA learn from these regional bodies in so far as the establishment of successful regionalism is concerned?
- (iv) What challenges must COMESA overcome and what opportunities must it seize if it has to evolve into a vehicle through which sustained socio-economic and political development could be attained in Eastern and Southern Africa?

This thesis is divided into five chapters. Chapter one is the introduction. In this chapter, I discuss some of the leading development theories—modernization and dependency—and strategies (structural-institutional reform) and point out why these theories and strategies have failed to bring about socio-economic and political development in Africa and why they should be replaced by developmental regionalism.

Chapter two is a theoretical discussion of regionalism. Here, I provide an in-depth analysis of the various theories on regionalism and attempt to discuss COMESA and the other regional integration arrangements identified in this study through various theoretical perspectives. In chapter three, I look at regional integration arrangements within the political economy of the international political system. Chapter four provides a general overview of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA in terms of their objectives, institutional structures and operations and their contribution to the socio-economic and political development of their respective regions. Chapter five focuses on a comparative analysis of COMESA versus the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. In this chapter, I establish important trends and patterns for successful regionalism and then discuss the challenges that COMESA faces before making some recommendations on how COMESA can improve its role as a central institution for Eastern and Southern Africa's development. I then look at COMESA's prospects of bringing about socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa before drawing a general conclusion that overall, COMESA has better prospects for promoting development in Eastern and Southern Africa compared the other theories and or strategies of development that have been previously promoted in the region.

--Chapter Two--

(i) **Regional Integration Arrangements: A Theoretical Perspective**

In this study, a theoretical perspective on regional integration arrangements is imperative for a number of reasons¹³⁹. Here, I list four central reasons, which though formulated within the general context of the importance of theory in political science, are specifically relevant to role of theory in regionalism. First, theory is central to the creation of definitions, concepts and categories around which the analysis of regional integration arrangements is conducted. Second, theory exposes the assumptions that remain explicit and unquestioned in descriptive or historical regionalism. Third, a theoretical perspective of regional integration arrangements sharpens our understanding of the main explanatory variables and causal mechanisms in the study of regionalism. Fourth and finally, regional integration theory provides us with a coherent framework for systematically comparing regional integration arrangements in different parts of the world¹⁴⁰.

While the theoretical literature on regionalism is enormous, it is at the same time uneven and fragmented¹⁴¹. Most of the theoretical work on regional integration has been formulated within the context of European integration, specifically, the European Union integration¹⁴². In this section, I first begin by focusing on the theoretical work that has emerged out of the European integration process and the debate this work has generated on whether European integration theories can offer replicable generalizations to the integration process of other regional integration arrangements in different regions of the world¹⁴³. Then second, I proceed to examine integration theory within a broader extra-EU conceptual context. However, before embarking on an examination of the European Union integration theories and their relevance to other regional integration arrangements, it is perhaps important to try and develop an understanding as to why Europe is such a strong focal point of integration theory. I embark on this task next.

Two main sets of events help explain why Europe is the dominant minefield of integration theory¹⁴⁴. First, events taking place in Europe in the 1950s and the 1960s (a period which coincided with the formative years of integration theory) helped propel Europe into the forefront of integration theory. This was a period of profound

Europe into the forefront of integration theory. This was a period of profound transformation in Europe's socio-economic and political landscape in which established patterns of political authority were being radically re-ordered. For example, Europe had just emerged out of a devastating war —World War II— that had seen the hitherto existing balance of power tilt in favour of two ideologically-opposed camps. These camps pitted Western Europe against Eastern Europe and effectively divided Europe into an Eastern Bloc (under the USSR tutelage) and a Western Bloc (under the US tutelage)¹⁴⁵. Second, apart from the new geopolitical alliances, the European nation-states had been politically diminished and economically destroyed by the war. As a result, Europe was engaged in a dual process of both trying to find a way of regaining its lost political authority while at the same time re-building its ruined economic base¹⁴⁶.

For Western Europe, forging closer socio-economic and political co-operation among the states of the region was one of the ways through which economic and political power could be regained¹⁴⁷. What is more, the emerging Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the US saw the latter actively encourage regional integration among western European states in its bid to create a strong economic and political bulwark against apparent Soviet expansionism¹⁴⁸. Hence, it can be argued that the onset of a new geopolitical order (marked by the Cold War rivalry between the USSR and the US) played an important role in fostering the emergence of a new political order in Europe¹⁴⁹. One of the manifestations of this new political order was a Western Europe that made attempts to re-organise its socio-economic and political structures in a manner that necessarily followed an underlying logic that anticipated a new sort of a politically and economically stronger state-form that was “above” the nation-state that had existed prior to the Cold War¹⁵⁰. The other manifestation of this order was an Eastern Europe that was under the tight grip and control of the USSR, with its keen ambition to expand its socio-economic and political frontiers¹⁵¹.

In Western Europe, the desire to forge a new political and economic entity that was “above the nation-state” laid the foundation of European integration theory since it triggered theoretical discussions on what this new supranational entity was likely to look like or whether it was even likely to emerge at all from the ashes of post World War II and therefore replace the hitherto existing European nation-states¹⁵². For example, neo-

functionalist and inter-governmentalist theories emerged around this period¹⁵³. These theories offer competing explanations for the emergence of regional integration in Europe¹⁵⁴. According to neo-functionalism, the key actors in regional integration arrangements are the supranational institutions—like the European Commission—who make and implement important integration policy decisions¹⁵⁵. Inter-governmentalists disagree. Unlike the neo-functionalists, inter-governmentalists argue that the key actors in regional integration arrangements are the national executives who determine the policy directions and outcomes of the integration process¹⁵⁶. Hence, while neo-functionalism is a theory of national change and transformation, inter-governmentalism is a theory that emphasises the supremacy of the nation-state and therefore international political anarchy as usual¹⁵⁷. From the formative years of integration, the focus of the theoreticians was either the collective international and trans-national institutions and the emergence (for neo-functionalists) or the non-emergence (for inter-governmentalists) of significant non-state actors in the world polity¹⁵⁸.

The early theoretical tradition (mainly dominant in the 1950s and the 1960s) on European integration was deeply anchored in the vocabulary of the discipline of international relations¹⁵⁹. For example, the alleged relationship between the nation-state system and war on one hand and the role of post-national forms of organization and peace on the other that informed the debate on international politics during this period had an impact on the theoretical formulations of integration theory¹⁶⁰. However, before explaining how this debate influenced integration theory, a brief summary of the main theories that informed these earlier debates is in order.

The main political debates of the 1920s and the 1950s focused on war and peace as envisioned by either realism or liberalism. After World War I, Liberalism earned a lot of theoretical clout among the intellectuals and politicians of the first part of the twentieth century¹⁶¹. According to these intellectuals and politicians, humanity needed to turn itself to the avoidance of war¹⁶². The desire among the post World War I and inter-war era liberal intellectuals and politicians was to steer the world away from war towards peaceful international cooperation and co-existence¹⁶³. However, while the liberals sought to create a world of peaceful cooperation and co-existence, the realists argued that conflict among states, and not cooperation, was the *modus operandi* of international

politics¹⁶⁴. The realists' position rose in prominence especially after the outbreak of World War II cast serious aspersions on the liberalists' efforts at promoting international cooperation and peaceful co-existence among states¹⁶⁵. It is this early realist and liberalist debates on the nature of international politics that laid the foundation of integration theory and because of these debates, two diametrically opposed theoretical views on regional integration emerged

The first category of theorists—those who believed in the role of post-national forms of organization in the post World War II era (i.e. the neo-functionalists) —thought that they could lead creative policy-makers into designing rational institutions to secure better forms of governance (and hence the avoidance of war) in a modern, interdependent world¹⁶⁶. The second category of theorists—those who believed in the supremacy of the nation-state in the post World War II era (i.e. the inter-governmentalists)—argued that the emergence of regional integration in Western Europe was not a reflection of a new post-national global order but rather, a reflection of the actions of national executives and the respective international power-dynamics of the time¹⁶⁷.

While these debates hold decidedly divergent views on Western European integration, it is important to note that the transformative events taking place in post-World War II Europe, especially those ignited by post-national activities like the Treaty of Paris (1951)—which brought together six European nations into some form of trans-national economic cooperation— ignited a theoretical debate that firmly established Western Europe as the centre of integration theory¹⁶⁸. This debate continues to form part of the broader contemporary literature on integration theory. And just like the original debates, the current debates on European integration have generated more points of contention that have led to or little no consensus in so far as integration theory is concerned¹⁶⁹. I will now turn to a brief discussion of some of the theoretical debates that are currently dominant in the European integration theory with particular reference to the European Union (the EU).

The EU integration theory can be examined within the following four theoretical domains:

1. The EU as an International Organization

International Organizations (IOs) are inter-governmental bodies designed in the explicit context of converging state preferences or common interests¹⁷⁰. From this perception of international organizations, an examination of the EU quickly makes it clear that the EU is more than a straightforward instance of an international organization. Unlike most international organizations, the EU has peculiar institutions and a unique configuration of internal forces that makes it difficult to analyze it in the same manner as other international organizations¹⁷¹. Therefore, the EU cannot be seen as a mere International Organization and hence, this domain is not adequate in developing our understanding of the EU in particular and integration theory in general since it fails to offer a convincing explanatory theory for EU integration and by extension, other regional integration arrangements in other regions of the world.

2. The EU as an instance of regionalism in the global political economy

The aim of this theoretical domain is to offer reflections and possible generalizations about the tendency of groups of territorially adjacent states to cluster together in blocs¹⁷². In exploring this tendency, a number of guiding questions can be posed. For example, is it possible to make meaningful comparisons between the EU and other regional groupings such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR) and the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) among other comparisons? Or, do instances of regionalism arise in similar sorts of circumstances regardless of time or place? Or, do global economic and political pressures force and or enable the creation of regional integration arrangements? Or, how do variations in levels of institutionalization in regional integration arrangements affect the interests and preferences of actors? Or, does the emergence of regional integration arrangements have implications for the construction of new identities and the deconstruction of established ones, especially at both the elite and the popular mass levels? Or, do regional integration arrangements accelerate or retard free trade and multilateralism? Or, finally, do regional integration arrangements pose a uniform threat to the nation-state and the international system of states?

The foregoing questions are important in helping us formulate a theoretical understanding of the EU as an instance of global regionalism. In fact, these questions are important in sparking off debate on such important theoretical issues as to whether the EU integration theories can be replicable in other regional integration arrangements. I discuss this issue further below. Here, it is only important to note that in order to formulate an EU integration theory within a global context, a broad array of questions covering various socio-economic and political facets of integration must be asked and a rigorous theoretical paradigm established to answer them.

3. The EU as a useful site for the study of policy-making dynamics

Another theoretical domain contends that the EU is a complex policy-making system whose perspectives on policy-making procedures—developed in the context of national polities—can be put to the test and further developed as a model for other regional integration initiatives to emulate¹⁷³. In this theoretical domain, attention is turned to the interaction of interested actors and the processes of agenda setting, policy formulation, legislation, interest intermediation and policy implementation. The analysis of the actions of different players and their impact on different processes offers useful integration insights on such issues as the loci of power within the EU and the relationship between formal and informal policy processes¹⁷⁴. From this theoretical vantage-point, one can assess policy networks and the role of institutions during such novel moments as when national (old) and supranational (new) politics overlap¹⁷⁵. While a number of different regional integration arrangements have paid heed to this theoretical domain and attempted to replicate the EU experience within their respective integration initiatives, some theoreticians have argued that the EU is a unique entity that cannot be replicated elsewhere.

4. The EU as a unique entity unto itself

Some theoreticians, like William Wallace, have argued that the EU is a *sui generis* i.e. there is only one EU and hence EU integration cannot offer a theoretical testing site from whence broader regional integration generalizations can be drawn¹⁷⁶. According to these theoreticians, rather than treat the EU as a theoretical paradigm for other regional

integration arrangements, the EU should be treated as a historically rooted phenomenon arising in specific conditions and therefore without meaningful historical or contemporary parallel¹⁷⁷. Wallace has succinctly declared the uniqueness of the EU in the following terms:

The experience of deep integration within Western Europe does not provide a model for others to follow. Its historical development was rooted in the stage of economic development and a security framework that have now disappeared. The institutional structures that West European governments agreed to under those past circumstances have managed to respond to the very challenges posed by economic and industrial transformation in the 1970s and the 1980s. Political, economic and security motivations have been entangled in the evolution of West European regional integration from the 1940s to the 1990s¹⁷⁸.

The view that the EU is a unique entity whose experience cannot be generalized to other regional integration arrangements has not only been confined to scholars of European integration theory¹⁷⁹. In fact, some scholars of the newer regional integration arrangements—especially in Asia-Pacific—support this position when they contend that the EU is a bad example, which should not be followed by other aspiring regional integration initiatives¹⁸⁰.

Be that as it may, the theoretical approach that seeks to view the EU integration as a unique historical development that cannot be generalized to other regional integration arrangements has been strongly criticized for promoting crude empiricism¹⁸¹. According to critics of this theory, this approach tends to chronicle the EU without offering a broader insight into the theoretical issues or the normative questions about the “real” problems facing Europe and its citizens¹⁸². Additionally, these critics contend that viewing the EU as a unique integration experience whose dynamics cannot be generalized to other regional integration arrangements is a direct affront to the work of numerous integration theoreticians who have developed theories (with the European Union in mind) with the intention of having these theories generalized to other integration initiatives¹⁸³. Hence, in their retaliatory response, those scholars who hold the view that the EU is a model of integration theory for emulation by other up-coming regional initiatives defend their position by arguing that two phenomena do not have to be exactly identical in order to be compared effectively¹⁸⁴.

This thesis relies on a comparative analysis of five different regional integration arrangements to make generalizations on the challenges and prospects of COMESA as a viable development strategy for Eastern and Southern Africa. Therefore, I support the view that it is possible to make effective comparisons between the EU and other regional integration arrangements, even when these—as is clearly the case with COMESA and the other regional integration arrangements in this thesis—are not identical to the EU. However, while the EU integration theory offers some invaluable and useful insights into the study of regionalism, it is important to note that other integration theoreticians have sought to develop a theoretical understanding of integration outside the ubiquitous grip of the EU integration theory. My thesis draws from these other non-EU focused integration theories as well. Hence, an analysis of these non-EU focused theories is in order.

Most of the contemporary debates on integration theory take as their starting point, the contentious issue of definition¹⁸⁵. The theoreticians who pay attention to the issue of definition aver that a proper theoretical formulation of regional integration theory cannot be attained unless a “clear definition of the term integration” or what integration entails is provided¹⁸⁶. However, focusing on the definitional aspect of regionalism poses other significant problems. For example, what does a “clear” definition of regional integration entail? Or put another way; is it really possible to come up with a firm and concise definition of such an amorphous and indeed dynamic concept as regional integration? The complexity of defining regional integration is reflected in the fact that attempts to define this concept have so far generated more questions and fewer answers¹⁸⁷. For example, is regional integration an economic phenomenon or a political one? Does economics influence regional integration or is regional integration influenced by politics? Or, how does the interaction between economics and politics (political economy) influence regional integration? Alternatively, is regional integration a process or an outcome? The list of questions seems to be endless or can indeed be made endless. However, since the focus of my thesis is largely on how the process of regional integration could be used as a paradigm of development in Africa, I limit myself to examining regional integration within the definitional context of process and outcome.

Taken as a process, Ernest Haas offers two insightful definitions of regional integration. First, Haas defines integration as the voluntary creation of larger political

units involving the self-conscious eschewal of force in relations between participating institutions¹⁸⁸. Second, in a fairly elaborate definition, Haas contends that integration is:

the process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new centre, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over pre-existing national states. The end result of a process of political integration is a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones¹⁸⁹.

From the definitions above, it can be seen that Haas views integration as both a process and an outcome of conscious political actions.

However, other theoreticians like William Wallace, while defining integration within the context of process and outcome, are keen to alert the students of integration to the relationship between economics and politics in integration theory. Wallace seeks to tease out this relationship by making a distinction between integration as a process and integration as an outcome¹⁹⁰. He particularly distinguishes between formal and informal aspects of integration¹⁹¹. On one hand, formal integration consists of outcomes such as institutions, policies or legislative change that have been brought about as a consequence of deliberate political sanction¹⁹². On the other hand, informal integration involves processes that have effective economic consequences without formal authoritative intervention¹⁹³. Richard Higgott offers a more or less similar definition of regionalism that favourably compares to that of Wallace, especially when he makes a distinction between *de facto* structural regionalism and *de jure* institutional economic cooperation¹⁹⁴.

Another important aspect to note about Wallace and Higgott's approach to integration is that both of them predicate their definition of regional integration within the context of political economy, especially since they attempt to draw connections between the political and economic forces that shape the emergence of regional integration arrangements¹⁹⁵. Defining regional integration arrangements within this context has dual-pronged merits. On one hand, defining regional integration within the context of political economy is beneficial because it offers ample room that allows for several theoretical permutations to be made¹⁹⁶. First adopting a political economy approach to regionalism could, for example, lead to the following conclusion: changes in the informal economic domain, manifested through heightened capital mobility, increasing volumes of cross-border trade, alterations in the production process and shifting corporate strategies

decisively structure and constrain the agenda of authoritative political actors¹⁹⁷. Second and as Rosamond contends, within the political economy context and faced with no options in the face of the changes emanating from the informal processes in the regional economic domain, governments seek closer cooperation through the construction of regional political institutions designed to capture and control the emergent informal economic processes¹⁹⁸. In this case, the political dimension of regional integration is brought about as a consequence of the intensity of the agglomeration effects of regional economic activity¹⁹⁹. Third, under the political economy approach, it can be argued that formal political actions involving deliberate government sanction help the creation of regional integration arrangements. In this case, economic and political integration can only happen if states enact policies that, for example, promote regional economic or political activity or both²⁰⁰.

Therefore, it can be seen that a political economy theoretical approach to regional integration draws our attention to the fact that the creation of regional integration arrangements is determined by different economic and political dynamics. This may in turn mean that different periods of integration may require different theoretical perspectives and different strategies for establishing regional integration arrangements²⁰¹. Hence, for example, in regions where there are minimal chances of creating regional integration arrangements through economic agglomeration effects (and this is clearly the case for COMESA and other regional integration arrangements in Africa), direct political involvement may be the most appropriate way of establishing a regional group. In other regions (especially those that already have high prior regional economic linkages like North America and Western Europe), political involvement may only be needed to coordinate a well-developed regional network of social and economic activities.

So far, the theoretical views that I have examined above sought to develop our theoretical understanding of regional integration initiatives by attempting to define the concept of “regional integration” as both a process and an outcome within the context of political economy. While this approach is illuminating, it is not necessarily exhaustive. Therefore, instead of attempting to develop a regional integration theory by focusing on political economy, other theorists have sought to formulate their theories by developing a set of features and characteristics that broadly defines the concept “regionalism”²⁰². The

early theoreticians (the late 1960s and the early 1970s) who adopted this approach analysed the concept “regionalism” in terms of the following four features and characteristics²⁰³:

- Social cohesiveness: regionalism is defined in terms of such factors of social cohesion as ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history, consciousness and a common heritage
- Economic cohesiveness: Economic factors such as trade patterns and economic complementarities are crucial in the definition of regional integration.
- Political cohesiveness: In defining regionalism under political cohesiveness, factors like regime type and ideology are taken into consideration.
- Organizational cohesiveness: Finally, regionalism is defined in terms of the existence (or non-existence) of formal regional institutions.

Having examined the views of the early (both EU and non-EU focused) integration theories, let us now turn our attention to some contemporary (mainly spanning the period from the 1980s to the present) regional integration theories. These theories embrace either the political economy or the characteristics approach to regional integration or a combination of both.

1. Regionalization:

Regionalization refers to the growth of societal integration within a region and to the often undirected processes of social and economic interaction²⁰⁴. This process of regional integration formation is also referred to as informal integration or soft regionalism. At the socio-political level, regionalization involves the development of complex social networks manifested through increasing flows of people, the expansion of shared political attitudes and the creation of a trans-national civil society²⁰⁵. At the economic level, regionalization involves the development of trans-border growth triangles, industrial corridors or increasingly dense networks linking industrial centres. An important point to note about the process of regionalization is that it is not necessarily driven by conscious inter-regional state policy.

2. Regional awareness and identity

Regional awareness and identity refers to the shared perception of belonging to a particular community. This perception can rest on a set of internal factors such as a common culture, a common history or common religious traditions²⁰⁶. It can also be defined against the external “other”, in which case it may primarily be understood in terms of a real or perceived external socio-economic and or political threat²⁰⁷. Some common examples of regional awareness and identity being defined in terms of an external ‘other’ include Western-Europe’s self-image defined as against the Soviet Union during the Cold War or Latin American nationalism as defined against US hegemony or African nationalism as defined against European colonial and post-colonial domination.

3. Regional inter-state cooperation

Inter-state cooperation involves the construction of interstate or intergovernmental agreements and regimes. The cooperation can either be formal or informal and does not necessarily depend on high levels of institutionalization. Regional inter-state cooperation serves two main functions. First, it can be a means of responding to external challenges and co-ordinating regional positions in international institutions or negotiating forums. Second, it can be developed to secure welfare gains, promote common values and solve common problems, especially those arising as a result of increased levels of regional interdependence²⁰⁸. This process of regional integration is highly statist and seeks to make the state the focal point of any regional integration initiatives²⁰⁹.

4. State-promoted regional integration

This process of regional integration involves specific policy decisions by governments designed to reduce or remove barriers to mutual exchange of goods, services, capital and people. This is the most popular form of regional integration and an extensive amount of literature has been written on this process²¹⁰. Although economic issues are only one aspect of regional integration arrangements, state-promoted regional integration is mainly concerned with economic integration. It is mainly evaluated on the basis of scope (the range of issues involved), depth (the extent of policy harmonization),

institutionalization (the extent of formal institutional building) and centralization (the degree to which effective authority is centralized)²¹¹.

5. Regional cohesion

Regional cohesion refers to the possibility of the four processes identified above coalescing, at some point, into a cohesive and consolidated regional unit²¹². Regional cohesion can be understood in two senses. The first sense is when a region comes to play a defining role in the relations between the states of the region and the rest of the world while the second is when the regional organization formed among states of a region takes over a central role in regional policy formulation across a range of socio-economic and political issues common to the integrating states²¹³.

It is important to note that there are various models upon which the move towards regional cohesion may be based. Here, I identify six possible models through which regional cohesion might be attained are²¹⁴. One model may be the gradual creation of a supranational regional integration arrangement based on deepening economic integration. A second model may involve arriving at regional cohesion through the creation of a series of overlapping and or strong inter-state arrangements or regimes. A third model may draw from a complex mix of traditional inter-governmentalism and supra-nationalism, a factor that may be prominent in the case of the EU²¹⁵. A fourth model might involve attaining regional cohesion through the development of consociational constitutional arrangements. A fifth model may have a ring of the neo-medieval order where the principles of territoriality and sovereignty are replaced by a pattern of over-lapping socio-economic and political identities and authorities in a cohesive regional unit. Sixth and finally, regional cohesion might be modelled on a strong regional hegemon, which sets the socio-economic and political agenda within its regional sphere of influence and does so with or without strong regional institutions²¹⁶.

6. Systemic theories and regional integration arrangements

Systemic theories emphasize the importance of the broader political and economic structures within which regional integration arrangements operate and the impact of external pressures on a given regional integration arrangement²¹⁷. These theories seek to

understand the character of regionalism by looking at a regional integration arrangement from “the outside-in” and within this perspective, analysing its place in the broader international system²¹⁸. Integration theorists identify the following two sets of systemic theories:

(a). Neo-realism

Both classical realism and its more recent neo-realist variant stress the importance of external configurations of power, the dynamics of political power competition and the constraining role of the international political system as the main determinants of understanding and defining the character of regional integration arrangements²¹⁹. Hence, the neo-realists, for example, argue that the end of the Cold War in the 1990s makes it easier for us to understand the extent to which Europe shifted from the 1940s and the early 1950s mindset of the Cold War era (an era that was based on intense ideological competition between Eastern and Western Europe) to the active promotion of regional integration and cooperation across Europe, especially since the 1990s to the present²²⁰.

Further, the Neo-realists argue that underlying these initiatives of regional integration arrangement is not a concern for the socio-economic and political welfare of the participating states but rather, their desire to either become global economic and political powers or their need to escape from real or imagined economic and political domination by other external powers²²¹. Viewed from this perspective, regional integration arrangements are products of power-politics that are geared towards responding to fears of a dominant hegemon among weak nations-states (who then chose to come together to leverage their power against the said hegemon)²²² or in response to the demands of a hegemon who wants to establish her sphere of influence among a group of weak states²²³. However, the neo-realists have been criticized by the structuralists for what the latter call “the neo-realists mischaracterization of the international system²²⁴”.

(b). Structural interdependence

While agreeing with the neo-realist’s contention on the importance of systemic factors in understanding the character of regional integration arrangements, structural interdependence theorists argue that focusing on systemic factors alone offers a narrow and simplistic view of regionalism²²⁵. According to structuralists, a systemic approach is

narrow and simplistic because it neglects the competitive dynamics of changes (that are not always necessarily adversarial and state-centric) in the international system²²⁶. Hence, structuralists contend that structural interdependence among states—intensified by the current globalization trends towards ever deepening socio-economic and political interdependence—offer a better theoretical understanding of the character of regional integration arrangements than that offered by the neo-realists²²⁷. As already noted above, neo-realism and structuralism are concerned with “outside-in” factors in formulating integration. Other theories, to which we next turn, focus on “the inside out” factors in their analysis of regional integration theory.

7. Regionalism interdependence theories and regional integration arrangements

In contrast to the ‘outside-in’ analysis adopted by systemic theories in explaining the character of regional integration arrangements, regionalism and interdependence theories see a close link between regional actors (as opposed to global) and regional interdependence as the basis of integration²²⁸. The theoretical clusters in this school are: neo-functionalism, neo-liberal institutionalism and constructivism. On one hand, neo-functionalism and neo-liberal institutionalism view regionalism as functional responses by states to the problems created by regional interdependence²²⁹. These two theories stress the critical role of institutions in fostering and developing regional cohesion²³⁰. On the other hand, constructivism lays greater emphasis on the relationship between material interdependence and understandings of identity and community within different regional integration arrangements²³¹. The following is a brief discussion of these theories.

(a). Neo-functionalism

This theory is based on the prediction that regional integration arrangements will evolve to eventually become self-sustaining²³². Neo-functionalists argue that high and rising levels of interdependence among integrating states will set in motion an ongoing process of cooperation that will move a regional integration arrangement from economic integration among the integrating states to the political integration of the integrating states²³³. This theory gives supranational institutions a central role in advancing regional

integration arrangements and argues that integration will take place through functional spill over and political spill over²³⁴. Under functional spill over, partial small steps down the integration road would create new problems that could then only be solved through further integration²³⁵. Political spill over will occur when the supranational institutions in place set in motion a self-reinforcing process of institution building²³⁶.

(b) Neo-liberal institutionalism

Neo-liberal institutionalism is based on three core conceptions. First, this theory contends that increasing levels of inter-dependence generate increased demand for international cooperation²³⁷. Hence, the institutions in a regional integration arrangement are viewed as purposively generated solutions to different kinds of collective action problems. Therefore, the norms, rules and institutions in a regional integration arrangement are generated because they help states deal with common problems and because they enhance their welfare²³⁸.

Second, neo-liberal institutionalism is heavily statist. It lays more emphasis on the states as the vanguard between the national and the international²³⁹. In this regard, liberal institutionalism shares a striking similarity with neo-realism. However, unlike classical neo-realism, this theory does not view states as constant sites of inter-state conflict. On the contrary, liberal institutionalism contends that mutual inter-state cooperation is possible²⁴⁰.

Third, neo-liberal institutionalism argues that in any regional integration arrangement, institutions matter²⁴¹. Institutions are important because they have an impact on the benefits that individual integrating states get and the ways in which they define their interests²⁴². What is more, the importance of institutions in regional integration arrangements is reinforced by the fact that they provide vital information to the integrating states, reduce costs of operation, develop convergence of expectations, facilitate the productive use of issue-linkage strategies, discourage cheating or defection and in a general sense, lengthen the shadow of the future²⁴³.

(c) Constructivism

Constructivists argue that regional integration arrangements are a result of both regional awareness and regional identity, forged on a shared sense of belonging to a

particular regional community²⁴⁴. Under this theory, the character of regional integration arrangements is constructed through three main ways. First, the regional integration character is built on a sense of a “we-ness” that is fostered on mutual sympathy, loyalty and a shared identity. Second, regionalism is based on collectively held norms arising out of the compatibility of the integrating states on major societal values such as capitalism or liberal democracy. Third, the character of regional integration is based on processes of social communication that lead to an increase in the level of transaction among the integrating states.

8. Domestic level –theories and regional integration arrangements

These theories focus on the role of shared domestic attributes and characteristics to explain the emergence of regional integration arrangements²⁴⁵. A number of integration theorists have sought to explain the emergence of regional integration arrangements by defining the character of regional integration arrangements in terms of ethnicity, race, language, religion, culture, history and consciousness of a common heritage²⁴⁶. Domestic-level theories offer the theoretical framework within which these theories are analyzed. Under these theories, the emergence of regional integration arrangements can be understood through three main theoretical explanations. These are:

(a) Regionalism and state coherence

While a number of regional integration theorists have argued that the role of the state is becoming increasingly diminished under the current era of globalization, theorists on regionalism and state coherence contend that the state is still a central component of regional integration arrangements²⁴⁷. According to the regionalism and state coherence theory, the apparent diminished role of the state is largely due to lack of legitimacy within states, a situation that has been partly brought about by the end of the Cold War²⁴⁸. Hence, this theory holds that the possibility, and indeed the success, of regional integration arrangements is likely to depend on the internal coherence and viability of the state structures of the integrating states²⁴⁹. In fact, the theorists in this school of thought argue that the absence of viable states have made the process of nation-building and regional integration in most parts of Africa and South Asia difficult, if not almost

impossible²⁵⁰. On the contrary, the most successful regional integration arrangements (e.g. the EU and NAFTA) have been possible in regions where state structures remain relatively strong and where their legitimacy is not called into question by internal socio-economic and political forces²⁵¹.

(b) Regime type and democratization

Democracy and the democratization process have a fundamental role in both shaping the character and prospects of successful regional integration arrangements. Regime type and democratization theorists argue that the wave of democratic transitions that have swept the world since the 1980s can be plausibly implicated in the current phenomenal revival of regionalism²⁵². For example, according to these theorists, regional integration arrangements in Latin America emerged against the background of a region-wide shift away from military regimes to more open democratic regimes²⁵³.

However, these theorists caution that while democracy and democratization are important ingredients in regional integration arrangements, they are not always a necessary condition. Hence, illiberal, and even violent, regimes in South East Asia, Latin America and Africa have formed regional integration arrangements even when democracy and democratization are not their forte²⁵⁴. Despite this fact, the regime type and democratization theorists emphasize the link between democracy and regionalism and argue that integrating states with a strong democratic culture are more likely to succeed at regional integration than those with a weak or no democratic culture²⁵⁵.

(c) Convergence theories

Convergence theorists argue that the convergence of domestic policy-preferences among the integrating states increases the chances for the formation of successful regional integration arrangements²⁵⁶. For Example, applied to the EU, convergence theory would argue that the EU is not a grand project of individual nation-states moving towards a supranational entity but rather, the best means of sheltering/protecting particular domestic projects built around post World War II Keynesian economics, social welfare and cooperative arrangements²⁵⁷. Furthermore, taken within the developing countries' context, convergence theorists argue that regional integration arrangements are a means of

pursuing policy-convergence issues anchored in neo-liberal market policies that stress trade liberalization and export expansion²⁵⁸. In fact, according to convergence theorists, regional integration arrangements are a conscious mechanism used by states to consolidate market-policies through so-called “lock-in effects²⁵⁹”.

The foregoing discussion provides a general overview on the theoretical perspective of regionalism. The central truism that emerges from the theories outlined above is that while all of them provide an important analytical tool for understanding the study of regional integration arrangements, taken in isolation, none of them fully captures the dynamism and complexity of regionalism. Therefore, these theories are important to the extent that they provide some insights into the emergence of regional integration arrangements in the international political system. In this study, the success of regional integration arrangements is analysed on the basis of the integrating states’ capacity or ability to play leading roles in the socio-economic and political development of their respective states and regions based on different development indicators²⁶⁰. In conducting this analysis, I make the assumption that based on these indicators, a general deduction can be made on the role played by regional integration arrangements in promoting the process of socio-economic and political development in different regions of the world. This study lays special emphasis on the case of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) to analyse the role of regionalism in Eastern and Southern Africa’s development.

In attempting to establish the role of COMESA in Africa’s development, I rely on a comparative analysis of COMESA, the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. As will become clear at the end of my thesis, I am optimistic that though the gains made by COMESA and other regional integration arrangements in Africa may currently be negligible (as compared to the gains made by the other regional bodies in this study), regionalism offers better prospects for Africa’s development than other theories and paradigms of development that have been attempted in the past²⁶¹. However, before embarking on this analysis, I first discuss the emergence of regional integration arrangements within the context of the political economy of the international system in the next chapter.

--Chapter Three--

(i) Regionalism and the Political Economy of the International System

Montchrétien de Watteville coined the term 'political economy' in 1615 when he used it to describe the science of wealth acquisition common to the state as well as to the family²⁶². While the concept of political economy presaged economics, it reflected this discipline's enduring pre-occupation with national territorial accumulation. Under classical political economy, national territorial accumulation entails a process of wealth creation through the continuous self-expansion of capital within the territorial bounds of the nation-state²⁶³. Since the establishment of the nation-state under the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the pursuit of national territorial wealth accumulation—especially under the mercantilist era—remained a significant part of the international political system. This chapter examines the evolution of the international political system from the age of state-led mercantilism to the era of globalization where the supremacy of the state in the international political economy system is increasingly being challenged by supranational entities, key among them being regional integration arrangements. The emergence of regional integration arrangements as an important strategy for socio-economic and political development, especially in this era of globalization, is examined within this evolving international political system.

(ii) The Nation-State and the Era of Mercantilism.

Since its inception at the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, the nation-state has remained the prominent socio-economic and political entity in the international political system²⁶⁴. Conceived within the realist tradition, the nation state has been mainly preoccupied with creating wealth within its boundaries and wielding sufficient political power to ensure legitimacy within its boundaries and its survival within the broader international political system²⁶⁵. The drive for national wealth creation and the need for international political survival were the instrumental factors that led to the emergence of the mercantilist system²⁶⁶. Mercantilism is best described as the practice of striving after political power through economic means²⁶⁷. As a result of mercantilist policies, throughout the seventeenth and the eighteenth centuries, European nation-states—all

competing against each other—sought to foster economic growth and consolidate their political power both at home and abroad²⁶⁸.

The mercantilists thought of wealth creation in competitive terms. According to them, wealth was something that was taken by one nation from another and wealth creation was therefore an inherently a competitive game that was more or less fashioned along the ethos of say, winning a race. Hence, for the mercantilists, international trade was seen as a zero-sum game, with clear winners and losers²⁶⁹. Under mercantilist policies, the economy was intended to serve the power and glory of the state. Mercantilist policies shaped the international political economy of this era in the context of the weak versus the strong, with different regions of the world being forcefully drawn into the mercantilist economy. It was because of mercantilism that Commodore Perry landed on the shores of Japan in 1854 to demand that Japan ‘opens itself up’ to outside (read American) trade²⁷⁰. It was because of mercantilism that the British waged the so-called opium wars on China in a bid to force the Chinese to open up their borders to British trade and thereby off-set the unfavourable balance of payments that had been prevailing between China and Britain before the opium wars²⁷¹. It was because of mercantilism that the most pernicious form of wealth accumulation was developed: the use of millions of African slave labour to develop and build the wealth of the new world²⁷². It was mercantilism that gave birth to imperialism, which in turn led to the creation of colonial spheres of influence by European states eager to stamp their economic and political might across the globe. Finally, mercantilist policies partly contributed to the violent confrontation between European powers in the first and second world wars and the desire for a new, less confrontational form of politics in the international political system²⁷³.

At the end of the World War II, the nationalist approach that had given mercantilist policies the credibility as the basis of the international socio-economic and political system came under increasing attack from liberal institutionalism²⁷⁴. According to liberal institutionalism, cooperation (not competition) among states should form the basis of the international socio-economic and political system. The post war liberal-institutionalists attempted to build the basis of this international cooperation at two levels. At the economic level, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the

Bretton Woods Institutions (the IMF and the World Bank) would form the basis of international cooperation²⁷⁵. At the political level, the different states of the world were called upon to mitigate their political conflict via the United Nations²⁷⁶. However, because of a number of different factors in the international political system, the vision set out by liberal institutionalists—that international cooperation was paramount in the international political system—did not fully materialize²⁷⁷. One of these factors was the outbreak of World War Two and the re-emergence of nationalist and statist-led politics under the Eastern and the Western blocs, fought within the ideological context of the Cold War.

However, although liberal-institutionalism had been discredited after the outbreak of World War II, it did not necessarily bring an end to the concept of cooperation in international political system. In fact, it is important to note that the onset of the Cold War era and the rise of a bi-polar international system provided an impetus to the emergence of the concept of regional cooperation among states, especially in Western Europe²⁷⁸. Similarly, with the end of World War II came a steady decline of European colonial powers. The fall of European colonial powers saw the newly independent post-colonial states move to establish regional integration arrangements as one of the ways through which they could consolidate their socio-economic and political independence²⁷⁹. Let us now briefly examine these two factors—the rise of the cold war era and the fall of European colonialism—and how they contributed to the emergence of regional integration arrangements in the post World War II era.

(iii) Regional Integration Arrangements: the Cold War Era and the end of European Colonialism

Although regionalism became a dominant aspect of the international political system immediately after the end of World War II and the beginning of the Cold War era, it is important to note that as a political concept, regionalism pre-dates the two. Hence, despite being portrayed in the literature as a novel phenomenon in the international political system, it is worth noting that regionalism has long historical roots which can be traced back to the 19th century²⁸⁰. One of the earliest manifestations of regionalism bearing the essential features of contemporary regional integration arrangements was the

bearing the essential features of contemporary regional integration arrangements was the German Zollverein²⁸¹. A Customs Union formed in 1834 among eighteen small states, the Zollverein functioned as an important catalyst for a united Germany later in the century²⁸². However, while empirical examples on regionalism abound throughout history, contemporary literature on regionalism mainly focuses on the regional integration arrangements formed in the post World War II era. The main reason for focusing on this era is that the regional integration arrangements formed during this period have a much closer connection with the current landscape of the international political system²⁸³.

The concept of regionalism as currently discussed in the literature began in the 1950s when the European Community (now the European Union), with the approval of the United States, emerged onto the international political landscape²⁸⁴. The main purpose of the European Economic Community—as expressed in the Schuman Declaration—was to prevent another war in Europe by binding European states through economic ties²⁸⁵. The United States of America’s efforts to rehabilitate war-torn Europe by means of measures such as the Marshall Plan, which was itself conditioned by concerns about the growing influence of the Soviet Union, provided a firm foundation for the establishment of the European Community²⁸⁶.

Since the formation of the European Community in the 1950s, regionalism has evolved within two distinct periods generally termed as “the First Regionalism” and “the Second Regionalism”²⁸⁷. The first regionalism phase picked up pace in the 1960s. During this period, a number of regional trading arrangements flourished across different regions of the world. Some of these were the North Atlantic Free Trade Area (NAFTA—not to be confused with “NAFTA”—the North American Free Trade Agreement), The Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA), the Lagos Plan of Action (LPA) and the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN)²⁸⁸.

During the first phase of regionalism, regional integration among the different integrating countries was mainly driven by politically-motivated strategic concerns²⁸⁹. Hence, as mentioned above, it was politically-motivated strategic concerns that compelled the US to play a major role in overseeing both the emergence and formation of the European Community. The US supported the emergency of the European Economic

Community (now the European Union) because it was America's political strategic consideration that a stronger Europe would counter-balance the rising influence of the Soviet Union in Central and Eastern Europe²⁹⁰. Based on the same logic of containing a powerful political adversary, most regional integration arrangements—the LAFTA, the LPA and the ASEAN among others—in the post-colonial world were formed as a means of maintaining internal solidarity against the ex-colonial Western powers²⁹¹. For the newly independent countries, regional integration arrangements provided one of the strategic moves that they could pursue in their bid to break free from the political and economic domination of their ex-colonial masters²⁹².

However, after being in operation for three decades and despite having set out amidst much gusto and fanfare, most of the regional integration initiatives under first regionalism were in dire need of a new direction and vision by the beginning of the 1980s²⁹³. While most of the post World War II regional integration arrangements had set out to secure political security and advance socio-economic development in their respective regions, these objectives—perhaps with the exception of the European Economic Community—had not been attained to any impressive degree by the end of the 1970s. Hence, most regional integration arrangements came to the sobering conclusion that after three decades of existence, they had not achieved their desired objectives. Perhaps the question to ask at this juncture is this: Why did regional integration arrangements (and especially those in the post-colonial states) under the first wave of post World War II regionalism fail to achieve their desired objectives?

The literature suggests that the futility of the first regionalism stems mainly from the format and rationale of these initiatives²⁹⁴. While regional integration initiatives under the first regionalism were heavily driven by politically motivated strategic issues such as containing Soviet expansionism or breaking loose from the grip of ex-colonial powers, most of them either neglected or out-richtly misunderstood the socio-economic aspects of their objectives²⁹⁵. As a result, their economic significance was greatly limited by their inward looking orientation and the pursuit of protectionist policies such as import-substitution policies²⁹⁶. The end result was that while most of these regional integration initiatives were driven by political considerations, they lacked the economic muscle to back their integration objectives²⁹⁷.

The failure of the first wave of regionalism paved the way for the rise of the second wave of regionalism, which emerged in the late eighties and early nineties, reaching its peak with the launch and completion of the Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) negotiations²⁹⁸. This second wave of regionalism, which was unprecedented in its intensity, is represented by among other regional integration arrangements: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR), the African Caribbean Pacific (ACP) trading arrangement and the African Economic Community (as envisaged in the Abuja Treaty of 1991)²⁹⁹. It has been argued that globalization has played a significant role in propelling the phenomenal growth of second regionalism, particularly in the post-Cold War era. In the next section, I examine how globalization has influenced the rise of post-Cold War regional integration arrangements.

(iv) Regional Integration Arrangements and Globalization in the Post-Cold War Era.

Globalization has become an important theme in the post Cold War analysis of the international political system³⁰⁰. The central contention of the globalization metaphor is that there is increasing interconnection and interdependence between the states and the societies of the international system³⁰¹. The common images evoked by globalization are: a global flow of money, people, values and ideas. Due to this global flow, some scholars have stated that the international system is witnessing the emergence of a 'borderless world' nay, the 'end of geography'³⁰².

According to the proponents of globalization, there are a number of indicators to support the view that we are living in an increasingly globalized world³⁰³. First, the international political system is witnessing a dramatic increase in the density and depth of economic interdependence. Second, both the information technology and the information revolution phenomena are playing an important role in globally diffusing knowledge, technology and ideas. Third, the integrating and homogenizing influence of market forces continue to facilitate increased global flows of values, knowledge, ideas and the ability of like-minded groups to organize across national boundaries³⁰⁴. The ability to organize at

cross-national levels has created a trans-national civil society that includes both trans-national policy communities and trans-national social movements³⁰⁵. Fourth and finally, the foregoing global developments have led to an unprecedented and growing consciousness of ‘global problems’ (such as global environmental change) and fostered a sense of belonging to a single human community³⁰⁶. So, how does the emergence of this seemingly ubiquitous post-Cold War globalized world relate to the unprecedented emergence of regional integration arrangements in this era? It is to this question that I now turn.

Although the relationship between regional integration arrangements and globalization in the post Cold War era has generated a substantial amount of literature³⁰⁷, I limit my discussion to two central views that have emerged from the literature concerning this relationship. The first view contends that post Cold War globalization has worked against the emergence of regional integration arrangements while the second view claims that globalization has provided an avenue for both the emergence and the entrenchment of regional integration arrangements within the international political system³⁰⁸. I examine these two opposing views in turn, beginning with the view that post Cold War globalization militates against the emergence of regional integration arrangements.

Two reasons have been advanced to explain how post Cold War globalization militates against the emergence of regional integration arrangements³⁰⁹. First, it has been argued that increasing levels of economic interdependence, together with the rise of new global issues—such as environmental degradation, growing numbers of refugees and complex humanitarian disasters among others—create a powerful demand for non-regionally based, issue specific international institutions designed to solve common problems and manage the numerous new sources of friction arising out of global interdependence³¹⁰. Second, post Cold War globalization has only served to create more room for the expansion and growth of socio-economic and political interdependence and cooperation among the OECD countries to the exclusion of the other poorer regions of the world³¹¹.

Hence, instead of providing an environment for the emergence of regional integration arrangements in different regions of the world, post Cold War globalization has helped foster powerful elements of Western cohesion, which are clearly inimical to regional cohesion in other parts of the world³¹². Reinforced by the Bretton Woods institutions, the Group of Seven (now Eight), transatlantic and transpacific security systems, the OECD-led regionalism has given regional integration a decisively Western outlook that has in turn constrained the emergence of coherent regional integration arrangements in other regions of the world³¹³. While the foregoing views cast globalization as being antithetical to regional integration arrangements, other views hold that globalization is the engine-head propelling the worldwide emergence of regional integration arrangements. Let us now turn our attention the views that have been advanced in support of globalization as a vehicle for regional integration.

There are a number of ways in which globalization may act as a stimulus to regional integration arrangements³¹⁴. Here, I analyse four. First, the ever-deepening integrative activities generated by globalization in the socio-economic and political realm create problems, which demand collective management, and regulation which goes beyond the limited confines of both the domestic affairs and the sovereign prerogatives of the state³¹⁵. This is a stimulus for regionalism since the demand for collective management and regulation that emerges out of the globalization process can only be effectively mitigated by supranational institutions such as those created through regional integration arrangements.

Second, some scholars have argued that the 'global' character of many issues is often exaggerated³¹⁶. According to this scholars, while some issues—such as climate change or loss of biodiversity—may have a truly global character, their impact is likely to be felt most directly in particular regions than others. In this case, the balance of interests and incentives is likely to reside in the region(s) that is/are most affected and hence, regional, as opposed to global policy responses may be more appropriate³¹⁷.

Third, regional integration arrangements offer the most viable level at which to reconcile the integrative market and technological pressures towards globalization on one hand and integration on the other hand³¹⁸. The lacuna created by the reduction in the

domestic regulatory role of the state due to globalization has opened vital socio-economic and political space that enables regional integration arrangements to act as the medium through which the balance of wealth and power among social groups within and across regions can be reconstituted³¹⁹. Viewed from this perspective, regional integration arrangements are essentially about issues of inequality and redistribution³²⁰.

Fourth, globalization may have acted as a powerful stimulus to regionalism (especially economic regionalism) by altering and intensifying patterns of economic cooperation³²¹. Changes in technology, in communications and in the operations of the global markets (all associated with globalization) have had a profound impact on how governments define their economic development and political autonomy in this era of globalization³²². For example, globalization has put pressure on states and compelled them to harmonize their economic policies in a bid to attract both foreign investment and the much needed new technology.

Additionally, the nature of competition under globalization has forced states and corporate actors to form larger units, both for economic efficiency and for the augmentation of the necessary political power needed to bargain effectively over the rules and institutions that govern the world economy³²³. Hence, regional integration arrangements have become a necessary part of the effort of states to cope with a pervasive globalization dragon that threatens to curtail their economic and political well-being. If regional integration arrangements are the medium through which corporate and state actors have sought to constrain the vagaries of globalization, the multi-lateral trading system is the medium through which the operations of regional integration arrangements are constrained. I examine regional integration arrangements and the multilateral trading system next.

(v) Regional Integration Arrangements and the Multilateral Trading System

As a result of the impressive gains made under the second regionalism, a new debate has emerged in the development literature; which of the two global trading systems—Regionalism vs. Multilateralism—is a better system in the promotion of socio-economic and political global prosperity? Traditionally, the desirability of regional integration has been discussed against the backdrop of multilateralism. Within this

integration has been discussed against the backdrop of multilateralism. Within this paradigm, a simple welfare analysis that weighs the “trade creation” and the “trade diversion” effects of regional integration has been used to measure the desirability of regionalism with respect to the multilateral trading system³²⁴.

However, some new-generation political economists have criticized the “trade creation” vs. “trade diversion” approach as being too narrowly focussed on the static aspects of economic welfare³²⁵. As such, these political economists argue that the trade-creation versus trade-diversion approach is incapable of capturing other socio-economic and political concerns that are necessary if the diffusion of the global benefits of regional integration is to occur³²⁶. Consequently, debate as to the desirability of regional integration has now been broadened to include other aspects beyond trade creation and trade diversion. The broadened debate seeks to find out, for example, whether regional integration arrangements are building blocks or stumbling blocks to broader global community welfare goals such as raising the standards of living of the poor and promoting sustainable development³²⁷.

Therefore, while regional integration arrangements have, for example, led to tremendous increases in global trade volumes, debate rages on as to how effective they are in dispersing the benefits of global trade, and hence promoting global prosperity. Two diametrically views have emerged from this debate³²⁸. On one hand, we have the view that regional integration arrangements are stumbling blocks to global prosperity due to their inability to allow global socio-economic and political benefits to percolate into their exclusive regional domains³²⁹. On the other hand, we have the view that regional integration arrangements are building blocks for global socio-economic and political prosperity due to the fact that they provide a basis for global multilateralism³³⁰. We shall examine these views in turn.

(a) Regional Integration as a stumbling block to global prosperity:

The view that regional integration arrangements are a stumbling block to global prosperity is examined within the following arguments:

- **External dynamics: regionalism as a stumbling block to global prosperity**

The view that regionalism is a stumbling block to global prosperity is based on the claim that regional integration arrangements cause a reduction in the aggregate global welfare³³¹. But how does regionalism bring about the reduction in aggregate global welfare? It does so mainly through competition. For example, at the economic level, regional integration arrangements compete with both non-member states and other regional integration arrangements in their bid to shift terms of trade in their favour³³². Raising tariffs against non-member states and other blocs is one of the common modes through which competition is manifested. As a result of high tariffs, global welfare is diminished because trading products of members within a given regional integration arrangement are protected irrespective of whether they are of the same quality or are produced under the same levels of efficiency as those of non-member counterparts³³³.

Another distinguishing feature of regional integration arrangements as stumbling blocks to global prosperity is their propensity to pursue mercantilist policies³³⁴. As already noted above, under the mercantilist mind-set, some regional integration arrangements seek to increase their trade surplus by importing less from non-member states while striving to export more to them³³⁵. Although this concept clearly violates the liberal idea of free trade that is supposedly one of the main trade principles of regionalism³³⁶, it nonetheless survives among most regional integration arrangements, especially the more economically established ones like the EU, NAFTA and MERCOSUR³³⁷. Additionally, the mercantilist behaviour is exhibited in the form of policy options reflecting the political reality of protectionism—such as the notorious Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) within the European Union³³⁸.

- **Internal dynamics: regionalism as a stumbling block to global prosperity.**

Another reason why regionalism is seen as a stumbling block to global prosperity stems from the fact that regional integration arrangements provide abundant opportunities for local interest groups to manipulate both their design and operation³³⁹. Under regional integration arrangements, producers of trade sensitive products can, for example use the sensitivity of their industry to serve their own economic interests to the detriment of the broader global economic interests³⁴⁰. What is more, once they are entrenched, it very difficult to break the interests of regional interest groups for the good of global welfare.

Hence in NAFTA for instance, due to the deep-seated power of interest groups, conventional trade barriers such as quotas in the agricultural sector have been phased out only through a tortuous and highly tedious process³⁴¹.

Furthermore, even when these conventional trade barriers are finally broken down, a host of new non-trade barriers such as the complicated “rules of origin” are invented in their stead. The rules of origin are designed to safeguard so-called “originating goods” with preferential treatment vis-à-vis “non-originating goods”, namely, goods imported from non-member countries³⁴². As Sungjoo notes, the complex, almost labyrinthine, character of such rules negatively affects the flow of international commerce by discriminating against non-members³⁴³. For example, under the NAFTA regime, arcane and idiosyncratic rules of origin still abound for specific products such as automobiles and textiles³⁴⁴.

These rules have had a definite negative impact on the flow of automobiles and textile products from other non-NAFTA members, hence reducing the aggregate benefits that are supposed to accrue from global commerce³⁴⁵. Therefore, although preferential rules of origin may help in boosting intra-regional trade (hence resulting in trade creation), to a certain extent, they generally block global trade flows (hence resulting in trade diversion) from non-member countries. When this is the case the trade-creation vs. trade diversion dynamics are such that any advantages achieved through regionalism are offset by the corresponding disadvantages³⁴⁶.

- **The “selfish hegemon” and the reduction of global prosperity role**

Some scholars highlight the dominant role of hegemony in the formation and operation of regional trading arrangements and argue that the hegemonic powers normally usurp the benefits from intra-regional trade in a disproportionate manner³⁴⁷. Empirical confirmation of the “selfish hegemon” thesis exists in the trade talks on intellectual property rights between the US and Mexico³⁴⁸. Under NAFTA, the US coerced Mexico into accepting a “one-on-one” bargain on intellectual property protection. So satisfied was the US over this easy trade concession with Mexico that it recommended it as an example worth emulating by other regional trades³⁴⁹. What the US failed to take into account when making the recommendation is the fact that it could not have gotten such a concession

from Canada, another NAFTA member who, though occupying the middle rung of NAFTA's pecking order, is capable of resisting such coercive trade negotiations³⁵⁰.

Another manifestation of the selfish hegemon thesis can be found in the so-called "hub-and-spoke" forms of regionalism. Under this type of regionalism, trade is characterized by bi-lateral trade arrangements between an economically superior central "hub" and economically inferior peripheral "spokes". In this kind of regionalism, the hub country/region is likely to benefit disproportionately from the spoke(s) country or countries/region(s). This is so because while the hub country/countries has/have duty free access to a variety of spoke countries/region markets resulting from bilateral arrangements, the spoke countries/region do not enjoy similar gains³⁵¹. The only option left for the spoke countries/regions is that they are forced to sign bilateral trading arrangements among themselves, thus forming a marginal "rim" of trade partners³⁵².

However, even more telling is that while the spoke countries are struggling to remain afloat in global commerce by such desperate measures as forming a trading rim, the hub country tends to prevail both in its own market as well as in the markets of the spoke countries due the advantages of the economies of scale³⁵³. Already blessed with a secure and well-established industrial manufacturing base, the hub country proceeds to reap the full benefits of its expanded export markets in the spoke countries with the contentment of knowing that the latter lack the economic wherewithal to break into its domestic market³⁵⁴.

While this picture already looks grim, the reality is that problems associated with the "hub-and-spoke" regionalism are likely to more serious in future. This is considering the fact that the greatest increase in trade regionalism notified to the World Trade Organization (WTO) so far is in the form of bilateral trade arrangements, normally between the developed (the hub) and the developing (the spoke) countries³⁵⁵. Under this arrangement, powerful regional integration arrangements like NAFTA and the EU could potentially exploit smaller and weaker trading partners, particularly those in the developing countries. COMESA's relationship with the EU has raised real concerns about the possibility of the emergency of a "hub-spoke" relationship that will see the EU effectively dominate COMESA at both socio-economic and political levels owing to the

examine the arguments in favour of regional integration arrangements as building blocks to global prosperity.

(b) Regional integration arrangements as building blocks for global prosperity

Two main arguments have been advanced in favour of regional integration arrangements as building blocks to global prosperity³⁵⁷. These are the “laboratory effect” argument and the “lock-in effect” argument.

- **The “laboratory effect” argument for regional integration.**

The laboratory effect argument provides one of the most powerful arguments for regional integration arrangements. The laboratory effect holds that regional integration arrangements are popular due to the fact that the negotiation and process for membership in a regional trading arrangement is much faster than that for membership in the WTO³⁵⁸. Another advantage of the regional integration arrangements is that once agreements are adopted and implemented, the experience gained and the lessons learnt through trial and error serve as a knowledge base for further improvement and or adjustment for a given regional integration arrangement³⁵⁹.

- **The “lock-in effect” argument for regional integration**

Some scholars argue that regional integration often leads to the “locking-in” of previous liberalization and reform efforts in a manner that prevents backsliding among the member countries of a regional trading arrangement³⁶⁰. This lock-in effect can be particularly attractive to governments of developing countries where reform efforts are normally stymied by deep-rooted anti-reform local powers³⁶¹. The lock-in effect enables these governments to stave off opposition to regional integration since all they have to do to resist making local concessions is to argue that their hands are tied by broader regional commitments³⁶². For example, in this context, it would be expected that individual member countries cannot reverse any socio-economic and political reforms made by COMESA at the regional level³⁶³.

Despite the fact that the debate on the effectiveness of regional integration arrangements as a viable strategy for socio-economic and political development in the post-Cold War remains heated and contentious (as can be seen from the foregoing views and sentiments), there can be no denying the fact that generally speaking, the socio-

Despite the fact that the debate on the effectiveness of regional integration arrangements as a viable strategy for socio-economic and political development in the post-Cold War remains heated and contentious (as can be seen from the foregoing views and sentiments), there can be no denying the fact that generally speaking, the socio-economic and political benefits of the second regionalism have been very impressive³⁶⁴. As already noted above, it can be argued that the success of second regionalism (in contrast to the failures of first regionalism) is largely due to its commitment to both the political as well as to the socio-economic concerns of the integrating countries³⁶⁵. What is more, the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of globalisation as a generally accepted trend in international development have laid a solid foundation for regional integration, especially given the fact that the world is no longer divided into two dangerously-opposed ideological camps. Since its emergence in the 1980s and its subsequent proliferation in the post-Cold War, second regionalism has become an important aspect of socio-economic development and political cooperation in different regions of the world.

However, despite the apparent gains of second phase of regionalism, the literature is mixed as to whether regional integration arrangements are the appropriate vehicles through which the expected socio-economic and political gains from globalization can be extensively dispersed to a majority of the global population. So far, the gains of second phase of regionalism have been uneven—with some regions like Europe, North America and to a certain extent, Latin America and Asia reaping impressive gains while others like Sub-Saharan Africa, getting negligible, if any, returns. While a number of factors have been advanced to explain the reason behind these regional disparities, in the next chapter, I adopt a comparative analysis approach and discuss some of these factors within the socio-economic and political context of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA. The main task in this chapter will be to establish, based on a number of selected development indicators, general socio-economic and political patterns and trends in the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN before making a comparison between these regional integration arrangements and COMESA and before finally drawing general conclusions on COMESA's role in the development of Eastern and Southern Africa.

--Chapter Four--

(i) Regionalism and Development: An Overview of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA.

In this chapter, I discuss the role of regionalism in development. I begin this section by presenting a general overview of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA within three main contexts: First, I look at the founding objectives of these regional integration arrangements, then second, I examine their institutional structures and operations and third and finally, I analyse their contribution to the socio-economic and political development of their respective regions. The analysis highlights the development achievements and limitations and or challenges of these regional bodies. As can be expected, all these regional integration arrangements have contributed differently to the development needs of their respective regions and all of them face unique challenges that reflect the complex dynamics of development both within their respective regions and at the international level.

Additionally, it can be seen that the level and degree of socio-economic and political development (as measured through such development indicators as intra-regional trade, regional infrastructure and the degree of citizen involvement) greatly varies across these regional integration arrangements but generally, it can be concluded that all of them have brought about some positive socio-economic and political development within their respective regions. It is against this backdrop that I make a comparative analysis between COMESA and the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN before examining both its challenges and prospects for Eastern and Southern Africa's development in the next chapter of this thesis. But before doing so, I first embark on the main focus of this chapter as already laid out above.

(ii) a. The EU: Founding Objectives

On 9 May 1950, Robert Schuman took up an idea originally conceived by Jean Monnet and proposed the setting up of a European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC)³⁶⁶. Following the establishment of the ECSC, European countries that had once fought each

other decided to pool the production of coal and steel under a shared authority—the 'High Authority'³⁶⁷. Through the ECSC and in a practical and symbolic way, the raw materials of war were being turned into instruments of reconciliation and peace³⁶⁸. The establishment of the ECSC set in motion a series of European integration activities that culminated into the EU as we know it today. Since the Schuman Declaration, and owing to a series of integration initiatives thereafter, the EU's objectives can be broadly identified as follows³⁶⁹:

- **The Establishment of Peace in Europe**

The idea of a united Europe was once just a dream in the minds of philosophers and visionaries. Victor Hugo, for example, imagined a peaceful 'United States of Europe' inspired by humanistic ideals³⁷⁰. However, two terrible wars that ravaged the continent during the first half of the 20th century seemed to have shattered the dream of building a peaceful 'United States of Europe'. But from the rubble of World War II, a new kind of hope emerged. People who had resisted totalitarianism during the war were determined to put an end to international hatred and rivalry in Europe and to build a lasting peace between former enemies³⁷¹. As a result of this new determination, between 1945 and 1950, a handful of European statesmen including Konrad Adenauer, Winston Churchill, Alcide de Gasperi and Robert Schuman set about persuading their peoples to enter a new era³⁷².

These leaders were determined to establish a new order in Western Europe based on the shared interests of both the European peoples and their nations³⁷³. The new order would be founded upon treaties guaranteeing the rule of law and equality between all countries in Europe³⁷⁴. The first manifestations of this order came into play in 1950 with the Establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (the ECSC). It was the start of more than half a century of peaceful co-operation between the member states of the European Communities. Under the Maastricht Treaty of 1992, the European Community institutions were strengthened and given broader responsibilities and the European Union (the EU) as we know it today was born³⁷⁵.

European integration activities provided a forum for Western Europe to both secure peace for itself and assure itself of peace, especially during the tumultuous Cold War era³⁷⁶. With the end of the Cold War, the peace agenda remained dominant and the EU played an instrumental role in the unification of Germany after the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989. When the Soviet empire eventually fell apart in 1991, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe that had for decades lived under the authoritarian yoke of the Warsaw Pact decided to seek a new world order and peace within the family of democratic European nations under the EU³⁷⁷. So far, the EU has succeeded in forging a sense of peaceful co-existence in Europe for over half a century.

- **Promotion of Safety and Security in Europe**

Although the EU has so far done a good job in promoting peace in Europe, it remains alive to the fact that the new demands of the 21st century still require Europe to deal with issues of safety and security. Hence, ensuring the safety and security of its 25 member states is one of the key objectives of the EU. In order to achieve this objective, the EU works closely with the regions just next to its borders— North Africa, the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East—and those beyond³⁷⁸. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has so far continued to provide the institutional structure within which Europe's peace and security is assured³⁷⁹. Additionally, the EU is committed to developing some form of continental security arrangement through the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP)³⁸⁰.

- **Promotion of European Economic and Social Solidarity**

The promotion of European economic and social solidarity is another important objective of the EU. The EU countries account for an ever smaller percentage of the world's population³⁸¹. This means that they must therefore continue pulling together if they are to ensure sustained economic growth for effective competition with the other major economies on the world stage³⁸². In this era of globalization, the EU recognizes that no individual EU country is strong enough to go it alone, especially on economic matters³⁸³. In order to achieve economies of scale and in order to find new customers, European businesses need to operate in a bigger market than just their home country

market³⁸⁴. To this end, the EU has opened up the single European market—removing the old obstacles to trade and cutting away the red tape—to boost intra-European trade and to strengthen the EU economic position in the international political system (see figures 1 and 2 on page 75 below).

While the EU is committed to promoting economic success in Europe, it is equally committed to the idea of counterbalancing the negative consequences of economic competition through a Europe-wide solidarity that is expressed in practical help for ordinary people³⁸⁵. For example, through the structural funds (managed by the European Commission), the EU encourages and backs up the efforts of national and regional authorities aimed at closing the gap between different levels of development in different parts of the EU³⁸⁶. Also, both the EU budget and the money raised by the European Investment Bank are used to improve the member-states transport infrastructure (for example, by extending the network of motorways and high-speed railways), thus providing better access to outlying regions and boosting intra-EU trade³⁸⁷.

However, the extent to which the EU satisfies the foregoing objectives, and therefore the socio-economic and political development needs of this region, largely depends on how the EU is organized. So, how does the EU's organizational structure look and how does this structure help in the promotion of socio-economic and political development within the EU? The response to this question follows in the next section.

(ii) b. The EU: Institutional Structures and Operations

▪ The European Council

The European Council is the EU's highest-level policymaking body. It brings together the presidents and prime ministers of all the EU countries plus the President of the European Commission³⁸⁸. The President of the European Parliament also addresses every European Council meeting³⁸⁹. The European Council dates back to 1974, when the EU's political leaders (the "Heads of State or Government"), began holding regular meetings³⁹⁰. The Single European Act (SEA) of 1986 made this practice official³⁹¹. The growing importance of the European Council is further reflected by the Treaty of Maastricht (1992), which made the European Council the official initiator of the Union's major policies³⁹².

Following the Maastricht Treaty, the European Council was given the responsibility to settle difficult issues on which ministers (meeting in the Council of the European Union) fail to agree on³⁹³. The European Council now meets, in principle, four times a year³⁹⁴. The President or Prime Minister of the country currently presiding over the Council of the European Union chairs it³⁹⁵. Some Member States would like the European Council to become the “Government of Europe”, with one of its members being the EU’s representative on the world stage³⁹⁶. But this is a contentious issue that raises a number of questions. For Example, would the European Council choose this person or would it automatically be the President of the European Commission³⁹⁷? Disagreement over this question continues. In the meantime, the EU’s representative on the world stage is the High Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy (a post created by the Treaty of Amsterdam), who is also Secretary-General of the Council³⁹⁸.

- **The Council of the European Union**

The Council of the European Union is the EU's main decision-making institution³⁹⁹. It was formerly known as the 'Council of Ministers', and for short it is simply called 'the Council'⁴⁰⁰. Each EU country in turn presides over the Council for a six-month period⁴⁰¹. One minister attends every Council meeting from each of the member states. The ministerial attendance of the Council meeting depends on which topic is on the agenda⁴⁰². For example, if the topic on the agenda is about agriculture, then the Ministers of Agriculture from the respective EU member states would attend the said Council meeting⁴⁰³. If the agenda topic is on foreign policy, then it will be attended by the Foreign Affairs Minister from each country and so on. There are nine different Council "configurations", covering all the different policy areas⁴⁰⁴. The Council's work as a whole is planned and co-ordinated by the General Affairs and External Relations Council⁴⁰⁵.

The preparatory work for Council meetings is done by the Permanent Representatives Committee (Coreper), made up of the member states' ambassadors to the EU, assisted by officials from the national ministries while the Council's administrative work is handled by its General Secretariat, based in Brussels⁴⁰⁶. The Council and the

European Parliament share legislative power as well as responsibility for the budget. The Council also concludes international agreements that have been negotiated by the European Commission⁴⁰⁷. According to the EU treaties, the Council has to take its decisions either unanimously or by a majority or "qualified majority" vote⁴⁰⁸. However, on important questions, such as amending the treaties, launching a new common policy or allowing a new country to join the Union, the Council has to agree unanimously⁴⁰⁹.

In most other cases, qualified majority voting is required. Qualified majority voting stipulates that a decision cannot be taken unless a specified minimum number of votes are cast in its favour⁴¹⁰. The number of votes each EU country can cast roughly reflects the size of its population and is as follows⁴¹¹:

- Germany, France, Italy and the United Kingdom: 29 each
- Spain and Poland: 27 each
- Netherlands: 13
- Belgium, Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary and Portugal: 12 each
- Austria and Sweden: 10 each
- Denmark, Ireland, Lithuania, Slovakia and Finland: 7 each
- Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Luxembourg and Slovenia: 4 each
- Malta: 3

From the numbers above, the total vote is 321. Out of these votes, a minimum of 232 votes (i.e. 72.3%) is required to reach a qualified majority⁴¹². In addition, the following two conditions must be met. First, a majority of member states (in some cases two thirds) must approve the decision, and second, any member state can ask for confirmation, in which case the votes cast in favour must represent at least 62% of the EU's total population⁴¹³.

▪ **The European Parliament**

The European Parliament is the elected body that represents the EU's citizens and takes part in the EU's legislative process⁴¹⁴. Since 1979, Members of the European Parliament (the MEPs) have been directly elected by universal suffrage every five years.

732 MEPs were elected at the June 2004 elections to represent the 25 EU countries in the EU parliament. Parliament normally holds its plenary session in Strasbourg and any additional sessions in Brussels. It has 17 committees that do the preparatory work for its plenary sessions and a number of political groups that mostly meet in Brussels.

Parliament and the Council share legislative powers, and they do so using three different procedures (in addition to simple consultation). First, there is the "cooperation procedure", introduced by the Single European Act of 1986. Under this procedure, Parliament gives its opinion on draft directives and regulations proposed by the European Commission, which can amend its proposal to take account of Parliament's opinion. Second, there is the "assent procedure", also introduced in 1986. Through this procedure, Parliament must give its assent to international agreements negotiated by the Commission, to any proposed enlargement of the European Union and to a number of other matters including any changes in election rules. Third, there is the "co-decision procedure", introduced by the Maastricht Treaty of 1992. This procedure puts the EU Parliament on an equal footing with the Council when legislating on a whole series of important issues including the free movement of people, the internal market, education, research, the environment, Trans-European Networks, health, culture and consumer protection. Parliament has the power to throw out proposed legislation in these fields if an absolute majority of MEPs vote against the Council's "common position". However, the matter can be put before a conciliation committee.

The European Parliament and the Council of the European Union also share equal responsibility for adopting the EU budget. The European Commission proposes a draft budget, which is then debated by Parliament and the Council. Parliament can reject the proposed budget, and it has already done so on several occasions. When this happens, the entire budget procedure has to be re-started. Parliament has made full use of its budgetary powers to influence EU policymaking. However, most of the EU's spending on agriculture is beyond Parliament's control.

Parliament is an important driving force in the EU politics. It is the EU's primary debating chamber, a place where the political and national viewpoints of all the member

states meet and mix with the intention of developing a common position. Since its establishment, the EU Parliament continues to play a role in shaping the outcome of the EU's legislative processes. For example, Parliament played a key role in drawing up the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (proclaimed in December 2000) and in setting up the European Convention following the Laeken European Council in December 2001.

Lastly, the EU Parliament is the body that exercises democratic control over the Union. It has the power to dismiss (this requires a two thirds majority) the Commission by adopting a motion of censure. It checks that EU policies are being properly managed and implemented—for example by examining the reports it receives from the Court of Auditors and by putting oral and written questions to the Commission and Council. The sitting President of the European Council also reports to Parliament on the decisions taken by the EU's political leaders.

- **The European Commission**

The European Commission is one of the EU's key institutions⁴¹⁵. The Commission has 25 members—one per EU country. It is required to act with complete political independence and since its job is to uphold the interests of the EU as a whole, it is required not to take instructions from any member state government. As "Guardian of the Treaties", the Commission has to ensure that the regulations and directives adopted by the Council and Parliament are being put into effect. If these regulations and directives are not being adopted as required, the Commission can take the offending party to the Court of Justice to oblige it to comply with EU law.

The Commission is also the only institution that has the right to propose new EU legislation, and it can take action at any stage to help bring about an agreement both within the Council and between the Council and Parliament. In addition, as the EU's executive arm, the Commission carries out the decisions taken by the Council in relation to the Common Agricultural Policy, for example. The Commission is also largely responsible for managing the EU's common policies, such as research, development aid and regional policy among others. It also manages the budget for these policies.

The Commission is answerable to Parliament and if Parliament passes a motion of censure against it, the entire Commission has to resign. It was when faced with just such a motion of censure that President Jacques Santer tendered the collective resignation of his Commission on 16 March 1999, allowing Romano Prodi to become President of the Commission for the period 1999-2004. The Commission is assisted by a civil service made up of 36 "Directorates-General" (DGs) and services, based mainly in Brussels and Luxembourg. Unlike the secretariats of traditional international organisations, the Commission has its own financial resources and can thus act independently on the implementation of its policy options.

- **The Court of Justice**

The Court of Justice is located in Luxembourg and is made up of one Judge from each EU country, assisted by eight Advocates-General⁴¹⁶. The Judges are appointed by joint agreement of the governments of the member states. Each is appointed for a term of six years, after which they may be reappointed for one or two further periods of three years. The Judges make their decisions based on the principle of impartiality and the Court's job is to ensure that EU law is complied with, and that the treaties are correctly interpreted and applied.

The Court of Justice can find any EU member state guilty of failing to fulfil its obligations under the treaties. Also, it can check whether EU laws have been properly enacted and it can find the European Parliament, the Council or the Commission guilty of failing to act as required. What is more, the Court of Justice is the only institution that can, at the request of the national courts, give a ruling on the interpretation of the treaties and on the validity and interpretation of EU law. When questions concerning the interpretation of the EU law are brought before the court in one of the member states, that court may—and indeed sometimes must—ask the Court of Justice for its ruling. This system ensures that EU law is interpreted and applied consistently throughout the European Union.

Finally, the EU Treaties explicitly allow the Court to check whether EU legislation respects the fundamental rights of EU citizens. The Court can give rulings on questions of

the EU citizens' personal freedom and security. It is within this context, for example, that "the Court of First Instance" (set up in 1989 and consisting of one judge from each EU country) is responsible for giving rulings on certain kinds of cases, particularly actions brought by firms or private individuals against EU institutions and disputes between the institutions and their employees.

- **The Court of Auditors**

The Court of Auditors was set up in 1977⁴¹⁷. It has one member from each EU country and this member is appointed for a term of six years by agreement between the member states and after consultation with the European Parliament. The Court of Auditors ensures that all the European Union's revenue has been received and all its expenditure incurred in a lawful and regular manner. It has the right to audit the accounts of any organisation that is handling EU funds and, where appropriate, to refer matters to the Court of Justice.

- **The Committee of the Regions**

The Committee of the regions (CoR), set up under the Treaty of the European Union, consists of representatives of regional and local governments⁴¹⁸. These representatives are proposed by the member states and appointed by the Council for a four-year term. Under the Treaty, the Council and Commission must consult the CoR on matters of relevance to the regions, and the Committee may also adopt opinions on its own initiative.

- **The European Investment Bank**

The European Investment Bank (EIB) is based in Luxembourg. It finances projects to help make the EU's less developed regions and small businesses more competitive⁴¹⁹.

- **The European Central Bank**

The European Central Bank (ECB) is based in Frankfurt. It is responsible for managing the euro and the EU's monetary policy⁴²⁰. The EU pursues its socio-economic and political development agenda within the foregoing institutional infrastructure. Our

next question is: Given this extensive infrastructure, how has the EU so far performed in its quest to promote the socio-economic and political development of its member states? Let us find out.

(ii) c. The EU and Europe's Socio-Economic and Political Development

As can be clearly seen from the foregoing, the EU has an extensive institutional infrastructure within which it pursues Europe's socio-economic and political development agenda. Within this infrastructure, the EU has adopted a broad-based approach to development that goes beyond the narrow confines of economic growth concerns to encompass the social as well as the political well being of the EU citizens. The scope of this thesis does not allow me to present an exhaustive account of the EU's extensive socio-economic and political development commitment. However, here, I limit myself to identifying four main areas in which the EU has made some progress in meeting the development needs of the citizens of this region.

First, at the socio-economic level, the EU has attempted to bring about a sense of "being European and European belongingness" through educational and training programmes such as Erasmus (which promotes student mobility), Comett (technological education and training) and Lingua, which encourages people to learn foreign languages⁴²¹. Additionally, the EU has set for itself a target of having 10% of its students spend one year in another European country taking a higher education course⁴²². To this end, the EU has committed funds to such programmes as Socrates, Leonardo da Vinci and other youth programmes to encourage young Europeans to cast their nets wider when exploring educational opportunities in the EU.

Second, the EU has been able to bring about economic prosperity to the citizens of this region through the establishment of a single European market⁴²³. Under the single market, businesses, professions and trade unions have all moved ahead swiftly, adapting their strategies to the new rules of a much wider European market⁴²⁴. The benefits of the single European market have spread within the EU as a wider range of goods and services have become available through increased intra-EU trading activities (see figures 1 and 2 below).

Figure a: Growth in intra EU trade from 1990 to 2001





Figure b: Intra EU trade in 2001



Source: The figures above have been adapted from Eurostat, the statistical division of the EU.

Third, through the Lisbon Strategy, the EU has adopted a comprehensive program aimed at achieving the following⁴²⁵: the promotion of a knowledge-based economy within the EU; the protection of Europe's social safety-net programs, especially in terms of raising enough resources to take care of the EU's aging population while saving enough

for future generations; raising the employment rate from an average of 61% in 2000 to 70% by 2010 and increasing the percentage of women in the work force from 51% to 60% over the same period of time⁴²⁶. So far, the EU seems to be on the right track in so far as achieving some of the Lisbon strategy goals is concerned⁴²⁷.


Fourth and finally, at the political level, the EU has been active in the promotion of the citizens' rights within this region. To this end, the EU established the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union⁴²⁸. This Charter was solemnly proclaimed in Nice in December 2000 and further underpinned by the Treaty of Amsterdam⁴²⁹. This treaty introduces a procedure for suspending the EU membership rights of any country that violates EU citizens' fundamental rights⁴³⁰. Also, the Treaty extends the principle of non-discrimination so that it not only covers nationality but also gender, race, religion, age and sexual orientation⁴³¹.

However, despite having made tremendous progress in promoting socio-economic and political development among the member states, the EU still has some obstacles and limitations that it must overcome. First, the recent rejection of the EU Constitution by both France and Denmark is a clear indication that the idea of a united, single-document governed Europe is still far from being achieved⁴³². While the promoters of a European Constitution make the case that such a document will be less complex (as opposed to the current treaty regime contained in some 80,000 pages) and therefore likely to promote an efficient form of governance in the EU, the resounding defeat of the EU's Constitutional referendum at hands of the Danes and the French is a clear indication that the issue of a centrally-governed EU (under one constitutional document), is not yet popular with the nationals of the EU member-states⁴³³.

Another area of concern for the EU is that despite spending a lot of resources to promote the idea of a strong, united and popularly supported EU, available statistics indicate that the EU has not really succeeded (though the pre-2004 EU-candidate countries showed a higher EU affinity than the 15 EU member-states as figures 2 and 3 below show) in forging a strong European identity. As a result, the EU has oftentimes been criticized by its critics for being an overblown bureaucratic, nay technocratic,


institution that is far removed from the needs of the European people. To the critics, the EU's extensive institutions, especially the non-elected ones, serve no real purpose in the task of building a strong and united Europe and are therefore a clear manifestation of the democratic deficit within this regional integration arrangement⁴³⁴. What is more, the recent sharp divisions among the EU countries on whether to join or not to join, the US-led invasion of Iraq is a clear indication that European cohesion, especially in matters that require the adoption of a common foreign policy, is far from near cohesive.

Figure c: European Identity in the pre-2004 Candidate States



Source: Adapted from the Euro barometer (Thumbs-Up means “proud to be European” and vice versa).

Figure d: European Identity in the EU+15 member states



Source: Adapted from the Euro barometer (Thumbs-Up means “proud to be European” and vice versa).

Finally, at the international level, the EU has often been accused of trying to use its immense socio-economic and political power to protect its base through such unfair trade practices like the Common Agricultural Policy⁴³⁵. Additionally, the EU has been portrayed as an economic giant out to bully and manipulate other weaker nations and or regional integration arrangements to do its bidding, especially within the context of multilateral organizations such as the World Trade Organization⁴³⁶.

(iii) a. NAFTA: Founding Objectives

NAFTA is a comprehensive trade agreement between the US, Canada and Mexico. The agreement establishing NAFTA was signed on 17th December 1992 and came into force on 1st January 1994⁴³⁷. The 1994 NAFTA agreement broadened and superseded the 1989 Free Trade Area agreement between the US and Canada⁴³⁸. Prior to the establishment of NAFTA, the US was strongly committed to the promotion of a global GATT-driven multi-lateral trading system⁴³⁹. However, a number of reasons have been advanced to explain why the US has increasingly abandoned its commitment to the post

World War II multi-lateral trading system (a system in which it was the principal architect) especially since the mid 1980s. Here, I identify two.

First, it has been argued that the slow, long and time-consuming multilateral 1986 Uruguay GATT round of negotiations made the US increasingly impatient since its desire to revamp a sluggish economy via international trade was not being realized as fast as it would have wished⁴⁴⁰. Eager to recover from the global recession of the 1980s and impatient with the pace at which the rest of the World, especially the major economies of the world, was opening up to market neo-liberalism, the US opted to start trade negotiations with its immediate neighbours (in this case, Canada and Mexico)⁴⁴¹. These negotiations were seen as part of the US' bid to spur its sluggish economy through the use of its hegemon status to increase international trade with its natural trading partners (in this case its regional neighbours)⁴⁴². Hence, in pursuit of this goal, the US and Canada established a Free Trade Area in October 1987. Later, this trade area was transformed into the North America Free Trade Agreement in 1989 when Mexico joined the US and Canada to pursue a regional economic agenda⁴⁴³. Therefore, while the US had been committed to the multi-lateral trading system for the better part of the Cold War era, by the beginning of the 1980s, it became clear that this system was not responding favourably to its international trade expectations⁴⁴⁴.

A second view holds that the US abandoned its commitment to the multi-lateral trading system when it became clear that it could no longer hold its lead as the economic super-power in the World⁴⁴⁵. Given the increased levels of competition from Japan and the European Union in the mid 1980s and the rising economic threat from China and India, especially since the early 1990s, the US had no option but to adopt a regional strategy so as to stave off the threats posed by these emerging economies to its traditional global economic dominance⁴⁴⁶. Hence, according to some analysts, the establishment of NAFTA was a case of the US 'circling the wagons' and retreating into a secure and less threatening regional sphere in order to consolidate whatever gains accrued from such an arrangement. Additionally, the formation of NAFTA was seen as a new strategy through which the US could re-invent, if not re-energize, its waning global economic position⁴⁴⁷.

Whichever of the two positions outlined above one decides to adopt as the main impetus for the US' new found affinity for regionalism, it is important to note that in this era of globalization, the US, just like other nation-states in the world—both strong and weak—has opted to adopt regionalism as one of the means through which to confront the many challenges that a globalizing world has thrown at the hitherto existing Cold War international political system. The US, Mexico and Canada have established NAFTA as the institution through which to respond to the challenges of globalization both within the North American region and at the global level. So what objectives has NAFTA set for itself in order to make North America a competitive regional integration arrangement capable of securing the socio-economic and political needs of the peoples of this region in the globalizing post Cold War era? The following are NAFTA's objectives as spelt out in Article 204 of the NAFTA Treaty⁴⁴⁸:

- (a) Eliminate barriers to trade in and facilitate cross-border movement of goods and services between the territories of the parties.
- (b) Promote Conditions of fair competition in the Free Trade Area
- (c) Increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the parties
- (d) Provide adequate and effective protection and enforcement of intellectual property rights in each party's territory
- (e) Create effective procedures for the implementation and application of the agreement for the joint administration and for the resolution of disputes
- (f) Establish a framework for further tri-lateral, regional and multi-lateral cooperation to expand and enhance the benefits of the agreement

In order to accomplish the above objectives, NAFTA has established a number of institutional structures. Let us next examine these institutions.

(iii) b. NAFTA: Institutional Structures and Operations

▪ **The NAFTA Free Trade Commission (the FTC)**

This is the body charged with fulfilling NAFTA's objectives. The NAFTA Free Trade Commission is composed of Cabinet-level representatives and is required to meet

at least once a year in locations rotating among the three member states⁴⁴⁹. The FTC supervises the implementation of the agreement and resolves any disputes that may arise on its interpretation and application.

- **The NAFTA Secretariat**

The NAFTA Secretariat is composed of three national sections: the Canadian, the Mexican and the United States of America section⁴⁵⁰. It has three main functions. First, it supports the FTC and any of the working group(s) or committee(s) that the FTC may establish. Second, the Secretariat acts as the administrative assistant for NAFTA's dispute settlement panels and other related committees. Third and finally, the Secretariat acts—in a limited capacity though—as a depository for any investment related disputes.

- **Dispute Settlement Panels**

The dispute settlement panels provide a mechanism through which the disputes that have not been resolved by the NAFTA member states at the FTC level could be resolved⁴⁵¹.

- **The Committee on Standard-Related Measures (the CSRM)**

This is a committee of the Free Trade Commission. The CSRM's mandate is to monitor the implementation and administration of NAFTA's environmental objectives⁴⁵². This committee reports annually to the FTC and operates under five sub-committees namely:

- (i) The Land Transportation Standards Sub-committee (the LTSS): The task of this committee is to standardize the member-states land transport related measures on bus, truck, rail operations and the transportation of dangerous goods
- (ii) The Telecommunications standards sub-committee
- (iii) The Labelling of Textile and Apparel Goods sub-committee
- (iv) The Committee on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (the SPS): This committee facilitates technical cooperation for the enhancement of food safety and holds consultations on sanitary and phytosanitary measures among the NAFTA member states. Additionally, this committee deals with the following two issues: The promotion of harmonization of standards and consistency in the application of appropriate levels of protection for human health and

environmental standards among NAFTA states; and the issue of trade irritants: the SPS attempts to mitigate on trade dispute issues before they reach the panel.

- (v) The Commission for Environmental Cooperation (the CEC): The North American Agreement on Environmental Cooperation (the NAAEC, or simply the CEC) addresses environmental concerns among the NAFTA member states. The CEC is composed of the following three-fold structure: A Ministerial-level Council, a Secretariat for technical, administrative and operational support and a 15-Member multi-stake holder Joint Public Advisory Committee (JPAC).

NAFTA has been in existence for a decade now. How has it performed in terms of achieving its objectives and what role has it played in meeting the socio-economic and political needs of this region? The next section addresses this question.

(iii) c. NAFTA and North America's Socio-Economic and Political Development

Unlike the EU which adopts a central, continent-wide institution-driven approach towards meeting the socio-economic and political development needs of its member-states, NAFTA tends to focus more on the economic dimension of regional integration while leaving other social and political development concerns to individual member states. Therefore, while jointly computed NAFTA data on development indicators such as life expectancy, access to health and education may not be readily available, data computed on these indicators from the statistics of individual member states held by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) indicates that the NAFTA member-states (with the exception of Mexico) enjoy one of the highest standards of living in the world⁴⁵³.

However, these high standards of living do not necessarily form the basis for drawing a simple causal relationship between NAFTA and social development in North America. This is mainly because NAFTA member states have pursued different and autonomous social development agendas and the gains made in, for example, raising the life expectancy, maintaining high levels of access to education and health in this region are a reflection of national policy options and not concerted regional efforts. Having made the foregoing claim however, it is equally important to note that ten years of NAFTA's

existence in North America have not led to a drastic decline in the social development standards of this region. Therefore, while one cannot directly attribute North America's high standards of living to NAFTA, one cannot claim that the existence of NAFTA has led a dramatic decline in North America's standards of living. It is within this context that I make the following argument: since a significant portion of the US, Canadian and Mexican economic activities are now conducted under NAFTA (see table 1 below), overall, it is logical to postulate that NAFTA has positively contributed to the socio-economic (and by extension to the political) well-being of this region⁴⁵⁴. I will shortly elaborate on this assertion.

As already mentioned above, economic integration remains NAFTA's main point of focus. However, even within this economic dimension, unlike the EU that has opted for deep economic integration, NAFTA has opted for shallow economic integration among the member states, choosing to operate under a free trade area and showing no immediate plans to expand beyond the free trade area regime. In fact, Jordan Strasburger succinctly captures NAFTA's economic dimension as follows:

...the objectives of the agreement as envisioned by its progenitors did not include creating a "Common Market". A "Common Market" involves questions of political and economic national sovereignty by actually consolidating governing bodies, policies, and procedures under a single unified system. The countries party to NAFTA never intended to give up any portion of their independent sovereignty regarding trade policies and procedures. NAFTA was simply designed to (1) reduce or completely eliminate economic barriers and promote economic integration among the United States, Mexico and Canada; (2) promote the development of key legal frameworks needed to improve security for investments and thereby enhance investment; and (3) facilitate the free flow of goods and services by increasing the importance of trade and identifying trade opportunities for members of the three countries⁴⁵⁵.

So, within this decidedly economically-oriented framework, how has NAFTA fared in so far as promoting development in North America is concerned? While the literature on NAFTA's economic achievements is mixed, existing statistical evidence indicates that intra-NAFTA trade has intensified over the years⁴⁵⁶. Canada, the US and Mexico have become significant trading partners and as can be from table 1 below, intra-NAFTA export trade (at 56%) is higher than extra-NAFTA export trade with the EU (at 14.6 %), Asia (at 17.4 %) and the Rest of the World (at 12.0%). In terms of imports (see table 1

below), NAFTA member states have equally become more dependent on each other with intra-NAFTA imports being 38.1 % while extra-NAFTA import trade stands at 17.6% with the EU, 31.5% with Asia and 12.8% with the rest of the world.

Table 1

NAFTA's International Trade Outlook in 2001 (Shares of Exports and Imports in Percentage Form)

	Destination	Destination	Destination	Destination
Exporter	NAFTA	EU	ASIA	ROW
NAFTA	56.0	14.6	17.4	12.0
EU	10.9	61.0	7.2	20.9
ASIA	26.3	14.7	48.1	10.9
Importer	NAFTA	EU	ASIA	ROW
NAFTA	38.1	17.6	31.5	12.8
EU	8.1	58.9	12.0	21.0
ASIA	13.7	12.1	56.3	18.0

Source: IMF Direction of Trade Statistics, in NAFTA 2004 Report, p. 8.

Similarly, over the last ten years, trade among the NAFTA member states has grown tremendously. For example, since the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, total merchandise trade between the US and Canada has grown by over 120% and close to 140% in goods and services⁴⁵⁷. Currently, trade between the US and Canada stands at US \$ 1.08 billion a day⁴⁵⁸. On the other hand, trade between the US and Mexico has grown at an annual rate of 11% jumping from US \$ 81.5 billion in 1993 to US \$ 235.5 billion in 2000⁴⁵⁹. Trade between the US and Mexico now stands at US \$638 billion⁴⁶⁰.

At the political level, though NAFTA does not have established institutions to pursue its political agenda, it has none the less managed to make some political mileage within the synergies created under its economic integration framework⁴⁶¹. Apart from capitalizing on the economic integration synergies to develop a common political agenda, the September 11 terrorist attack on the US provided another important reason for political cooperation among the NAFTA member states. The post September 11 cooperation is forged within the context of bilateral relations between the US and Canada and the US and Mexico and is based on the principle of "Secure But Open Borders"⁴⁶². As a result of this cooperation, the US and Canada are currently working on the "Smart

Borders Accord” while the US and Mexico are pursuing the “Border Partnership Action Plan”⁴⁶³.

NAFTA’s socio-economic and political development record in the North American region is however not without challenge. Since its inception in 1994, NAFTA has generated a lot of debate in so far as its efficacy as the appropriate institution for North America socio-economic and political development is concerned. Some of the main limitations that NAFTA suffers include:

(i) A Weak Institutional Architecture

Although the literature is mixed on the need for deepening NAFTA’s institutional architecture, some critics argue that NAFTA’s institutions are either under-developed or insufficient and therefore incapable of effectively meeting the socio-economic and political demands of North America, especially in this era of globalization⁴⁶⁴. For example, these critics point out that though the Secretariat is supposed to be NAFTA’s backbone, it is weak and ineffective due to the fact that each NAFTA member state runs an independent Secretariat. As a result, NAFTA has been characterized by the following⁴⁶⁵:

- Skewed terms of trade in selected areas
- Differential subsidization, especially in agriculture, among member-states
- Lack of sufficient country data, and therefore, lack of detailed NAFTA data analysis
- Lack of up to date market structure evolution
- Increasing incidents of trade disputes

(ii) Business Sovereignty over People Sovereignty

One of the biggest criticisms of NAFTA has been its overwhelming focus on economics and its apparent neglect of other socio-political concerns in the region⁴⁶⁶. For example, critics argue that while the economic benefits of NAFTA has been impressively huge, they have only benefited big-business to the detriment of small-businesses and the North American labour market (especially the Canadian and American labour markets) has suffered inordinately as a result of NAFTA. Critics further contend that NAFTA has

led to the loss of jobs from the high cost Canadian and US labour markets to the low cost Mexican labour market⁴⁶⁷. What is more, since NAFTA does not have a social safety net mechanism for those who are affected by the negative consequences arising out of its regional economic agenda, this burden has been shifted to individual member-states where it has not been adequately addressed⁴⁶⁸. Therefore, while NAFTA has made business sovereign, and in fact made it easier for businesses to relocate their capital within the region, it has taken away peoples' sovereignty in this region in the sense that its limited institutional infrastructure has denied them a chance to actively shape its policy directions, especially those that have a direct impact on their socio-economic and political well-being.

(iii) NAFTA and the US: A Selfish Hegemon at Work

Given its huge economic and political might within NAFTA, the US has at times been portrayed as a selfish hegemon out to compel Canada and Mexico to do its socio-economic and political bidding. For example, critics accuse the US of giving concessions mostly on those trade issues that only advance its economic interests most and not those of the other member-states⁴⁶⁹. Additionally, the US has tended to promote a hub versus spoke kind of regionalism in North America where, although it is under a tri-partite agreement with Canada and Mexico under NAFTA, it seems to prefer a bilateral, as opposed to a regional approach while dealing with the two member states⁴⁷⁰.

Therefore, while NAFTA has certainly made impressive gains on the economic front, the interpretation of the benefits of these gains is mixed, with some arguing that the gains have been good for North America in general while others contending that these gains have only benefited North America's big business conglomerates, especially those in the US⁴⁷¹. Hence, if NAFTA intends to play a more proactive role in promoting socio-economic and political development in North America, it must come up with mechanisms to limit its current shortcomings at both the socio-economic and political levels. Some of these mechanisms include establishing a central Secretariat and creating an institutional base that is capable of actively involving the citizens of this region in NAFTA's integration activities.

(iv) a. MERCOSUR: Founding Objectives

The Latin American region was once ruled only under two metropoli located in the Iberian Peninsula⁴⁷². Over time, and owing to a number of internal and external political forces, Latin America was divided into the 19 states that currently make up the region⁴⁷³. However, although the fragmentation of Latin America seems to have gone on unabated, it is important to note that the political leaders of this region have always sought to stem the region's fragmentation by taking measures aimed at restoring its original unity. Simon Bolivar made the first attempts at restoring Latin American unity when he called two Pan-American Congresses (the first one in 1819 and the second one in 1826) to discuss the issue of the restoration of Latin American unity⁴⁷⁴. These Congresses failed to reverse Latin American's fragmentation.

However, the failures of these two congresses to bring about unity in the early and mid nineteenth century did not extinguish the desire for unity in Latin America. On the contrary, this desire was rekindled again in the 1960s, but unlike the earlier attempts that had sought continent-wide unity, the 20th century Latin American unity initiatives opted for a regional integration approach as a means through which to attain continent-wide unity⁴⁷⁵. Some of the key regional integration arrangements that were established towards attaining this goal include⁴⁷⁶: the Central American Common Market (the CACM) established in 1960; the Andean Pact and the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) both established in 1969 and the Common Market of the Southern Cone (MERCOSUR—the focus of this section) established in 1991⁴⁷⁷. The following are MERCOSUR's member-states: Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. While the socio-economic and political gains of the CACM, the Andean Pact and the CARICOM have generally been lacklustre, MERCOSUR stands out for having made the most impressive gains in this region.

However, as will be shown shortly, while MERCOSUR has set for itself concise and fairly attainable objectives and despite making some fairly impressive gains, it still has a number of socio-economic and political obstacles that it must overcome in order to consolidate its gains and thus continue playing an important role as the vehicle for development in Latin America. But before making an assessment of MERCOSUR's gains and challenges, we need to start by looking at its objectives. The following are MERCOSUR's objectives as set out in the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion⁴⁷⁸:

- (a) Promote the free movement of goods, services and factors of production between the members states through, *inter alia*, the elimination of customs duties and the non-tariff restrictions on the movement of goods and any other equivalent measures.
- (b) Establish a Common External Tariff (CET) and adopt a common trade policy in relation to third states or groups of states and coordinate positions in regional and international economic and commercial forums.
- (c) Coordinate macro-economic and sectoral policies between the member states in the areas of foreign trade, agriculture, industry, fiscal and monetary matters, foreign exchange and capital, services, customs, transport and communications and any other areas that may be agreed upon in order to ensure proper competition between the member states.
- (d) Secure the commitment from member states to harmonize their legislation in the relevant areas in order to strengthen the integration process

MERCOSUR has established an institutional infrastructure to achieve the above set objectives. The next section offers a brief discussion of MERCOSUR's institutional structures and operations.

(iv) b. MERCOSUR: Institutional Structures and Operations

- **The Council of the Common Market (the CCM)**

This is the highest policy-making organ of MERCOSUR⁴⁷⁹. It is charged with the responsibility of providing political leadership for the integration process and for making decisions to ensure the achievement of the objectives defined in the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion. The CCM is made up of Ministers' for Foreign Affairs and Ministers' of the Economy of member states or their equivalents.

The Presidency of the CCM rotates among the member-states in alphabetical order for periods of six months. The CCM meets whenever deemed appropriate but at least once every six months, and the meetings are normally graced with the participation of the Presidents of member states. The meetings are co-ordinated by Ministers for Foreign

Affairs and other Ministers or Ministerial authorities may be invited. The rulings of the CCM take the form of Decisions and are binding upon member states.

- **The Common Market Group (the CMG)**

This is the executive organ of MERCOSUR⁴⁸⁰. It consists of four members and four alternates from each country appointed by their respective governments. The CMG must include representatives of ministries for Foreign Affairs, ministries of the Economy or their equivalents and the Central Banks of the member-states. The CMG is co-ordinated by the Ministers for Foreign Affairs. It may call representatives of the member states governments or other MERCOSUR organs if and where these are needed to help meet or further MERCOSUR's objectives. The CMG holds extra-ordinary meetings as often as necessary and in accordance with its terms and rules of procedure. Its rulings take the form of Resolutions, which are binding upon member-states.

- **The MERCOSUR Trade Commission (the MTC)**

Together with the Common Market Group, the MTC monitors the application of the common trade policy instruments agreed upon by the MERCOSUR member states⁴⁸¹. The MTC is made up of four members and four alternates from the member-states and is co-ordinated by MERCOSUR's respective Ministries of Foreign Affairs. It meets at least once a month or whenever it is requested to meet by the Common Market Group or any member-state.

The MTC is responsible for considering complaints referred to it by its National Sections and originated by member-states or individuals, whether natural or legal persons, relating to the situations provided for in Articles 1 to 25 of the Brasilia Protocol, if and when they fall within its sphere of competence

The decisions of the MTC take the form of Directives or Proposals which are binding upon the member-states.

- **The Joint Parliamentary Commission (the JPC)**

The JPC represents the parliaments of MERCOSUR member states, in accordance with their internal procedures⁴⁸². It consists of equal members of parliament representing the member states. The members of the JPC are appointed by the respective national parliaments. The JPC's duties include: speeding up the internal procedures in member states to ensure prompt entry into force of decisions taken by MERCOSUR and working to harmonize legislation in order to advance the integration process. The JPC makes recommendations to the Council through the Common Market Group.

- **The Economic-Social Consultative Forum (the ESCF)**

The ESCF represents economic and social sectors within MERCOSUR⁴⁸³. It consists of equal numbers of representatives from each member state. The ESCF plays a consultative role on social and economic matters in MERCOSUR. Its views are expressed in the form of recommendations to the Common Market Group.

- **The MERCOSUR Administrative Secretariat**


The Administrative Secretariat is based in the City of Montevideo⁴⁸⁴. It is responsible for providing services to the other MERCOSUR organs and among other things, does the following: serves as the official archive for MERCOSUR documentation; publishes and circulates decisions adopted within the framework of MERCOSUR; organizes the logistical functions of the meetings of all the MERCOSUR organs; informs member-states about measures being taken by individual members states to incorporate MERCOSUR's decisions into their legal systems and finally, draws up MERCOSUR budget and ensures its proper implementation. A Director who is a national of one of the member-states heads the Secretariat. The Director is chosen by the Common Market Group on a rotating basis and holds office for a term of two years and may not be re-elected at the end of term.

(iv) c. MERCOSUR and Latin America's Socio-Economic and Political Development

As already noted above, compared to other regional integration arrangements in Latin America and indeed those in Asia and Africa, MERCOSUR has made impressive


gains, which have in turn meant higher socio-economic and political returns for its member states⁴⁸⁵. However, unlike the EU, MERCOSUR does not have an elaborate, region-wide institutional mechanism to distribute both the burdens and benefits of integration. Nonetheless, this regional integration arrangement has continued to see increased socio-economic and political benefits to its member-states⁴⁸⁶. At the socio-economic level, intra-MERCOSUR trade has continued to improve as the member-states turn more and more to each for trade. For example, as can be seen from graph 1 below, in 1990 and only one year before its formal establishment, intra-country trade among the states that would later make up MERCOSUR stood at only 9%. However, after eight years of existence, intra-MERCOSUR trade rose from 9% in 1990 to an impressive 25% in 1998⁴⁸⁷ (see graph 2 below). Also, with the exception of the automotive sector, the MERCOSUR member countries have eliminated quantitative trade barriers and are currently in the process of eliminating non-tariff barriers⁴⁸⁸. Similarly, under MERCOSUR's social dimension, this regional integration arrangement has broadened its internal agenda to cover such areas as education, labour, culture, environment, justice and consumer protection⁴⁸⁹. Recently, at a meeting held in Asuncion in June 18-19th 2005, MERCOSUR approved an accord on defending human rights and launched a US \$ 100 million regional cooperation fund to help fight poverty⁴⁹⁰.

Graph 1: MERCOSUR's Destination of Exports (1990)



Source: Adapted from Echandi (2001): p 384.

Graph 2: MERCOSUR's Destination of Exports (1998)



Source: Adapted from Echandi (2001): p 384.

At the political level, in 1998, MERCOSUR adopted a democratic clause as part of the region's treaty *acquis*⁴⁹¹. Under MERCOSUR, nation-states that were once hallmarks of repressive military dictatorships are slowly parting with this unenviable political culture and embracing a democratic culture, which without a doubt has created an environment within which sustainable development can occur⁴⁹². MERCOSUR has been fairly successful in shunning a return to military dictatorships in Latin America. For example, in 1996, MERCOSUR's commitment to a democratic political culture saw other member states engage in concerted diplomatic action that prevented Paraguay from slipping back into military authoritarianism⁴⁹³.

What is more, MERCOSUR has given the member-states the necessary political clout that has led to increased visibility in international multilateral institutions like the WTO as well as increased bargaining power among other well-established regional integration arrangements like the EU and NAFTA⁴⁹⁴. Generally speaking, MERCOSUR's success at both the socio-economic and political levels can be attributed to the fact that this regional integration initiative has elected to focus on a concise and achievable regional agenda as opposed to pursuing grand and unattainable, but lofty objectives, a mistake that led to the downfall of earlier regional integration arrangements in Latin America and as we shall find out in this thesis, one that still continues to impede successful regionalism in Africa. But despite its many socio-economic and political

achievements, MERCOSUR's is still confronted by a number of limitations in so far as pursuing its socio-economic and political mandate is concerned. Here, I identify and briefly examine three such limitations.

First, at the socio-economic level, although the 1991 Treaty of Asuncion states that economic integration should include services and factors of production, it makes no operational provisions on how this is supposed to be attained⁴⁹⁵. Hence, as Malamud notes, measures to promote the free circulation of services, capital and workers have either been scarce or ineffective⁴⁹⁶. Also, although MERCOSUR claims that it has a social dimension to its integration agenda, so far, the Consultative Social and Economic Forum lacks real power and is barely accessible to the citizens⁴⁹⁷. What is more, in terms of striking regional economic deals, unions and businesses prefer to lobby top ranking officials at home on matters that are of interest to them and not lower-ranking envoys in Montevideo⁴⁹⁸.

Second, even though MERCOSUR has seen tremendous increases in intra-member trade, this has not been accompanied by preferential treatment of the citizens of the member-states. As a result, the concept of intra-regional citizen remains weak⁴⁹⁹. Therefore, although free movement of people is part of MERCOSUR's objectives, so far, this objective remains but an idea. Consequently, the MERCOSUR flag remains a less meaningful insignia that is largely limited to the diplomatic arena of the member states.

Third and finally, at the political level, since all decision-making, dispute-settlement and implementation capacities are in the hands of member countries, MERCOSUR still remains heavy on diplomatic operations and light on juridical procedures. Therefore, even in those areas with agreed upon regional rules, there is a discordance of implementation due to dissimilar national implementation capacities⁵⁰⁰. Additionally, MERCOSUR has not made much progress at the political level, especially when it comes to the issue of enlargement. Hence, although a number of Latin American countries have expressed their intention to join; this is not happening, particularly given the fact that MERCOSUR lacks clear application procedures⁵⁰¹.

Therefore, while MERCOSUR has so far made some good progress in contributing to the promotion of socio-economic and political development among its member states, it must strive to overcome the above-mentioned limitations so as to enhance its capacity and so as to continue playing an important socio-economic and political development role for its members in particular and the Latin American region in general. For example, at the socio-economic level, the ESCF should be strengthened and given a more mainstream role in shaping MERCOSUR's social policy agenda. At the political level, MERCOSUR must develop a strategy for its expansion, including putting in place a clear application procedure.

(v) a. ASEAN: Founding Objectives

Like most other post-World II and Cold War era regional integration arrangements, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established in the 1960s. On 8 August 1967, five South East Asian countries, namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand met in Bangkok and out of this meeting, ASEAN was born⁵⁰². Brunei Darussalam joined on 8 January 1984, Vietnam on 28 July 1995, Laos and Myanmar on 23 July 1997, and Cambodia on 30 April 1999⁵⁰³.

Generally speaking, although ASEAN has been in operation for almost four decades now, the member states of this regional integration arrangement and other South East Asian countries in general never really embraced regional integration as a strategy for their development, especially at the socio-economic economic level⁵⁰⁴. As is the case with most parts of the third world, South East Asia's 1960's regionalism was more an affirmation of political autonomy (from the just vanquished colonial era) by South East Asian nations that was based on political-autonomy affirming rhetoric and not a means through which sustainable development in the region was to be attained⁵⁰⁵. Hence, despite the public declarations of leaders in this region about their commitment to regionalism, none of them gave regionalism serious attention as an avenue for development, especially in the formative years of independence.

However, as Choi notes, the development and apparent success of regional integration arrangements in other regions of the world, especially in Europe (the EU) and North America (NAFTA) have forced many countries in East and South East Asia to

consider establishing more institutionalized regional integration frameworks ⁵⁰⁶ . Additionally, the post Cold War era globalization forces and the Asian financial crisis of 1997 have made the countries in this region more amenable to the idea of regional integration arrangements as a strategy for stable and sustainable socio-economic and political development ⁵⁰⁷ . It is within the context of this renewed interest in regionalism in East and South East Asia that I examine ASEAN and its role and or contribution towards meeting South East Asia's socio-economic and political development. I embark on this task by first giving the following outline of ASEAN's objectives⁵⁰⁸:

- (a) To accelerate the economic growth, social progress and cultural development in the region through the framework for elevating functional cooperation to a higher plane
- (b) To promote regional peace and stability through abiding respect for justice and the rule of law in the relationship among countries in the region and adherence to the principles of the United Nations Charter
- (c) To promote political cooperation and regional security cooperation, through the ASEAN Regional Forum, based on the principles of self-confidence, self-reliance, mutual respect, cooperation, and solidarity among the member states

(v) b. ASEAN: Institutional Structures and Operations

- **the ASEAN SUMMIT**

This is the highest-decision making body in ASEAN⁵⁰⁹ . It is made up of the Heads of State and or Government of the member states. The Summit holds its meetings annually, and whenever decided, the Summit is preceded by a Joint Ministerial Meeting of the Foreign and Economic Ministers.

- **The ASEAN Standing Committee**

This Committee is under the Chairmanship of the Foreign Minister of the country-in-chair and is mandated to coordinate the work of the Association in between the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (the AMM)⁵¹⁰ . The ASEAN Chair and Vice Chair are elected based on alphabetical rotation of all ASEAN Member Countries.

- **The ASEAN Secretariat**

The ASEAN Secretariat is headed by the Secretary-General⁵¹¹. Its mandate is to initiate, advise, coordinate, and implement ASEAN activities. The operational budget of the ASEAN Secretariat is prepared annually and funded through equal contribution of all ASEAN Member Countries.

- **Committees in Third Countries**

These Committees are composed of Ambassadors of all ASEAN Member Countries based in the capitals of the ASEAN Dialogue Partners and other countries⁵¹². ASEAN has 11 Dialogue Partners, namely Australia, Canada, China, European Union, India, Japan, New Zealand, Republic of Korea, the Russian Federation, the United States and the United Nations Development Programme.

- **ASEAN's Specialized Agencies**

Apart from the above institutions, ASEAN is supported by several specialized Agencies based in different ASEAN capitals⁵¹³. Some of these agencies are: ASEAN University Network, ASEAN-EC Management Centre, ASEAN Centre for Energy, ASEAN Agricultural Development Planning Centre, ASEAN Earthquake Information Centre, ASEAN Poultry Research and Training Centre, ASEAN Regional Centre for Biodiversity Conservation, ASEAN Rural Youth Development Centre, ASEAN Specialized Meteorological Center, ASEAN Tourism Information Centre, and ASEAN Timber Technology Centre.

From the foregoing, it can be seen that compared to NAFTA and MERCOSUR, ASEAN has a fairly extensive institutional structure. But has ASEAN effectively employed this extensive institutional infrastructure both to attain its objectives and to enhance socio-economic and political development in South East Asia? Let us find out.


(v) c. ASEAN and South East Asia's Socio-Economic and Political Development

At the socio-economic development level, ASEAN's focus has been in the following sectors⁵¹⁴: trade, investment, industry, services, finance, agriculture, forestry,

energy, transportation and communication, intellectual property, small and medium enterprises, and tourism. Within these sectors, ASEAN has made some commendable progress. For example, after establishing the ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA) and within three year of AFTA operation, exports among ASEAN countries grew from US\$43.26 billion in 1993 to almost US\$80 billion in 1996, an average yearly growth rate of 28.3 percent⁵¹⁵. In the process, the share of intra-regional trade from ASEAN's total trade rose from 20 percent to almost 25 percent over the same period⁵¹⁶.

Additionally, as can be seen from figure 1 below and based on the 2004 provisional estimates, ASEAN has substantially cut down intra-regional tariffs and therefore, virtually established a Free Trade Area in the region. Intra-regional tariff has gone down by more than 90 percent to fall within the 0-5 percent tariff range for the products in the Common External Preferential Trade Inclusion List (IL). In addition to trade and investment liberalization, ASEAN has sought to promote economic development through the development of a regional transport, telecommunications and energy infrastructure⁵¹⁷.

Figure 1: Percentage of Tariff Lines at 0-5percent in the Tentative 2004 CEPT Package



At the transportation services level, the Trans-ASEAN Transportation Network, consisting of major inter-state highway and railway networks, principal ports and sea-

lanes for maritime traffic, inland waterway transport, and major civil aviation links has been established⁵¹⁸. Through this network, ASEAN seeks both to improve and expand the national and regional infrastructure. At the telecommunication services level, ASEAN is promoting both the interoperability and interconnectivity of the national telecommunications equipment and services⁵¹⁹. Finally at the energy services level, ASEAN is building Trans-national energy networks, which consist of the ASEAN Power Grid and the Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline Projects⁵²⁰.

ASEAN's development focus goes beyond economic growth concerns to embrace other social development sectors like health and education⁵²¹. For example, on health matters, ASEAN member states have opted for a regional approach, especially on such cross-border contagions like SARS and other regionally pandemic infections such as HIV/AIDS⁵²². Hence, during the SARS health crisis, ASEAN leaders decided to undertake coordinated measures to contain the SARS outbreak that included⁵²³: the exchanging of information; the appointing of a focal/contact point in every country; carrying out joint SARS research and training programmes and standardizing pre-departure screening for international travelers.

On combating the HIV/AIDS pandemic, the ASEAN Senior Officials Meeting on Health Development (SOMHD) is in the forefront fighting to make anti-retroviral drugs accessible to HIV/AIDS patients in the region⁵²⁴. Based on the recommendations of the SOMHD meetings, ASEAN member-states have agreed to compile baseline data on the extent of unmet demands for Anti-Retroviral (ARV) drugs, patent laws, prices of ARVs, local capacity for production and administrative requirements for importing generics so that joint action plan could be prepared on options to increase access through such strategies as joint negotiation and bulk purchasing⁵²⁵. What is more, the SOMHD continues to exchange views on the WTO Doha Declaration on the Agreement on Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Right (TRIPS) and public health⁵²⁶. To this end, the SOMHD has endorsed the project proposal on: "Intellectual Property Law Review and Capacity Building on Intellectual Property Rights Related to Public Health in the ASEAN Region", which aims to address the issue of access to drugs⁵²⁷.

On the education front, ASEAN has attempted to popularize itself among its member states through the ASEAN Committee on Education (ASCOE)⁵²⁸. ASCOE held

its first meeting in September 2002 in Cambodia with a re-focused mission to promote ASEAN awareness in primary and secondary schools⁵²⁹. At the tertiary level of education, the ASEAN University Network (the AUN) continues to promote collaborative studies and research programs among its 17-member educational institutions⁵³⁰. The AUN has, among other things, conducted activities such as developing an ASEAN Studies Programme; Student and Faculty Exchange Programme; Scholarships for Graduate Students at ASEAN Countries; Information Networking among ASEAN Universities; and Collaborative Research⁵³¹.

Under the AUN, the University of Malaya launched a Master's Degree Programme in ASEAN Studies in June 2003 and now offers MA degrees in this field⁵³². Similarly, the AUN has facilitated faculty exchange through the ASEAN Distinguished Professors Program and continues to organize conferences, workshops and seminars for scholars within the ASEAN member states to both exchange views and to develop possible policy actions that will further help ASEAN achieve its objectives and meet its socio-economic and political development demands⁵³³.

In so far as political development is concerned, ASEAN has relied more on the diplomatic channels among the member states than a juridical regional structure to pursue both its regional and international political agenda⁵³⁴. Through diplomatic channels, ASEAN has made major strides in building cooperative ties with states in the Asia-Pacific region⁵³⁵. What is more, ASEAN has intensified its cooperation with other East Asian countries, especially with its major FDI contributors (i.e. China, Japan, and the Republic of South Korea) through holding annual dialogues with the leaders of these countries⁵³⁶. ASEAN also continues to foster political cooperation with its other Dialogue Partners who include Australia, Canada, the European Union, India, New Zealand, the Russian Federation, the United States of America, and the United Nations Development Programme⁵³⁷. Additionally, ASEAN has continued to maintain high visibility in the international political arena as most of its member states participate actively in the activities of the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM), and the East Asia-Latin America Forum (EALAF) and the WTO negotiations⁵³⁸.

Like the other regional integration arrangements discussed above, ASEAN suffers a number of limitations that have impeded its full socio-economic and political

development potential. I will examine these limitations within two main contexts. First, at the socio-economic level, despite having a seemingly ambitious agenda, ASEAN has not shown firm material commitment to the realization of this agenda. Second, although ASEAN seems to have made tremendous progress in liberalizing the economy and attracting substantial levels of FDI, it has not made similar strides in facilitating the free movement of people within the region and from its current institutional layout, such plans do not seem to be a priority issue⁵³⁹. But why should the free movement of people be a priority issue for ASEAN? The free movement of people in ASEAN should be a priority because of two main reasons. First, free movement of people will make it easy for labour to freely circulate within the region and second, having established a Free Trade Area, such movement will make it possible for the gains and losses of the FTA to be fairly distributed in the ASEAN region. This will lessen the short-term pangs of integration in the areas most hit by regionalism, for example through job loss, as the affected people will move to those areas that have either gained or not adversely suffered from integration.

Finally, at the political level, ASEAN is still a predominantly top-heavy institution that accords little room for citizens democratic input into its day to day operations. What is more, owing to its firm commitment to non-interference in the internal affairs of the member-states, ASEAN has not been very effective in promoting a democratic culture in South-East Asia. On the contrary, some of the ASEAN member states, like Myanmar, carry the unenviable reputation of being among some of the most repressive political regimes in the world⁵⁴⁰.

So far, I have presented a general overview of the role of regional integration arrangements in the socio-economic and political development pursuits in North America, Europe, Latin America and South East Asia. In my discussion, I have focused on the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN and highlighted the roles that these regional bodies have played in securing the socio-economic and political development needs within their respective regions. While I take note of the gains made by these regional integration arrangements in so far as the attainment of their development objectives is concerned, I equally note their limitations and point out some of the challenges they must seek to overcome in order to continue playing key roles in meeting development needs within

their respective regions. In the remaining section of this thesis, I turn my attention to the role of regionalism in meeting Africa's socio-economic and political development needs. I begin my discussion by first providing a general overview of regionalism in Africa. Then second, I focus on COMESA and discuss its role in the socio-economic and political development of Eastern and Southern Africa. Then in the final chapter of this thesis, I examine COMESA within a comparative context and analyze both its present challenges and future prospects in promoting socio-economic and political development in Southern and Eastern Africa.

(vi) a. Regionalism and Africa's Development: an Overview

As is the case with the other post-colonial regions of world (mainly Latin America and South East Asia), the rise of regional integration arrangements in Africa in the 1960s was mainly in keeping with the spirit of the national liberation movements that had, to large extent, contributed to the demise of the colonial era in the continent⁵⁴¹. Hence, the main driving force behind the original idea of regionalism in Africa was the desire by the newly independent African states to break away from the colonial era through creating geographic entities that were both economically independent and politically united⁵⁴². To this end, three Pan-African Conferences (the first held in April 1957, the second held in June 1960 and the third held in May 1963) were unequivocal in their advocacy of freeing Africa in an all round sense—i.e. socially, economically and politically⁵⁴³.

Two views emerged out of these Pan-African conferences. On one hand, was the view held by some African leaders, like Kwame Nkrumah, who argued that immediate continental unity through a Pan-African approach that would install a "United States of Africa" was the only way of securing a strong united front against other dominant political actors in the international system⁵⁴⁴. On the other hand, other African leaders, like Julius Nyerere, called for a gradual unification of Africa through a regional integration approach⁵⁴⁵. Eventually, the latter views prevailed. Therefore, at the launch of the Organization of African Unity (the OAU) at Addis Ababa in May 1963, African states incorporated regionalism as the *modus operandi* for socio-economic and political development and the avenue through which eventual continental unity could be attained⁵⁴⁶.

The experiment for the eventual, African-wide socio-economic and political unity and development via regionalism was designed to take place at sub regional levels in West Africa, Eastern and Southern Africa, Central Africa and North Africa. Some of the regional integration arrangements formed to fulfill this vision for African unity via regionalism include⁵⁴⁷: ECOWAS, ECCAS, PTA and SADCC and AMU. With these regional integration arrangements, the newly independent African states hoped to embark on the process of regional socio-economic and political development that would eventually lead to a continent-wide approach to African development⁵⁴⁸. However, like other regional integration arrangements in other parts of the world, Africa's regionalism had not brought about the expected socio-economic and political development gains by the 1980s. Why was this so?

A number of factors have been advanced to explain why, after two decades of operation, regional integration arrangements in Africa had not made much progress in attaining their set development objectives⁵⁴⁹. Here, I identify three. First, like other regional integration arrangements in other regions of the world, Africa's pre-1980 regional integration arrangements were caught up in pursuing a political agenda and insufficient attention was paid to the socio-economic dimension of regionalism. Hence, although one of the founding principles of regionalism had been the desire to secure full political autonomy by breaking away from the grip of the ex-colonial powers, the reality was different from the rhetoric, especially given the fact that most member states in Africa's regional integration arrangements continued to exhibit patterns that reinforced their strong links to their ex-colonial powers⁵⁵⁰. This was particularly the case in the French speaking West and Central African states where France played a strong underwriting role for a number of regional integration arrangements, key among them being UDEAC and CEAO. The regional integration arrangements in French West Africa and French Central Africa were seen as necessary counterweights to regional integration initiatives like ECOWAS that were seen as being predominantly Anglophone oriented⁵⁵¹. Hence, regionalism was emerging as a source of regional disunity and therefore acting contrary to the anticipated eventual emergence of African unity⁵⁵².

Second, and still at the political level, divergent political ideologies among the member-states of the different regional integration arrangements proved anti-thetical to

successful regionalism in Africa. For example, it has been argued that the ideological difference between Kenya (under a capitalist ideology) and Tanzania (under a socialist ideology) partly contributed to the break-up of the East African Community in 1977⁵⁵³. What is more, the politics of the Cold War era and the protection accorded to client states (like Zaire—now the DRC—during the ruinous three-decade Mobutu regime and Ethiopia under Mengistu) by the super-powers led to the emergence of some of the most brutal dictatorships in Africa⁵⁵⁴. The leaders of these super-power propped dictatorships cared less about the socio-economic and political well being of their citizens. Expecting that such regimes would muster the necessary political will needed for successful regionalism when they did not even care about promoting the socio-economic and political well-being of their individual states is, simply put, expecting too much.

Third, at the socio-economic level, most integrating member-states pursued import- substitution industrialization strategies that were inimical to the growth of complementarities since they promoted competition both for the acquisition of similar capital input goods and for the export of similar primary products to the same external market niche⁵⁵⁵. Furthermore, owing to their narrow resource base, most newly independent African states heavily relied (and most still continue to rely on) on tariff revenues as one of the main components of government revenue and since implementing regional integration schemes required, among other things, tariff reduction, most states found this a difficult policy to implement⁵⁵⁶. What is more, owing to their highly repressive character, most member states excluded their citizens from active involvement in the respective regional integration arrangements and therefore limited both the spirit of individual initiative and enterprise that are important catalysts for the emergence of strong regional economies⁵⁵⁷.

So, by the beginning of the 1980s, there was a need to re-evaluate and if possible, re-engineer regional integration arrangements in Africa. This need was captured in the Lagos Plan of Action (the LPA) of 1980⁵⁵⁸. The LPA laid out a new vision for regionalism in Africa that was supposed to steer African regionalism from the pre-1980s failures⁵⁵⁹. However, a combination of poorly implemented internal development policies and the Cold War era politics continued to militate against post 1980 African regionalism. The end of the Cold War era in the 1990s and the subsequent demands for socio-

economic and political reforms in most African states led to the re-birth of regionalism under the Abuja Treaty of 1991 that established a regional integration approach and vision for the emergence of the African Economic Community by 2025⁵⁶⁰. Given the changed circumstances in the international political arena (key among them being the end of the Cold War) and the internal socio-economic and political reforms taking place in Africa, it is my opinion that the Abuja Treaty stands a better chance of making regionalism a more meaningful strategy for Africa's development. I focus on a comparative analysis of COMESA to examine the renewed possibilities for regionalism as a development strategy. However, before embarking on this comparative analysis, I first present a general overview of COMESA (based on the same approach adopted for the other regional integration bodies above) in terms of its founding objectives, its institutional structures and operations and its socio-economic and political development achievements and limitations within the identified institutional structures and operations.

(vi) b. COMESA: Founding Objectives

With 20 member-states, the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) is one of the largest regional integration arrangements in Africa⁵⁶¹. COMESA covers the Eastern and the Southern half of the African continent, stretching from Egypt to the north of the continent to Zimbabwe to the South. COMESA was founded in 1993 as a successor to the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern Africa (PTA), which was established in 1981⁵⁶². It formally succeeded the PTA on 8 December 1994 upon ratification of the COMESA Treaty by 11 signatory states⁵⁶³. The establishment of COMESA was a fulfilment of the requirements of the PTA Treaty, which provided for the transformation of the PTA into a common market ten years after the entry into force of the PTA Treaty⁵⁶⁴. The following are some of the key objectives of COMESA as outlined in its founding treaty⁵⁶⁵:

- (a) To attain sustainable growth of the member states by promoting a more balanced and harmonious development of its production and marketing structures;

- (b) To promote joint development in all fields of economic activity and the joint adoption of macro-economic policies and programmes to raise the standard of living of its peoples and to foster closer relations among its members states;
- (c) To cooperate in the creation of an enabling environment for foreign, cross-border and domestic investment and in the joint promotion of research and adaptation of science and technology for development;
- (d) To cooperate in the promotion of peace, security, and stability among the member states in order to enhance the economic development in the region;
- (e) To cooperate in strengthening the relations between the common market and the rest of the world and in the adoption of common positions in international fora; and
- (f) To contribute towards the establishment, progress, and the realisation of the objectives of the African Economic Community

COMESA has established an institutional structure within which it hopes to attain the above set objectives. I briefly discuss this institutional structure and its operations next.

(vi) c. COMESA: Institutional Structures and Operations

- **The COMESA Authority (the Authority)**

The Authority is the supreme policy organ of COMESA, comprising of Heads of State or Government of member countries⁵⁶⁶. It is responsible for the general policy, direction and control of the performance of the executive functions of the COMESA and the achievements of its aims and objectives. The inaugural meeting of the Authority took place in Lilongwe, Malawi in December 1994. The Authority's decisions are reached through a general consensus, mostly during its annual summit meetings. The Head of State/Government of the country that hosts the annual summit assumes the Chairmanship of Authority for the year. The most recent summit of the Authority took place on 12-13th

June 2005 in Kigali, Rwanda. Therefore, the current Chairman of the COMESA Authority is Mr. Paul Kagame, the President of Rwanda.

- **The Council of Ministers (the Council)**

Each member state appoints a minister to participate in the Council of Ministers⁵⁶⁷. The Council monitors COMESA's activities, including the supervision of the Secretariat. It makes COMESA's policy recommendations and suggests the policy directions of the organization. The Council meets once a year. It reports to the Authority.

- **The Secretariat and the Secretary-General**

The COMESA Secretariat is headed by a Secretary-General who is appointed by the Authority to serve for a term of five years and is eligible for reappointment for a further term of five years⁵⁶⁸. He/She is the Chief Executive Officer of COMESA and its representative in the exercise of its legal personality. The Secretary-General is not expected to seek or receive instructions from any Member State or from any other authority external to COMESA in the performance of his/her duties. Additionally, the Secretary-General is required to refrain from any actions, which may adversely reflect on his or her position as an international official. On their part, Member States are required to respect the international character of the responsibilities of the Secretary-General and the other staff at the Secretariat and are therefore expected not to unduly seek to influence the Secretariat while it is discharging its responsibilities.

The duties of the Secretary-General include, but are not limited to, the following: submitting reports (in consultation with the Intergovernmental Committee) on the activities of COMESA to the Authority and Council; ensuring that the objectives set out in the COMESA Treaty are attained and to this end, either on his/her or own initiative or on the basis of a complaint, investigate a presumed breach of the provisions of the COMESA Treaty and report to the Council in accordance with an investigative procedure to be determined by the Council; presenting the budget of COMESA to the Intergovernmental Committee administering COMESA finances; and finally, promoting the adoption of joint positions by the Member States in multilateral negotiations with third countries or international organisations.

- **The Committee of Governors of Central Banks**

This committee advises the Authority and the Council of Ministers on monetary and financial matters⁵⁶⁹. It is responsible for the development of programmes and action plans in the field of finance and monetary co-operation and is made up of Governors General of the Central Banks of COMESA member states.

- **The Intergovernmental Committee**

The committee consists of Permanent or Principal Secretaries designated by each member state and is responsible for the development of programmes and action plans in all fields of co-operation except in the finance and monetary sector⁵⁷⁰.

- **Technical Committees**

There are 12 technical committees, which are responsible for the preparation and monitoring of comprehensive implementation programmes and, also, responsible for making recommendations to the Intergovernmental Committee⁵⁷¹. These are: Administrative and Budgetary Matters; Agriculture; Comprehensive Information Systems; Energy; Finance and Monetary Affairs; Industry; Labour, Human Resources and Social Affairs; Legal Affairs; Natural Resources, Environment, Tourism and Wildlife; Trade and Customs and lastly, Transport and Communications.

Apart from the above noted institutions, COMESA has the following institutions, which are also referred to either as the COMESA independent institutions or the COMESA family of institutions:

- **The COMESA Court of Justice**

The court was established under the COMESA Treaty and became fully operational in September 1998⁵⁷². It is currently located in Lusaka, Zambia and is composed of seven judges, headed by a president of the COMESA Court of Justice. The principal functions of the Court include: examining and arbitrating in disputes relating to arbitrary commercial practises that are contrary to the ratified protocols among COMESA

member states; and interpreting the provisions of the COMESA Treaty to ensure that member states implement and respect its decisions. A host agreement was signed in Khartoum on 26 January 2004 according to which the capital of Sudan will be the permanent seat of the COMESA Court. This agreement followed a decision on the need to have a permanent location for the Court at the 8th COMESA Summit held in Sudan on March 2003. Currently, the Court is in the process of relocating to Khartoum.

▪ **The Eastern and Southern Africa Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank)**

The Bank has a capital base of US\$500 million and its principal function is to provide investment and trade financing to the business community in the COMESA region⁵⁷³. By September 2002, the Bank had approved a total of ten projects amounting to US\$29.5 million, including one equity investment in the Africa Trade Insurance Agency, bringing the total cumulative portfolio to US\$225.4 million. This compares favourably with the Bank's eight projects amounting to US\$27.4 million for the same period in the year 2001. The Bank's operational activities are spread out over most of the COMESA member States. Up to 30th September 2002, the Bank approved a total of US\$46.9 million in trade finance facilities bringing the total cumulative trade finance activities to US\$830 million, up from US\$783 million as at 31st December 2001.

In order to further improve on its performance better, the Bank has designed and commenced the implementation of a number of other initiatives aimed at enhancing its operational capacity, the most important of which are:

- (i) The Third Corporate Plan (FYCORP-III), covering the period from 2003-2007. This plan seeks to promote large-scale corporate investment within COMESA. Additionally, through this plan, the Bank intends to transform itself into a world class financial institution delivering quality services and contributing significantly to the economic growth and prosperity of COMESA members.

- (ii) The Bank's decision to adopt the US dollar as its sole reporting currency in order to be easily understood internationally.
- (iii) The Bank's campaign to persuade those countries that are members of COMESA but have not joined the Bank to do so expeditiously.

- **The PTA Reinsurance Company (the ZEP-RE)**

The ZEP-RE was established in 1993⁵⁷⁴. Since then, it has been experiencing steady growth and its current share capital stands at US\$27 million. In 2002, the company underwrote approximately US\$14.5 million compared to US\$11.75 million under-written in 2001. By the end of the year 2002, the ZEP-RE was operating in thirty-eight countries both within and outside COMESA.

- **The Leather and Leather Products Institute (the LLPI)**

The mission of LLPI is to contribute to the strengthening of the leather industry in the COMESA region while working as a centre of excellence in leather and leather products through the following two approaches⁵⁷⁵: First, improving leather processing and manufacturing technology by developing human resources to meet this role; and second, addressing leather problems related to market capacity utilisation, input, technology, pollution, and standardisation. The leather market in Africa has a good potential to expand and develop, especially given the fact that Africa accounts for more than 19.5 % of the global livestock population, of which the COMESA region accounts for more than half. In 2002, the LLPI prepared eight projects for different countries and with the assistance of the COMESA Secretariat, secured funds to finance them.

- **The COMESA Clearing House (the Clearing House)**

The Clearing House is intended to address regional trade impediments, key among them being limited amounts of convertible currency in the COMESA region⁵⁷⁶. Together with the Secretariat, the Clearing House has established a cross-border payment and

settlement system called the Regional Payments and Settlement System (REPSS). Under this system, once the exporter has shipped goods, the funds transfer are made in the importer's local currency and converted into the exporter's currency, at an agreed rate (by the exporter's central bank) for the credit of the exporter's commercial bank. This transaction is normally done at least on a same-day basis, which drastically reduces cross-border transaction costs and hence makes regional producers more competitive. Additionally, the Clearing House has set up a Trust Fund for ensuring timely completion of daily settlements in the event of an inability of some participants to settle. What is more, since 2002, the REPSS has been using a multilateral netting system that converts all payments in local currencies to a "Settlement Currency" (US dollars or Euro) based on a fixed daily rate of transfer between countries, with imbalances in the settlement currency being realigned or settled on a daily basis.

- **The COMESA Bankers' Association (the Bankers' Association)**

The COMESA Bankers' Association acts as a forum for the exchange of information on banking practices in the region, and carries out activities meant to improve them⁵⁷⁷. In the year 2001-2002, the Bankers' Association conducted a total of seven seminars on issues such as bank fraud prevention, information technology, credit risk assessment, credit risk management, marketing and money laundering.

As can be seen from the foregoing, COMESA has a fairly extensive institutional structure and a brief glimpse of its institutions reveals that most of them seem to be making some progress in fulfilling their mandates. But to what extent have COMESA's institutions and their operations translated into some tangible socio-economic and political development gains for the Eastern and Southern African region? This question informs the discussion in the next section.

(vi) d. COMESA and the Socio-Economic and Political Development of Eastern and Southern Africa.

On the economic front, the main approach being taken by COMESA in its bid to achieve the levels of economic growth necessary to enhance economic development in

Eastern and Southern Africa is market integration through the removal of barriers to trade and investment. Under this approach, COMESA intends to consolidate its economic base and increase prospects for the member-states' economic development through the following five stages⁵⁷⁸:

- i. The first stage is the Preferential Trade Area (PTA), during which parties in the economic integration process offer each other preferences relating to market access for the goods produced in their territories.
- ii. The second stage is the Free Trade Area (FTA), during which the integrating parties' trade is conducted on a duty-free and quota-free basis. Trade within a PTA or an FTA is dependent on agreed Rules of Origin.
- iii. The third stage of integration is the Customs Union (CU), during which two or more customs territories come together to form a single customs territory. Trade within the territory is conducted on a duty-free and quota-free basis for all products obtained or produced within the territory. The territory also imposes a Common External Tariff (CET) on products imported from outside its borders.
- iv. The fourth stage is the Common Market, which can be summed up as a Customs Union plus the free movement of the factors of production, namely labour and capital. At this stage, the cardinal issues include visas, work and residence permits, especially for skilled labour, businesspersons and investors. Normally, a Common Market simplifies these issues in that enhances the free movement of the factors of production. For example, in a properly functioning Common Market, the distinction between local (national) and foreign businesspersons or investors of the constituent member states ceases to exist.

- v. The fifth and final stage is the Economic Union (EU), which incorporates all the features of the Common Market plus common monetary and fiscal policies and the adoption of a single currency issued by a common monetary authority. During this stage, economic policy in all areas is co-ordinated and any policy disarticulation arising from any of the member-states' national policy/policies is not permitted. Also, during this stage, a common legislative body is established.

From the stages above, it is obvious that the "Common Market" component of the COMESA acronym is purely nominal and conceptually non-descriptive. Properly conceptualized and properly defined, COMESA is at the Preferential and the Free Trade Areas stage of its five-stage economic development projection. Currently, and following the latest Authority meeting in Kigali, Rwanda on June 2005, COMESA has embarked on the process of establishing a Customs Union⁵⁷⁹. So, the question here should be: What economic development gains has COMESA made as a PTA/FTA? Let us find out.

Since its establishment in 1993, COMESA has made some impressive strides in the promotion of economic development in the region⁵⁸⁰. These gains can be analyzed within two broad categories: the trade category and the infrastructure category. First at the trade level, COMESA has continued to register increased trade volumes among its member states. For example, the total value of intra-COMESA trade rose from US\$ 26,131 million in 1996 to US\$ 4.5 billion in 2002⁵⁸¹. What is more, COMESA FTA has adopted an outward-looking liberalisation strategy that has seen increased regional trade liberalisation measures taken among the member states. As a result, COMESA's intra-FTA trade rose from US\$ 2.1 billion in 2002 to US\$ 2.6 billion in 2003, a growth rate of 24%⁵⁸². Over the same period, intra-COMESA trade rose from US\$ 4.5 billion to US\$ 4.8 billion, an increase of 7%⁵⁸³.

Second, at the infrastructure level, COMESA has taken concrete steps to reduce infrastructural impediments to regional economic growth. Some of the steps taken include⁵⁸⁴: improving transport and communications in the COMESA region; establishing strong institutions to mobilise financial resources in order to provide investor confidence

in the region and strengthening business links in the region through trade promotion and trade facilitation activities. In the transport and communications sector, COMESA has taken the following measures aimed at reducing regional impediments to economic development⁵⁸⁵:

(a) Surface Transport Facilitation

Transport facilitation is one area in which COMESA has made notable progress. In road transport, the measures taken to improve this sector include the COMESA Carriers Licence, the Harmonised Axle Load Limits and Road Transit Charges and the Third Party Vehicle Insurance Scheme (or the Yellow Card Scheme)⁵⁸⁶. When implemented together, these combined infrastructural changes have reduced transport costs in the COMESA region by an estimated 25 percent⁵⁸⁷. In the case of rail transport, COMESA is working closely with railways in the region to improve efficiency. In this regard COMESA has assisted the railways in the region adopt an information technology-based management system known as the Advance Cargo Information System (ACIS) that facilitates the tracking of cargo⁵⁸⁸.

(b) Air Transport Facilitation

In accordance with COMESA's vision to attain higher levels of economic development in the region, air transport liberalisation has become one of its top priorities⁵⁸⁹. The main objective of air transport liberalisation is to foster greater regional co-operation through the provision of better quality and competitively priced air transport services. Already, COMESA countries implementing the air liberalisation programme have experienced increased frequencies in commercial flights between member countries, cheaper fares, entry of new airlines and a wider choice of routings with better connections⁵⁹⁰. In addition to intra-regional air liberalisation, COMESA, in collaboration with the East African Community (EAC), the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) has developed competition regulations to ensure an orderly transition to open skies and the development of a vibrant civil aviation industry within the region⁵⁹¹.

(c) Information and Communications Technology

Recognising that a reliable, efficient and cost-effective regional telecommunications network will greatly facilitate economic integration in the region, COMESA is currently promoting the establishment of a regional telecommunications network that is viewed as part of the solution the telecommunications problems in the region⁵⁹². This regional telecommunications network will be built and managed by the COMESA Telecommunications Company (COMTEL), which is a private limited company launched by COMESA⁵⁹³. A strategic partner will hold 30 percent of COMTEL's equity, participating National Telecommunications Operators will own 25% of the equity while private sector investors will own the remaining 45%⁵⁹⁴. The estimated total investment is US\$300 million. The COMTEL project is on course and in March 2004, three companies submitted their bid to the COMTEL Interim Board Meeting⁵⁹⁵. Work on the project is expected to resume soon⁵⁹⁶.

COMESA is also undertaking work in the e-readiness sub-sector aimed at assisting its member states to put in place the infrastructure needed to promote electronic commerce, and thus ensuring that they not only take advantage the e-commerce benefits, but also ensure that they are not further disadvantaged by being left behind as the new business technology moves forward elsewhere in the world⁵⁹⁷. At the institutional infrastructure level, COMESA has established specialised institutions that are dedicated to supporting and facilitating regional economic development integration. Some of these include⁵⁹⁸:

- The Eastern and Southern African Trade and Development Bank (PTA Bank) with a capital base of US\$500 million. The Bank provides investment and trade financing to the private sector within COMESA and the East and Southern Africa region.
- PTA Reinsurance Company (ZEP-RE), with a capital base of US\$27 million, and doing business in twenty African States. The main goal of ZEP-RE is to foster economic growth and development in the region through trade in insurance and reinsurance business

- The African Trade Insurance Agency (ATI) with a capacity to underwrite business up to US\$360 million. ATI is supported by the World Bank and the private sector, including Lloyds of London and Garing Namur of Germany and is a unique institution providing insurance cover for trade into and within the COMESA region.
- Leather and Leather Products Institute (LLPI) is a technical institution that focuses on leather processing and manufacturing.
- The Clearing House is developing a cross-border payment and settlement system which will meet the needs of traders, industrialists and investors in the newly-liberalised environment.

Finally, COMESA has sought to promote economic development in Eastern and Southern Africa through both promoting and facilitating intra-regional trade and intra-regional business contacts. COMESA's trade and business promotions have already created opportunities for cross-border investment, franchise and agency arrangements and joint venture operations⁵⁹⁹. For example, Egyptian business persons have sought to work with Malawian cotton growers and processors in a joint venture operation to access the US market for textiles under the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA)⁶⁰⁰; Mauritian manufacturers are operating in Madagascar in the textile sector and other sectors as well⁶⁰¹; While Zimbabwean farmers and agro-processors are investing in Zambia in order to maximise their benefits under the COMESA FTA⁶⁰². Such cross-border investment is, in turn, promoting the transfer of technology and skills that contribute directly to the economic development of the region⁶⁰³.

At the social level, COMESA is committed to developing a joint strategy against such regional health challenges, as the HIV/AIDS pandemic, that are a threat both to the economic gains so far attained and to the vast economic potential that is yet to be exploited in this region⁶⁰⁴. Hence, at the 2004 COMESA Authority meeting, the member-states resolved to jointly lobby against pharmaceutical companies invoking Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) regulations as a justification for denying the production of the urgently needed Anti-Retro-Viral generic drugs for millions of HIV/AIDS patients within

the COMESA region⁶⁰⁵. Similarly, COMESA has spurred the growth and development of active regional civil society organizations such as SEATINI, MWENGO and CUTS-ARC, which are predominantly concerned with lobbying COMESA and other regional (e.g. SADC) and multilateral (e.g. WTO) bodies to incorporate a socially and politically inclusive dimension in their development agenda⁶⁰⁶.

Finally, at the political level, COMESA has acted on the synergies emanating from the regular interaction of its leaders to develop a broad and fairly successful regional and international political agenda⁶⁰⁷. COMESA is fully aware of the fact that civil strife, political instabilities and cross-border disputes in the region have seriously affected the ability of some of its member states to develop their individual economies as well as their capacity to participate and take full advantage of regional integration arrangement under COMESA⁶⁰⁸. As a result, COMESA has taken a political approach to addressing the civil strife between and within some of its member states because without peace, security and stability, satisfactory levels of socio-economic and political development in the region cannot be attained⁶⁰⁹. To this end, a meeting of the Intergovernmental Committee held in November 1999 in Lusaka, Zambia, explored ways to involve COMESA more directly in efforts to secure peace in the sub-region and rebuild war-torn economies⁶¹⁰.

A follow-up meeting held in March 2000 at the same venue ended years of COMESA's ad hoc peace initiatives and laid the groundwork for a more institutionalized approach to realizing the peace and security objective enshrined in the COMESA Treaty. At this meeting, member states established a permanent, three-tier COMESA Peace and Security Programme structure to address the widespread and persistent armed conflicts between and within some member states⁶¹¹. This structure is composed of Heads of State and/or Government; Ministers of Foreign Affairs; and a Committee on Peace and Security⁶¹².

What is more, unlike other past initiatives, the Peace and Security Programme is unique in that it includes the private sector and civil society organisations who have been given an advisory role⁶¹³. The Ministers of Foreign Affairs have so far held two meetings on Peace and Security⁶¹⁴. At the first meeting held in Lusaka from 27-28 April 2001, the

Ministers agreed to step up efforts to control the proliferation of small and light weapons, step up the campaign against landmines and the stockpiling, use and or sale of arms. At the second meeting held in Addis Ababa on 22 May 2002, the Ministers of Foreign Affairs resolved to liaise with their respective governments to strengthen the role of the member-states Parliaments and Parliamentarians in the promotion of a culture of peace and security in the region⁶¹⁵.

The COMESA Secretariat is responsible for the implementation of the COMESA Peace and Security Programme, which falls under its Legal Affairs Department. As of March 2003, COMESA had carried or was in the process of carrying out the following peace and security activities⁶¹⁶:

- Capacity building for regional parliamentarians and senators in conflict prevention and management skills: As at March 2003, COMESA had trained 70 parliamentarians drawn from the parliaments of each member-state. Ultimately, COMESA's aim is to strengthen parliaments in the region as institutions of conflict management, armed with a pool of trained conflict managers capable of addressing regional conflicts at the grassroots (read constituency) level;
- Developing criteria and rules of procedure for the role of the private sector and civil society organisations in the programme on peace and security;
- Seeking financial assistance from developed countries for the elimination of landmines and rehabilitation of victims; and
- Adopting the Nairobi Declaration of March 15th 2000 on the control of illicit proliferation of small arms and light weapons as one of the main means to control a key root cause of conflicts in the region⁶¹⁷.

In collaboration with other regional integration arrangements, COMESA has made some major breakthroughs in resolving political conflict in the Eastern and Southern Africa region⁶¹⁸. For example, in Sudan, the Sudanese Government signed a peace agreement with the Sudanese People's Liberation Army in 2004, bringing an end to a two-decade civil war that had pitted northern Sudan against southern Sudan⁶¹⁹. In Uganda, the Ugandan Government and the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) are, for the first time in

18 years, talking directly with one another⁶²⁰. This is a positive step that is likely to lead to a peaceful resolution between the Ugandan Government and the rebels and hence, promote the much-needed peace in Uganda. In Burundi, several rebel groups signed a peace agreement and are now working with the government to draw up a new constitution for the country⁶²¹. Finally, Somalia, that epitome of Hobbesian politics, is slowly but surely rebuilding its statehood again after years of being a stateless political jungle⁶²².

Internationally, COMESA has continued to build its profile through both bilateral and multi-lateral cooperation initiatives with regional integration arrangements, multi-lateral organizations and individual countries both within and outside the African continent. The following are some of the COMESA's international cooperative activities⁶²³:

- **COMESA and the African Development Bank:** The Secretariat actively participates in meetings convened by the African Development Bank to prepare action plans for medium and long-term projects to be funded by the Bank. Normally, the action plans cover the development of physical infrastructure in aviation, roads, railways, ports, telecommunications and energy.
- **COMESA and the Economic Commission of Africa:** COMESA has continued to receive technical support from the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA)⁶²⁴ in, for example, identifying the investment opportunities for different COMESA member States.
- **COMESA and NEPAD:** Within the framework of NEPAD and the African Union, COMESA is developing closer and more cooperative links with other regional organisations in Africa. For example, COMESA has good working relationships with the East African Community (EAC), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and the Indian Ocean Commission (IOC). Additionally, COMESA has signed co-operation agreements with IGAD and the Economic Community of Western African States (ECOWAS) and will soon sign an agreement with the IOC. At a meeting of the COMESA Council of Ministers held in January 1997, it was agreed that COMESA and SADC should co-exist and cooperate. Consequently, COMESA and SADC are in the process of establishing

a framework that will lead to complementarity and co-operation in their activities⁶²⁵.

- **COMESA and the Commonwealth:** COMESA receives technical and financial assistance from the Commonwealth Secretariat and, through this assistance, COMESA has undertaken a study on enhancing trade and production of quality pharmaceutical products in the COMESA region.
- **COMESA and the EU:** The EU is COMESA's major donor and COMESA continues to implement a number of programmes with funding coming from the European Development Fund, mainly in trade policy and trade facilitation areas. Also, in 2003, the EU allocated Euro 223 million to COMESA and its sister regional organisations of EAC, IOC and IGAD to implement a 5 year regional programme in three main focal sectors of Economic Integration; Management of Natural Resources and Transport and Communication.
- **COMESA and USAID and other Agencies and Countries:** COMESA continues to work closely with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) in a number of areas, including in the implementation of the AGOA. In addition, COMESA maintains its associations with the Corporate Council on Africa, the African Capacity Building Foundation, and the French and British Governments.

Finally, one of COMESA's major challenges remains how to more effectively integrate into the global economy on equitable terms. COMESA is actively working to overcome this challenge by increasingly playing a strategic role in articulating its negotiating positions on WTO issues that range from agriculture to TRIPS. For example, COMESA member states, in collaboration with other developing countries and as part of the African group, played a significant role in ensuring that the Doha round of development issues was not trumped by the so-called Singapore issues at the 2003 Cancun WTO Ministerial meeting⁶²⁶. COMESA is also co-ordinating negotiations for the Economic Partnership Agreements between the European Union, its largest co-operating partner, and the African Caribbean and Pacific (ACP States) at the regional level⁶²⁷. As

can be seen from the foregoing, COMESA has made some gains in promoting socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa and overall, seems to be on the right trajectory in so far as making more socio-economic and political gains in the future is concerned. However, despite making these gains, COMESA's performance at promoting development in Eastern and Southern Africa has been less than optimal due to a number of socio-economic and political reasons. I shall now briefly examine some of these reasons.

At the socio-economic level, COMESA is confronted by a myriad of problems. First, although intra-COMESA trade has grown since COMESA was established, COMESA member-states still predominantly rely on external parties as their most important trading partner(s) and not other COMESA member-states (see table 2 below). This extroverted nature of the COMESA economy has been mainly attributed to lack of complementarities among COMESA member-states, most of whom are producers and exporters of similar primary products⁶²⁸. Second, COMESA has not acquired the necessary economic growth to effectively tackle the social dimension of development as, for example spelt out in the Millennium Development Goals (the MDG)⁶²⁹. In order to meet the Millennium Development Goals, COMESA needs an estimated growth rate of at least 7% per annum so as to generate sufficient capital formation and the levels of employment needed to make the MDG a reality⁶³⁰. This growth rate translates to a minimum investment of 25% of the regions Gross Domestic Product (GDP)⁶³¹.

However, the current domestic savings to GDP is about 11%, and the total regional investment to GDP ratio is 18%, with Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) accounting for 7% of GDP⁶³². Therefore, COMESA needs to increase investment by at least 7% if it must acquire the necessary economic wherewithal to implement the Millennium Development Goals. Third, although COMESA is committed to increasing the intra-regional flow of the factors of production (capital and labour), so far, the achievements in this area remain lacklustre. In fact, on the issue of free movement of people within the COMESA region, only three countries (out of 20) have ratified the protocol on the free movement of people within COMESA⁶³³.

Table 2: the Structure of trade among COMESA Member States

COUNTRY	Intra-COMESA Exports (As % of Total Exports)	Intra-COMESA Imports (As % of Total Imports)
1. Angola	0.04	1.78
2. Burundi	5.97	18.22
3. Djibouti	6.63	23.42
4. Egypt	1.11	0.89
5. Eritrea	11.77	1.32
6. Ethiopia	13.67	2.94
7. Kenya	43.77	1.78
8. Comoros	3.07	11.11
9. Madagascar	3.33	7.04
10. Mauritius	6.59	2.30
11. Malawi	10.38	15.35
12. Rwanda	79.16	19.23
13. Seychelles	0.63	3.46
14. Sudan	8.92	4.83
15. Swaziland	6.03	0.28
16. Uganda	11.30	21.85
17. Zambia	12.11	12.26
18. Zimbabwe	10.46	2.93

Source: COMESA Secretariat, 2002 Discussion Paper on “Economic Partnership Agreements”.

At the political level, COMESA has not done enough to ensure an active involvement of the citizens of this region in popular development as spelt out in its

objectives⁶³⁴. What is more, although it has made some gains (as can be deduced from the role of some COMESA member states in Cancun) in bringing the economic issues of the region to international attention, the COMESA member-states are still politically invisible internationally and or incapable of effectively lobbying for COMESA's agenda internationally⁶³⁵. So what chance does COMESA stand in its endeavour to promote development in Eastern and Southern Africa? While COMESA has made some gains and suffered some obvious limitations, a comparative analysis of COMESA versus other regional integration arrangements in this thesis will help set out COMESA gains and limitations in sharp relief and also help in formulating recommendations that are likely to help make COMESA an effective tool for Eastern and Southern Africa's development. This is the main task in next chapter of this thesis.

--Chapter Five--

(i) **COMESA and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa: A Comparative View**

In this chapter, I discuss COMESA's role in Eastern and Southern Africa's development by conducting a comparative analysis of COMESA within the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN contexts. While each of these regional bodies is committed to the task of promoting socio-economic and political development in their respective regions, all of them have accomplished this task to varying degrees of success. Here, I adopt a comparative analysis in order to accomplish two main tasks: First, to determine why some of these regional integration arrangements have been more successful at the task of promoting development within their regions than others and subsequently point out some of the lessons that COMESA can learn, especially from the more successful regional integration arrangements; and second, based on this analysis and other general discussions in this thesis, to point out some internal and external challenges that COMESA must overcome so as to play a more effective socio-economic and political development role in Eastern and Southern Africa. But before embarking on these tasks, a brief discussion on how a comparative analysis of these regional integration arrangements will contribute to accomplishment of these two tasks is necessary.

A comparative analysis of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA is crucial in helping us establish a link between regionalism and development based on the following four reasons⁶³⁶: First, a comparative analysis of these regional bodies is important since it helps in expanding the descriptive knowledge of these organizations in a manner that makes it possible to develop detailed information about relatively unknown aspects of their individual and systemic behaviour. From this information, it is possible to determine which individual and systemic behaviours are likely to promote regional developmentalism and which ones are not. Second, a comparative approach plays a leading role in helping both to identify and to explain the fundamental trends and patterns of political behaviour across the regional bodies under comparison in this study. Useful theoretical generalizations, for example on such questions as what aspects of political behaviour are important for successful regionalism,

are drawn from these trends and patterns of political behaviour. Third, a comparative study of the regional integration arrangements identified in this thesis is necessary in that it provides the background for making evaluative judgements on what is valid or good in one or more regional integration arrangements and therefore worth replicating in others. Fourth and finally, through accurate description, valid explanations and acceptable evaluations of the data provided, the outcome of this comparative analysis forms the foundation for making recommendations for successful regionalism in Eastern and Southern Africa. For example, the outcome of this comparative study leads me to call for a reform to those aspects of regional integrations arrangement—e.g. poor political leadership in the COMESA region—that are a clear hindrance to developmental regionalism in this region of the world.

In this thesis, I conduct the comparative analysis of the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA at three levels: the descriptive level, the analytical level and the conceptual level. First, at the descriptive level, though it is often difficult to achieve accurate comparisons of descriptive data, I have attempted to minimize this problem by relying on data from credible and reliable sources such as the United Nations, Transparency International, Freedom House and the Heritage Foundation. Similarly, while I recognize that the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA are all unique organizations faced with different challenges and opportunities, an analytical and conceptual comparison of these organizations (based on the information extracted from the foregoing sources), reveals some interesting trends and patterns in so far as their socio-economic and political configurations are concerned. As already noted above and as will shortly be shown below, these trends and patterns are important in helping to establish a link between regionalism and development and in providing the basis for offering some general suggestions on how COMESA could become a more effective vehicle for Eastern and Southern Africa's development.

Second, at the analytical level, the comparison of the regional integration arrangements in this study is based on the assumption that for a regional integration arrangement to be an effective paradigm of development in its respective region, the integrating countries must be committed to addressing the overall development needs of the people in their region at the social, economic and political levels⁶³⁷. At the social level,

successful, development-oriented regional integration arrangements continually seek to broaden the social networks in their regions by, among other things, increasing their capacity to address several development-enhancing factors such as promoting human rights and showing a firm commitment to the provision of health and education to peoples in their region⁶³⁸. At the economic level, successful developmental regionalism normally seeks to expand the productive capacity of the integrating countries by, for example: promoting good practices of economic management through the elimination of such vices as corruption, boosting their economies of scale through expanded economic activities (key among them being increased volumes of trade) and creating conducive environments for the emergence of complementarities⁶³⁹. Finally, at the political level, successful regional integration arrangements are those that are committed to nurturing positive political ethos such as the rule of law, the promotion of a democratic culture and the establishment of a stable political dispensation both within and among the integration countries.

Third, at the conceptual level, I conduct the EU's, NAFTA's, MERCOSUR's, ASEAN's and COMESA's comparison within the following benchmarks outlining some of the characteristics of successful regional integration arrangements⁶⁴⁰:

- *Proximity*: successful regional integration arrangements often involve geographically contiguous countries or countries within the same broad geographic area.
- *Level of integration*: They often involve countries that exhibit high levels of cross-border trade and investment, including intra-corporate transfers and inter-corporate alliances, before the negotiation of the regional agreement. In effect, the regional agreement is more likely to be the result of, rather than the precursor to, closer economic relations.
- *Similarity*: Successful agreements are more likely to be found among countries with similar levels of economic development, legal structures, business cultures, political institutions and cultural values.

- *Institutional maturity*: Partners in such an agreement are likely to boast political and economic institutions that have developed over time and are capable of adjusting to the demands of a regional agreement.
- *Stake*: Partners in such an agreement are likely to have a high or similar stake in the success of the agreement and would face problems in the absence of an agreement.
- *Commitment*: Successful agreements involve a significant commitment by the parties to open, rules-based relationships.
- *Power relationship*: Disparities of power—political and socio-economic—among parties to the agreement are such that it is possible to provide for full reciprocity and equality of obligations, both de jure and de facto.
- *Economic impacts*: On the whole, successful agreements are more likely to be trade creating than trade diverting. While there may be some trade diversion in the early stages, the mature agreement leads to net growth in economic activity and prosperity for the members rather than the redistribution of trade and investment patterns.
- *Dynamism*: Successful agreements grow and expand as the extent of integration among the parties deepens.

It should be noted that the above characteristics are only a general, if not ideal, guideline and that none of the regional integration arrangements identified in this study possesses all of these characteristics. However, having said this, it is important to note that those regional integration arrangements, which possess a greater degree of these characteristics, tend to be more successful than those, which do not.

The comparative analysis in this section is based on a few select and measurable development indicators data from the following categories: the socio-economic and political category (see table 3 below); the public spending category (see table 4 below) and the structure of trade category (see table 5 below). Based on the content of the data provided in tables 3 to 5, a comparative analysis of NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA reveals the following comparable attributes of successful regional

integration arrangements: similarity (this attribute must be qualified in terms of positive versus negative similarity, and depending on the direction of measurement, a positively higher—marked by a strong positive score—similarity level is the most desirable attribute); institutional maturity; level of integration and commitment. I will examine these attributes in turn.

Table 3

Selected Socio-economic and Political Development Indicators in NAFTA, the EU MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA

INDICATOR	NAFTA	The EU	MERCOSUR	ASEAN	COMESA
GDP per Capita	US\$ 24,733	US\$ 22,823	US\$ 7,773	US\$ 7,389	US\$ 3,143
School Enrolment	87 percent	86.5 percent	85.6 percent	67.9 percent	53.2 percent
L.E.A.B	76.5 years	73.5 years	72 years	67.1 years	48.7 years
Health Exp. Per capita	US\$ 2,741	US\$ 1527.8	US\$ 752	US\$ 287.1	127.3
Public Educ. Expenditure	5.3 percent	4.9 percent	4 percent	3.4 percent	5.1 percent
Telephone lines/1000	476	465.4	192.3	131.1	46.2
Internet users/1000	342.3	353.9	82.6	111.0	20.2
Patents granted/mill.	111.7	65.7	2	9.7	0.1
P. E. F	2.23	2.17	3.45	3.33	3.34
C.P.I	6.5	6.6	3.6	3.8	2.7
P.O.P.F	1.3	1.0	2.0	4.9	4.6

The data above was extracted from the following sources: The Human Development Index, 2003 Report; The Heritage Foundation, 2005 Index of Economic Freedom Report; Transparency International, 2005 Global Corruption Report and Freedom House, 2005 Freedom in the World Report.

Legend:

1. **L.E.A.B:** Life Expectancy At Birth
2. **P.E.F:** Perceptions of Economic Freedom
3. **C.P.I:** Corruption Perception Index
4. **P.O.P.F :** Perception of Political Freedom

Notes:

- GDP Per Capita: The figures used here are for 2002
- Public Health Expenditure: The figures here are in US\$ PPP. They are a percentage of the 2001 GDP.
- Public Expenditure on Education: Calculated as a percentage of the 1999-2001 GDP
- The figures for telephone main lines per thousand, Internet users per thousand are for the year 2002 while the figures for patents granted to residents per million are for the year 2000.

The similarity attribute posits that successful regional integration arrangements are likely to be found among countries with similar levels of economic development, business cultures, political institutions and cultural values. As can be seen from Table 3 above, positive similarity is strongest in NAFTA and the EU, fairly strong in MERCOSUR and ASEAN and rather weak in COMESA in the following development indicators: GDP per Capita, School Enrolment and Life Expectancy at Birth. On health expenditure per capita, NAFTA and the EU have the highest positive similarity among the member states; MERCOSUR has a fairly positive similarity among the member states while ASEAN and COMESA have the lowest positive similarity among their member states. However, all the regional integration arrangements tend to be fairly similar in their public education expenditure, although the EU and NAFTA still have higher percentages in this area. The level of similarity in telephone lines/1000 and internet users/1000 is positively high in the EU and NAFTA, fairly high in MERCOSUR and ASEAN and low in COMESA. In patents granted per million, NAFTA (mainly because of the US factor and the small number of member states) leads the pack while the EU, ASEAN, MERCOSUR and COMESA follow in that order. All the regional integration arrangements seem to be committed to a fairly similar business culture as is reflected in their levels of economic freedom. The EU and NAFTA have the highest positive similarity in the political culture of their member states as is reflected in the political freedoms enjoyed in their respective regions. In this regard, MERCOSUR has a fairly high level of positive similarity in its political culture while ASEAN and the COMESA have rather low positive similarity levels in their political cultures. Finally, based on the

data in table 3, it can be deduced that the corruption scores are highest and positive in the EU and NAFTA and low in MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA.

Table 4

Priorities in public spending in NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA

PRIORITY AREA	NAFTA	The EU	MERCOSUR	ASEAN	COMESA
EDUCATION (as % 1999-2001 GDP)	5.3	4.9	4.0	3.4	5.1
HEALTH (as % of 2001 GDP)	5.2	5.6	4.1	1.5	2.7
MILITARY (as % of 2002 GDP)	1.7	1.7	1.4	3.0	4.5
DEBT SERV. (as % of 2002 GDP)	6.8*	13.3*	8.4	7.5	3.7
R & D (as % of 2002 GDP)	1.7	1.5	0.4	0.9*	0.4*

Source: This data was computed from the Human Development Indicators 2003 Report

Note: The asterisk (*) on NAFTA scores points to the fact that this score is high due to Mexico's high-debt servicing responsibilities while that on EU points to the fact that the score is higher due to the fact that most of the new EU entrants have high debt-serving obligations. Under R&D, the asterisk indicates limited data availability from ASEAN and COMESA respectively.

Table 4 above provides the social dimension commitment in terms of public spending in some selected priority areas. From the data in table 4, it can be deduced that NAFTA and

COMESA place the highest priority in spending on education; the EU and MERCOSUR place a high priority in the education expenditure while ASEAN's expenditure in education is lower than that of all the other regional integration arrangements. The EU and NAFTA have the highest expenditure in health, followed by MERCOSUR, COMESA and ASEAN in that order. COMESA and ASEAN have the highest military expenditure, followed by NAFTA, the EU and MERCOSUR. The EU spends the highest amount in debt serving. However, it should be noted that most of this expenditure is incurred by the recent (2004) EU entrants. MERCOSUR spends the second highest amount in debt-servicing. It is then followed by NAFTA, where the debt servicing mainly falls within the Mexican jurisdiction. COMESA spends the lowest amount in debt servicing. However, the COMESA figures need to be qualified as they are not a reflection of the least debt burden, but rather, the inability of most COMESA member states to meet their debt repayment obligations⁶⁴¹. Finally, in terms of expenditure in research and development, NAFTA and the EU have the highest expenditure, followed by ASEAN with COMESA and MERCOSUR tied.

Finally, Table 5 below provides the economic dimension of the regional integration arrangements in this study. From this table, it can be seen that the EU and ASEAN are the leading exporters of goods and services, followed by COMESA, NAFTA and MERCOSUR. COMESA and MERCOSUR are the leading exporters of primary products followed by ASEAN, NAFTA and the EU in that order. The EU and NAFTA are the leading exporters of manufactured products, followed by ASEAN, MERCOSUR and COMESA. Lastly, ASEAN is the leading exporter of high-tech products, followed by NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR and COMESA in that order.

While I do not intend to draw simple causal relationships between the data above and developmental regionalism, it is nonetheless possible to establish general patterns and trends from these data. For example, the EU and NAFTA, which are generally regarded as successful regional integration arrangements, tend to consistently score high in the social, economic and political dimensions of development as per the above selected categories. At the social level, the EU and NAFTA's expenditures in health and research and development are higher than those of the other regional bodies. As can be seen from the data, the dividends from these higher social expenditures include high levels of life

expectancy and high levels of innovation, which in turn provides an important ingredient for successful regionalism. For example, as a result of research and development, the EU and NAFTA produces high value, manufactured products, and this means higher economic returns for these regions.

Table 5

The Structure of Trade (as % of 2002 GDP exports) in NAFTA, the EU, MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA

TRADE ITEM	NAFTA	the EU	MERCOSUR	ASEAN	COMESA
Goods and Services	27	55.0	24.3	64.	29.3
Primary Exports	20	19.5	64.3	21	71.8
Manufactured Exports	76	78.5	34.3	47.3	24.7
High Tech. Exports	22.3	13.0	8.0	39	3.5

Source: Human Development Indicators 2003 Report.

At the economic level, the EU and NAFTA have higher levels of GDP per capita compared to MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA. These higher levels of GDP mean that the citizens of these regional integration arrangements are fairly wealthy and therefore capable of participating in the market mechanism both as producers and consumers of good and services⁶⁴². Owing to their higher incomes, the citizens of NAFTA and EU are more likely—compared those of MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA—to have some disposable income, which they can in turn invest and therefore help to increase both the agglomeration effects and the economic complementarities of their respective regions⁶⁴³.

At the political level, the data indicate that the citizens in the EU and NAFTA enjoy a higher degree of political freedom compared to those in MERCOSUR, ASEAN and COMESA. Political freedom is an essential component of development since it ensures that the citizen's input in the development policies that directly affect their

overall well-being is not ignored by political decrees or directives⁶⁴⁴. Additionally, political freedom ensures that the political leaders are held accountable and that their decisions, to the greatest extent possible, reflect the wishes of the citizens⁶⁴⁵.

Therefore, from the foregoing, it can be said, and with a reasonable degree of accuracy that the EU and NAFTA are fairly successful regional integration arrangements because they possess a good number of the features and characteristics that make for successful regional integration arrangements. And as can be seen from the data, the other regional integration arrangements have made varying degrees of progress in developing these features and characteristics. For example, COMESA's expenditure on education as a percentage of the GDP is one of the highest among all the other regional integration arrangements. Similarly, in terms of levels of economic freedom, all the regional integration arrangements in this study have fairly similar levels of economic freedom. MERCOSUR, another regional integration arrangement that is seen to be fairly successful, especially among third world regional integration arrangements, scores impressively in terms of GDP per capita, school enrolment and health expenditure. ASEAN has done well the exports of goods and services, especially in the manufacturing and high-tech sector.

However, apart from the information derived from the data above, other factors can be attributed to the varying degrees of regional integration success. These factors include a combination of internal and external factors that have made some regional integration arrangements more successful than others. For example, the EU has grown into a formidable regional integration arrangement because at its formative stages, the US was fully committed to the idea of a united Western Europe, mainly as a means to wade-off perceived Soviet expansionism⁶⁴⁶. Hence, in order to ensure the success of the idea of a united Europe, capable of resisting the lure and or coercion of the USSR, the US substantially contributed to this idea through the Marshall Plan and through encouraging the emergence of regionalism in Western Europe⁶⁴⁷.

Similarly, the lessening rivalry between France and West Germany, fostered through the creation of strong economic ties, was instrumental in launching the idea of regionalism in Western Europe onto a more hopeful path for growth⁶⁴⁸. Finally, the strong position held by the EU in such multi-lateral organizations as the WTO, the UN, the IMF

and the World Bank and in its bilateral relations with a number of developed and developing countries has given the EU the necessary leverage to bargain for favourable economic policies at the international level⁶⁴⁹. These policies have significantly contributed to the EU's success⁶⁵⁰.

As the de facto power in NAFTA and the biggest economy in the world, the US has continued to expand both NAFTA's and its personal agenda regionally and internationally. Like the EU, NAFTA, particularly through the US, continues to strike favourable deals at the WTO level and at the level of bilateral relations with other countries and or regional integration arrangements⁶⁵¹. In MERCOSUR, Brazil and Argentina have taken the lead in championing the objectives of their member states while increased levels of FDI have meant improved prospects for the emergence of a successful regional integration arrangement⁶⁵². ASEAN has benefited greatly from Chinese and Japanese capital while promoting such vital sectors as the high-tech industry⁶⁵³. Finally, given its socio-economic and political climate, COMESA's developmental regionalism gains are not as negligible as they are normally portrayed in the literature⁶⁵⁴. However, for COMESA to build on these gains and therefore transform itself into a more viable institution for Eastern and Southern Africa's development, it must overcome a number of challenges and act on those areas where its prospects for success are highest. I will now examine COMESA's challenges in so far as the development of Eastern and Southern Africa is concerned before making some general recommendations on the way forward and drawing some conclusions on COMESA's development prospects for the future.

(ii) COMESA and Development in Eastern and Southern Africa: Challenges, Recommendations and Prospects.

(a) Challenges to COMESA's Developmental Regionalism Efforts in Eastern and Southern Africa.

While COMESA faces a number of challenges in its efforts to promote socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa, here I limit my discussion to the following: institutional constraints; structural constraints; infrastructural constraints and international constraints. COMESA's institutional constraints are

reflected in a number of ways. First, at the executive level, the implementation of the COMESA protocols is mainly left to the COMESA Authority and a few bureaucrats in the member states⁶⁵⁵. This renders the COMESA Secretariat an ineffective body and reduces its task to report writing and documentation. Second, because each member state is supposed to independently enforce the COMESA protocols, there is poor coordination in regional social, economic and political policy areas⁶⁵⁶. A third institutional constrain can be attributed to COMESA's sheer size and the multiplicity of regional integration arrangements within this regional body⁶⁵⁷. The common cliché holds that bigger is better.

However, bigger is not always better, especially when (as is the case with COMESA) it is not backed up by sufficient capacity⁶⁵⁸. COMESA's expansive size and its limited capacity to effectively promote developmental regionalism in this vast region of the African continent is one of the challenges that must be addressed before COMESA's efficacy as a regional development initiative can be bolstered. Additionally, multiple memberships in different regional integration arrangements within and outside COMESA further reduce its capacity for effective developmental regionalism⁶⁵⁹. Finally, as can be seen from the data above, COMESA has not built effective political institutions and is confronted by such bad-governance practices as high levels of corruption⁶⁶⁰. The absence of well-functioning political institutions among the COMESA member states is not conducive to developmental regionalism because: it reduces the political will needed to propel regional integration; increases the perception of COMESA as a high risk region and therefore discourages both local and international investment; and finally, it denies regionalism the much needed input from the citizens of this region and hence leads politicians to pursue wrong priorities (e.g. massive military expenditures) at the expense the high priority development areas like health and education.

Low levels of economic complementarities among the member states form one of the main structural constraints in COMESA's efforts to promote development in Eastern and Southern Africa. As already noted above, COMESA member states are mainly producers and exporters of primary products. COMESA's exports are normally destined for the same markets in Europe and North America and this has meant increased competition (not cooperation) among the COMESA member states⁶⁶¹. What is more, the economic returns and profits from primary products have considerably declined over the

years and as a result, the levels of income in most COMESA countries are lower than that in other regions of the world. A limited capital base means that a substantial number of the COMESA citizens are excluded from actively participating in COMESA's market mechanism. As a result, there is a limited chance of economic diversification and the continued reliance on a few primary products for the international market⁶⁶².

At the infrastructural level, COMESA's constraints are manifested through an under-developed regional transport and telecommunications network⁶⁶³. This constraint is exacerbated in COMESA's landlocked states like Uganda, Rwanda, Zambia, Sudan and Malawi where entire regions are isolated from meaningful cross-border development. The development of an extensive transport and telecommunications network is a major requirement for successful regional integration and COMESA must address this challenge⁶⁶⁴.

Finally, COMESA's efforts at promoting developmental regionalism are constrained by the international environment, which seems to cater for large, well-established industrial and technology-driven regional integration arrangements like the EU and NAFTA while further marginalizing the weaker, primary-product driven integration arrangements like COMESA⁶⁶⁵. Additionally, owing to their socio-economic and political largesse, the more successful regional integration arrangements like the EU and NAFTA have erected unfavourable trade barriers in the agricultural sector⁶⁶⁶. This is one area where COMESA possesses the so-called comparative advantage and therefore, the impact and the effect of these barriers has made COMESA even less competitive in the emerging post-cold War global economy⁶⁶⁷. So the question is: what are some of the ways in which COMESA can overcome, nay, limit the foregoing challenges. I offer some recommendations next.

(b) Recommendations on Reducing COMESA's Challenges to Successful Regionalism in Eastern and Southern Africa:

The recommendations given here are in no way exhaustive. However, they provide a general outline on some of the measures that COMESA can undertake so as to limit or overcome the negative impact of the challenges identified and therefore bolster its role in the socio-economic and political development of Eastern and Southern Africa. So

as to overcome the above challenges and so as to bolster its development role, COMESA should:

- Give the Secretariat more executive authority, especially in the implementation of those protocols that have already been ratified by the COMESA authority. This will bring about a more coordinated approach to policy implementation within COMESA.
- Rationalize and harmonize the process of integration among the member states. The first approach here will entail COMESA persuading those member states who belong to other regional integration arrangements to quit their membership in these regional bodies and therefore concentrate their efforts and resources to building of a stronger and more efficient regional integration arrangement based on regional integration co-ordination centres: an Eastern Africa Coordination Centre (to be based in Nairobi, Kenya); a Southern Africa Coordination Centre (to be based in Harare, Zimbabwe) and a Northern Africa Coordination Centre (to be based in Cairo, Egypt). These centres will act as the engine-heads of integration in COMESA and the focal points for COMESA-wide integration. The centres should be under the overall co-ordination of the COMESA Secretariat.
- Promote a culture of good political governance and uphold the rule of law. As already noted above, incidents of political instability and lack of a strong, rules-based legal environment have had a negative impact on regionalism in this region of the world.
- Encourage the emergence of complementarities in the region through promoting a broad auto-centric approach to development. While COMESA should continue seeking external markets, it should first start by unleashing the latent potential of its under-utilized market by encouraging increased regional production for increased regional consumption. To this end, and as already suggested above, COMESA should focus on improving its regional infrastructure, especially its transport and communication network so as to further boost regional trade and improve its overall economic performance. Additionally, COMESA should invest more in health and education as a means of increasing its regional and international competitiveness.

- Finally, COMESA should continue liaising with other regional integration arrangements and countries, especially those from the developing world to ensure that its socio-economic and political development agenda is not ignored at the multi-lateral level.

In light of the challenges above and the recommendations given thereof, what prospects does COMESA have in so far as promoting socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa is concerned? I offer a brief response to this question next.

(c) COMESA: Prospects for Eastern and Southern Africa's Development

Despite the challenges identified above, COMESA's prospects for promoting development in Eastern and Southern Africa look promising for a number of reasons. First, although COMESA's socio-economic and political development gains look minimal in comparison to the other regional integration arrangements, they are nonetheless important gains, especially given COMESA's level of integration⁶⁶⁸. Second, COMESA has laid out some important plans in terms of developing its transport and telecommunications sector. For example, in the transportation sector, COMESA has made impressive progress in liberalizing its skies and harmonizing its road and rail cross-border transportation procedures⁶⁶⁹. In the telecommunication sector, COMESA is in the process of building and installing a regional telecommunication network dubbed COMTEL⁶⁷⁰. All these measures are likely to boost COMESA's regional trading activities and therefore lead to increased economic growth.

Third, since the end of the Cold War, most COMESA states are breaking away from the shackles of repressive political regimes and embracing more democratic forms of governance. While this process is slow, and at times beset by retrogressive political developments (such as the current case in Mugabe's Zimbabwe and Kabila's DRC), overall, COMESA and Africa in general are moving away from the political horrors of Idi Amin, Mobutu SeSe Seko, Jean Bokassa, Mariam Mengistu that haunted Africa from the 1960s to the beginning of the 1990s. New mechanisms of moderating political conflict in Africa, such as a re-vitalized African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) are likely to ensure the non-emergence of such despicable

regimes⁶⁷¹. Additionally, as already mentioned above, political stability and normalcy are returning to Rwanda, Burundi and Sudan. The emerging political climate in COMESA is generally tranquil and therefore likely to foster COMESA's socio-economic and political development pursuits.

What is more, at the international level, the development concerns of some of COMESA's member states are being taken into consideration through, for example, the recent G8 debt cancellation for the least developed countries⁶⁷². Overall, the African agenda is being taken into account through such initiatives as Tony Blair's Commission for Africa and the United States of America's African Growth Opportunity Act⁶⁷³ and the EU's Everything But Arms (EBA) trade strategy⁶⁷⁴. Therefore, from the foregoing and as I have attempted to show throughout this thesis and while some challenges and limitations still exist, the contention that COMESA's has good prospects for bringing about socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa compared to other past development strategies is not far-fetched.

(iii) Summary and Conclusion

In this thesis, I have examined the political economy of regionalism by looking at regionalism and its viability as a strategy for Africa's socio-economic and political development. I started my discussion with a theoretical analysis of regionalism. Then next, I examined different theories of development and pointed out their inherent limitations before presenting some reasons why regionalism is a better development strategy for Africa than the other theoretical formulations on development. In exploring the viability of regionalism as a development strategy for Africa, I conducted a comparative analysis of the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA) versus the EU, NAFTA, MERCOSUR and ASEAN. It has been my contention that while all these regional integration arrangements are confronted by unique challenges and operate under different circumstances in their respective regions, a comparative analysis of these regional bodies exhibits certain trends and patterns that are closely related to their perceived degree of success as avenues for socio-economic and political development.

For example, from the comparative analysis of the regional integration arrangements in this study, it was found that the regions committed to a more holistic approach to development are the one that are, overall more successful. Hence, those regions that have invested more in the socio-economic dimension of development through committing more funds to health, education, research and development and in information telecommunications technology tend to have positive regional development input factors such as healthy citizens, innovative citizens and high-income earning citizens. The same trend is reflected in the political dimension of development, with those regional bodies boasting of higher levels of political freedoms and low levels of mal-governance (i.e. low levels of corruption) also being perceived as more successful. Going by the select data used in the comparative analysis of the regional integration arrangements in this study, COMESA's scores are comparatively lower than those of the other regional integration arrangements in most development categories except for Education and economic freedom where the scores are more or less similar for all the regional bodies.

While the scores from this comparative analysis have been useful in helping to identify some of the reasons for low regional integration success in COMESA, I have also identified other institutional, structural, infrastructural and international environment constrains to successful regionalism in this regional integration arrangement. Within this context, I made some recommendations and based on a number of reasons, argued that COMESA's has good prospects for bringing about socio-economic and political development in Eastern and Southern Africa.

Yes! It is true that compared to the other regional integration arrangements in this study, COMESA's developmental regionalism gains look minimal. However, within its present socio-economic and political capacity, COMESA has done fairly well. What is more, COMESA has put in place mechanisms to improve its performance and if, perchance, it takes the above recommendations into consideration, it is likely to improve on its performance even more. However, the greatest hope for COMESA comes from the fact that for the first time, COMESA (and indeed all the other regional integration arrangements in Africa) has a real chance of shaping its socio-economic and political

outcome in an environment that encourages less adversarial regional and multi-lateral cooperation. Before the end of the Cold War, such an environment was not really available and international politics, regional integration arrangements notwithstanding, was mainly shaped by the geopolitical interests of the US and the USSR. The Cold War era is over. The people of Africa and indeed the whole world are shaping their socio-economic and political fortunes under a different era—globalization. For many people and for many states in the international system, regionalism has become one of the main ways through which such fortunes are being determined. For the people of Eastern and Southern Africa, COMESA provides an appropriate vehicle through which the journey of developmental regionalism in a globalizing world is being taken.

ENDNOTES:

1. The literature on the role of regionalism as a strategy for development is mixed. While some scholars argue that regionalism is a better paradigm for development, especially in the post Cold War era of globalization, others disagree. Some of the literature on regionalism includes: Winham, Gilbert. 1999. "Regionalism and the Evolving Global Trade System" in Barry, Donald and Keith, Ronald C. (eds.), "Regionalism, Multilateralism and the Politics of Global Trade". Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp.54-70; Jouyet, Jean-Pierre. 2002. "Political Underpinning for Regional Integration" Paris: OECD, pp. 199-201; Hart, Michael. 1999. "A Matter of Synergy: Regional Agreements in the Multilateral Trading Order", in Barry, Donald and Keith, Ronald C. (eds.), "Regionalism, Multilateralism and the Politics of Global Trade". Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp.26-51; Coleman, William D. 1999. "Globalization, Regionalism and the Analysis of Domestic Public Policy", in Barry, Donald and Keith, Ronald C. (eds.), "Regionalism, Multilateralism and the Politics of Global Trade". Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp.71-91; Mansfield, Edward D and Milner Helen V. 1997. "The Political Economy of Regionalism: An Overview", in Mansfield, Edward D and Milner Helen V. (eds.) "The Political Economy of Regionalism". New York: Columbia University Press, pp.1-19; Hveem, Helge. 2000. "Explaining the Regional Phenomenon in an Era of Globalization" in Stubbs, Richard and Underhill, Geoffrey R.D (eds.), "Political Economy and the Changing Global Order" (2nd ed). Don Mills: Oxford University Press, pp 70-81; Mansfield, Edward D. and Milner, Helen V. 1999. "The New Wave of Regionalism". International Organization, Vol. 53, No. 3, pp. 589-627; and Vayrynen, Raimo. 2003. "Regionalism: Old and New". International Studies Review Vol. 5, pp. 25-51.
2. For some general discussion on this view, please see: Dunning, John H and Hamdani Khalil. 1997. "The New Globalism and Developing Countries". New York: United Nations University Press; Blanton, Robert G. 1996. "Diminished Giant or Vanguard for Liberalization? The U.S and the Regionalization of Trade". Political Research Quarterly, Vol. 49, No.4 pp. 783-805; Wyatt-Walter, Andrew. 1995. "Regionalism, Globalization and World Economic Order" in Fawcett, Louise and Hurrell, Andrew (eds.), "Regionalism in World Politics: Regional Organization and International Order". New York: Oxford University Press, pp. 37-74; Winham, Gilbert. 1999. "Regionalism and the Evolving Global Trade System" in Barry, Donald and Keith, Ronald C. (eds.), "Regionalism, Multilateralism and the Politics of Global Trade". Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp.54-70; and Coleman, William D. 1999. "Globalization, Regionalism and the Analysis of Domestic Public Policy", in Barry, Donald and Keith, Ronald C. (eds.), "Regionalism, Multilateralism and the Politics of Global Trade". Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, pp.71-91.
3. Phillips, Nicola. 2000. "The Future of the Political Economy of Latin America", in Richard and Underhill, Geoffrey R.D (eds.), "Political Economy and the Changing Global Order" (2nd ed). Don Mills: Oxford University Press, pp.284-293; Cerny, Phillip G. 2000. "Political Globalization and the Competition State", in Richard and Underhill, Geoffrey R.D (eds.), "Political Economy and the Changing Global Order" (2nd ed). Don Mills: Oxford University Press, pp. 300-309; Yoshida et al. 1994. "Regional Economic Integration in East Asia: Special Features and Policy Implications", in Cable, Vincent and Henderson David (eds.), "Trade Blocs? The Future of Regional Integration". London: The Royal Institute of International Affairs, pp. 59-101 and Shaw, Timothy M and Nyang'oro, Julius E. 2000. "African Renaissance in the New Millennium: From Anarchy to Emerging Markets?" in Richard and Underhill, Geoffrey R.D (eds.), "Political Economy and the Changing Global Order" (2nd ed). Don Mills: Oxford University Press, pp.274-283
4. For a good review of the international political system since the mercantilist era, please see Craig, Albert M. et al. 1996. "The Heritage of World Civilizations, Volume Two: Since 1500" (4th ed.) New Jersey: Prentice Hall
5. Isbister, John. 2001. "Promises Not Kept: The Betrayal of Social Change in the Third World". Connecticut: Kumarian Press, pp. 66-98 and pp. 101-140; and Hoogvelt, Ankie. 1997. "Globalization and the Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development". Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
6. Ibid.
7. Nye, Joseph S. 2000. "Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History" (3rd ed.). Don Mills: Addison Wesley Longman, pp.108-144.
8. The Non-Aligned Movement was formed out of a Conference held in 1961 in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. At this Conference, newly independent countries resolved to remain neutral in the West-East ideological divide. However, the idea of Non-Alignment did not translate into practice as most countries, in reality, either

supported the West or the East and some changed alliances depending on the political favour they were promised by the super powers.

9. See footnote 2 above

10. Asante S.K.B. 1996. *"The Strategy of Regional Integration in Africa"*. Accra: The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, p. 2-3.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid. pp. 1-77. See also, OECD. 2002. *"Regional Integration in Africa"*, a collection of articles on the state of regional integration in Africa.

14. Although the gains from regionalism are presently minimal, available literature indicates that regionalism offers better a better strategy to stem Africa's further marginalization from the global economy. Some of the literature includes: Kouyate, Lansana. 2002. *"The Prospects for Integration Have Improved"* Paris: OECD, pp141-146; Spicer, Michael. 2002. *"Globalization, Regional Integration, Economic Growth and Democratic Consolidation"*. Paris: OECD, pp 163-169; Abouyoub, Hassan. 2002. *"The Regional Approaches as a Liberating Factor"*. Paris: OECD, pp 177-180 and Jouyet, Jean-Pierre. 2002. *"Political Underpinning for Regional Integration"* Paris: OECD, pp. 199-201.

15. Ndongko, W.A. (ed.).1985. *"Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa"*. Dakar: CODESRIA; Nnoli, O. 1985. *"External Constraints of Pan-African Economic Integration"* in Ndongko, W.A. (ed.), *"Economic Cooperation and Integration in Africa"*. Dakar: CODESRIA, pp. 126-152; Asante, S.K.B. 1985. *"The Political Economy of Regionalism in Africa: A Decade of the Economic Community of West African States"*. New York: Praeger Publishers;

16. Piazzolo, Marc. 2001. *"Regional Integration in Southern Africa: Motor of Economic Development?"* pp. 1-36; Bourenane, Naceur. 2002. *"Regional Integration in Africa: Situation and Prospects"*. Paris: OECD, pp.17-46

17. For a good policy discussion on how to revive regionalism in Africa, please see OECD.2002. *"Regional Integration in Africa"*.

18. Most development theories have failed to yield any impressive levels of development because of two main reasons: First, the design, ownership and implementation of these theories have been solely in the hands of "external development experts". Second, political expediency, especially during the Cold War era, trumped the broader development goals in order to meet the short-term political gains of the major donor agencies and or governments. With the Cold War over, Regionalism is now a far much better option for Africa's development because it allows for the pooling of resources within the continent and also, the process is mainly driven by African leaders and policy-makers who are more likely to have a deeper understanding of the development needs of the region.

19. Kouyate, Lansana. 2002. *"The Prospects for Integration Have Improved"* Paris: OECD, pp141-146 and Jouyet, Jean-Pierre. 2002. *"Political Underpinning for Regional Integration"* Paris: OECD, pp. 199-201.

20. Asante S.K.B. 1996. *"The Strategy of Regional Integration in Africa"*. Accra: The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, p. 1-77.

21. Ibid.

22. The case of the EU is a good example here.

23. Asante S.K.B. 1996. *"The Strategy of Regional Integration in Africa"*. Accra: The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, p. 1-77; Tutty, Michael G. 2002. *"Enhancing Infrastructure in Africa"*. Paris: OECD, pp181-188; Alli, Nazir. 2002. *"Integration and Infrastructure in Africa"*. Paris: OECD, pp189-198.

24. Ibid.

25. Ibid.

26. Asante S.K.B. 1996. *"The Strategy of Regional Integration in Africa"*. Accra: The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, p. 1-77 and Goldstein, Andrea and Carlos Quenan. 2002. *"Regionalism and Development in Latin America: What Implications for Sub-Saharan Africa?"* Paris: OECD pp. 47-72

27. Mengistab Kidane. 1996. *"Globalization and Autocentricity in Africa's Development in the 21st Century"*. Asmara: Africa World Press, Inc.

28. Wallach, Lori and Sforza Michelle. 1999. *"Whose Trade Organization?" Corporate Globalization and the Erosion of Democracy."* Washington, DC: Public Citizen, pp. 100-130; Anderson, Kym. 2004. *"Trade Liberalization, Agriculture and Poverty in Low-Income Countries"* in Guha-Khasnosbis, Basudeb (ed.), *"The WTO, Developing Countries and the Doha Agenda: Prospects and Challenges for Trade-Led Growth"*. New York: Palgrave, pp. 37-38; Oxfam International. 2002. *"Rigged Rules and Double Standards: Trade, Globalization and the Fight Against Poverty"*. London: Oxfam International and Annan

- Kofi. 2001. *“Laying the Foundations of a Fair and Free World Trade System”*, in Sampson, Gary P. (ed.), *“The Role of World Trade Organizations in Global Governance”*. New York: United Nations University, pp 19-27;
29. Abouyoub, Hassan. 2002. *“The Regional Approaches as a Liberating Factor”*. Paris: OECD, pp 177-180 and Jouyet, Jean-Pierre. 2002. *“Political Underpinning for Regional Integration”* Paris: OECD, pp. 199-201.
30. Jackson, Winston. 1999. *“Methods: Doing Social Research”*. Scarborough: Prentice Hall, pp. 8-12.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. For a good analysis of the current socio-economic and political challenges in Africa, please see, Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *“African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999”*. New York. Cambridge University Press and Ayittey, George B.N. 1998. *“Africa in Chaos”*. London: Macmillan Press
34. The critical and interpretive approaches advocate for this kind of approach.
35. Ibid.
36. From the proceedings at COMESA’s annual summits, it is clear that the leaders of this region are committed to the idea of COMESA. Also, given the progress it has made so far, COMESA appears committed to the attainment of its socio-economic and political objectives.
37. Asante S.K.B. 1996. *“The Strategy of Regional Integration in Africa”*. Accra: The Friedrich Ebert Foundation, p. 1-77; Tutty, Michael G. 2002. *“Enhancing Infrastructure in Africa”*. Paris: OECD, pp181-188; Alli, Nazir. 2002. *“Integration and Infrastructure in Africa”* .Paris: OECD, pp189-198 and Bourenane, Naceur. 2002. *“Regional Integration in Africa: Situation and Prospects”*. Paris: OECD, pp.17-46
38. A good example of such values includes the EU’s commitment to reducing and ultimately eliminating its Common Agricultural Policy subsidies and its commitment to building regional integration capacity in Africa. See, Richelle, Koos. 2002. *“Europe’s Commitment to Coherent Regional Initiatives”*. Paris: OECD, pp. 157-161.
39. Some of the literature on third world development referenced in this thesis includes:
 Handleman, Howard. 2003. *“The Challenge of Third World Development”* (3rd Edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall; Martionussen, John. 1997. *“Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development.”* New York: Zed Books Ltd.; Mengisteab, Kidane. 1996. *“Globalization and Autocentricity in Africa’s Development in the 21st Century”*; Oxfam International. 2000. *“Rigged Rules and Double Standard: Trade, Globalization and The Fight Against Poverty”*; Sampson, Gary P. 2001. *“The Role of World Trade Organization in Global Governance”*. Hong Kong: The United Nations University; Rodrik, Dani. 1999. *“The New Global Economy and Developing Countries: Making Openness Work”*. Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press; Sen, Amartya. 1999. *“Development as Freedom”* New York: Archer Books; Ayittey, George B.N. 1998. *“Africa in Chaos”*. Hampshire: Macmillan Press Limited; Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *“African Economics and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999.”* Cambridge: Cambridge University press; Allen, Tim and Thomas, Allan. 2000. *“Poverty and Development into the Twenty-First Century”*. Oxford: Oxford University Press; United Nations Development Program. 2003. *“Making Global Trade Work for People”*. New York: Earthscan; Hoogvelt, Ankie. 1997. *“Globalization and The Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development”*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press; Isibister, John. 2001. *“Promises Not Kept: The Betrayed of Social Change in the Third World.”* Connecticut: Kumarian Press
41. Ibid.
42. Handleman, Howard. 2003. *“The Challenge of Third World Development”* (3rd Edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall, pp. 3-21.
43. Social, economic and political under-developments are some of the reasons for the low levels of regional integration in Africa.
44. Kouyate, Lansana. 2002. *“The Prospects for Integration Have Improved”* Paris: OECD, pp141-146
45. This is the case because the whole integration process depends on the political leaders, policy makers and other members of the civil society taking an active role in shaping the integration process to meet the national development needs within a regional context.
46. Ibid

47. See COMESA's Annual Report of 2004 for an outline of the benefits of political dialogue and confidence building in COMESA.
48. Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *"African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999"*. New York. Cambridge University Press and Ayittey, George B.N. 1998. "Africa in Chaos". London: Macmillan Press
49. Ibid.
50. Since the end of the Rwandan genocide, this region has continued to be home to intermittent acts of inter and intra-state political conflict.
51. The EU and NAFTA are some of the regions where political stability and development have brought about huge economic returns.
52. See COMESA Annual Report of 2004.
53. Ibid.
54. See OECD. 2004. *"Regional Integration in Africa"*
55. Handleman, Howard. 2003. *"The Challenge of Third World Development"* (3rd Edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall; Martinussen, John. 1997. *"Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development"*. New York: Zed Books Ltd and; Isibister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayed of Social Change in the Third World"*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
56. Ibid.
57. Ibid.
58. Isbister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayal of Social Change in the Third World"*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press pp. 31-63
59. Ibid.
60. Ibid.
61. Ibid.
62. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid.
65. Ibid.
66. See footnote 55 above
67. See footnote 58 above.
68. Ibid.
69. Ibid.
70. Ibid.
71. Ibid.
72. Ibid.
73. Ibid.
74. Ibid.
75. Ibid.
76. Ibid.
77. Martinussen, John. 1997. *"Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development"*. New York: Zed Books Ltd
78. Isbister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayal of Social Change in the Third World"*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press pp. 31-63
79. Ibid.
80. Ibid.
81. Ibid.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid.

84. Ibid.
85. Ibid.
86. Handleman, Howard. 2003. *"The Challenge of Third World Development"* (3rd Edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall
87. Isbister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayal of Social Change in the Third World"*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press pp. 31-63
88. Ibid.
89. Ibid.
90. Ibid.
91. Ibid.
92. Ibid.
93. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. *"The Capitalist World Economy"*. 1979. New York: Cambridge University Press.
94. Ibid.
95. Ibid.
96. Hoogvelt, Ankie. 1997. *"Globalization and The Post-Colonial World: The New Political Economy of Development"*. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press;
97. Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1979. *"The Capitalist World Economy"*. 1979. New York: Cambridge University Press.
98. Isbister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayal of Social Change in the Third World"*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press pp. 31-63
99. Ibid.
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
102. Ibid.
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. Martinussen, John. 1997. *"Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development"*. New York: Zed Books Ltd; and Isbister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayal of Social Change in the Third World"*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press pp. 31-63
106. Isbister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayal of Social Change in the Third World"*. Connecticut: Kumarian Press pp. 31-63.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid.
110. Handleman, Howard. 2003. *"The Challenge of Third World Development"* (3rd Edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall; Martinussen, John. 1997. *"Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development"*. New York: Zed Books Ltd and; Isibister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayed of Social Change in the Third World."* Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
111. Isibister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayed of Social Change in the Third World."* Connecticut: Kumarian Press, pp. 31-63.
112. Ibid.

113. Ibid.
114. Ibid.
115. Ibid.
116. Ibid.
117. Ibid.
118. And even in the so-called communist countries like Cuba, the impact of global capitalism is fast eroding the ideological base of the government.
119. Julius Nyerere's "Ujumaa" (Socialist) policies have been blamed for Tanzania's under-development. See also Van de Walle, Nicolas. 2001. *"African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis, 1979-1999"*. New York. Cambridge University Press; and Ayittey, George B.N. 1998. *"Africa in Chaos"*. London: Macmillan Press.
120. Isibister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayed of Social Change in the Third World."* Connecticut: Kumarian Press, pp. 31-63.
121. Ibid.
122. Ibid.
123. See endnote 119 above.
124. See endnote 120 above.
125. Ibid.
126. Ibid.
127. Ibid.
128. Ibid.
129. Ibid.
130. One of the most prominent theories advanced for the Asian Tigers rapid development is Japan's Developmental State model and the fact that the Asian Tiger's benefited from both emulating and or directly receiving assistance from Japan based on this model of development.
131. Handleman, Howard. 2003. *"The Challenge of Third World Development"* (3rd Edition). New Jersey: Prentice Hall; Martinussen, John. 1997. *"Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Development"*. New York: Zed Books Ltd and; Isibister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayed of Social Change in the Third World."* Connecticut: Kumarian Press.
111. Isibister, John. 2001. *"Promises Not Kept: The Betrayed of Social Change in the Third World."* Connecticut: Kumarian Press, pp. 31-63.
132. Ibid.
133. Since the development of the so-called Washington Consensus in 1992, the IMF and the World Bank have been on the forefront pushing for a new model of development in the third world based on Structural Adjustment Programmes (S.A.Ps)
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137. While the literature is mixed as to the success of IMF and the World Bank's development policies, there is an overwhelming consensus,(even among these institutions, and especially within the World Bank), that the SAPs have not delivered the desired levels of development to the third World. Part of the accusation has been that the policies emphasized by these institutions are more concerned with the economic dimension of development while ignoring the social and political dimension. Hence, the thinking

in the development world is slowly shifting to Amartya Sen's comprehensive approach to development as spelt out in: Sen, Amartya. 1999. *"Development as Freedom"*. New York: Anchor Books.

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261. Regionalism is a better strategy for development because, unlike other past theories, it places the responsibility for development squarely within the African context and requires that African leaders and other policy-makers formulate policies that will lead to the overall development of the continent. This reduces instances of “scape-goating” as has been the case in the past where African leaders blamed all the failures for Africa’s development solely on external forces.
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